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Abstract 
 
Spatial disparities in economic performance are amongst the most pervasive and 
persistent characteristics of modern economies. In the UK and across the EU, 
minimising regional inequalities is an objective of government policy. Yet analysis of 
how local differences in unemployment, earnings and industrial structure affect 
individual agents is not straightforward. Individual heterogeneity and sorting behaviour 
make separating the effects of agent attributes and regional characteristics difficult – a 
problem which is only compounded by the potential impact of unobserved individual 
heterogeneity.  
This thesis seeks to disentangle the effects of agent attributes – both observed and 
unobserved – from the effects of local labour markets in three individual level decisions 
made by graduates in the UK. The chapters examine (a) how agents choose which 
degree subject to study at university, (b) the determinants of postgraduate participation 
and (c) the likelihood of a graduate finding employment after completion. In this way, 
this thesis examines micro-level choices which affect the aggregate supply of skilled 
labour in the UK.  
The methodology I adopt permits conclusions to be drawn about how individual 
behaviour varies across observably different groups and offers insights into how local 
economic performance can shape the supply of skilled labour. I conclude that while 
agent attributes – including gender, ethnicity and prior academic attainment – are the 
most important determinants of an individual’s academic choices, economic 
circumstances have a significant, if smaller role to play. The results have several public 
policy implications, ranging from the impact of educational inequalities to the funding 
arrangements for postgraduate study in the UK. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Spatial disparities in economic performance are among the most pervasive and 
persistent characteristics of modern economies. In the UK and across the EU, 
minimising inter-regional inequalities is a central policy objective. Yet wide differences 
remain both within and between regions. In the UK in 2010, unemployment at the Local 
Authority level ranged between 2.9% in Surrey and 15.6% in Methyr Tydfil, while 
average full-time earnings varied from £10.90 per hour in Blackpool to £32.30 per hour 
in Kensington and Chelsea. Ranking Local Authorities by average full-time earnings 
reveals the persistence of these effects, as eight of the ten highest earning areas in 2002 
remained in the top ten eight years later.
1
  
 The evolution and impact of regional economic disparities is of significant 
interest to policy-makers and academics alike. Yet analysis of how local differences in 
unemployment, earnings and industrial structure affect individual agents is not 
straightforward. Individual heterogeneity and sorting behaviour have made separating 
the effects of agent attributes and regional characteristics difficult – a problem which is 
compounded by the potential impact of unobserved individual heterogeneity.  
This thesis seeks to disentangle the effects of agent attributes – both observed 
and unobserved – from the impact of local economic performance in three micro-level 
decisions concerning the formation and supply of skilled labour in the UK. Specifically, 
it examines the impact of individual and local economic characteristics on choices about 
(1) the type of training and (2) the level of training which individual students in higher 
education choose to acquire, as well as (3) the labour market outcomes which result. In 
                                                          
1
 Unemployment data is taken from the Labour Force Survey. Earnings data is taken 
from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings for 2010. These are nominal wage 
figures and consequently do not reflect differences in real incomes, which may be 
significantly smaller if the cost of living in high-wage areas is also higher. See Gibbons, 
Overman and Pelkonen (2011) for a discussion of wage disparities in Great Britain.  
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each of the following chapters, the methodology adopted is designed to control for 
several different forms of endogeneity bias. In common with a large body of literature 
in labour economics, special attention is paid to the role of selection effects and their 
potentially detrimental impact on parameter estimates. 
 To provide some context for the following three contributions, this introduction 
offers a brief overview of three foundational topics. Firstly, it reviews the literature on 
the relationship between human capital and individual economic outcomes. Secondly, it 
discusses the methods by which skilled labour and knowledge are thought to influence 
the concentration of economic activity. Thirdly, it summarises recent changes in higher 
education policy in the UK which provides important context. The final section draws 
together elements from each of these topics and provides a summary of the three 
subsequent chapters. A discussion of the limitations of the work and suggestions for 
future research are deferred to the concluding section of the thesis. 
 
1.1 Scientific context: Human capital and economic outcomes 
 
The importance of human capital for individual, local and national economic outcomes 
is now well established. Individuals who have larger stocks of human capital – broadly 
defined as their skills and experience, knowledge and ability – are thought to be more 
productive (Becker 1975), healthier (Silles 2009, Kenkel 1991, Grossman 1973, Perri 
1984), more likely to raise high-ability children (Currie and Moretti 2003, Oreopoulos, 
Page and Stevens 2003, 2006, Chevalier 2004, Black, Devereux and Salvanes 2004), 
less likely to suffer unemployment (Nickell 1979, Ashenfelter and Ham 1979, Mincer 
1991, Katz 1974) and are more highly paid (Hansen, Weisbrod and Scanlon 1970, 
Mincer 1974, Angrist 1995, Harmon and Walker 1995, Blundell et al. 2000) than 
individuals who are less well endowed. Specifying    as a variable which captures the 
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likelihood of one of these outcomes (better health or higher earnings for example) and 
   as an indicator of an individual i's human capital, labour economists think of    as an 
increasing function of    : 
 
         (1) 
 
 To estimate the returns to education empirically, many researchers have adopted 
a functional form based on Mincer (1974). In these regressions, a measure of earnings 
(  ) is regressed on years of education (  ), experience (    ) and its square, alongside 
a set of other control variables (  ): 
  
                        
          (2) 
 
In regressions such as (2), a positive and significant estimate of     is interpreted as 
evidence that additional schooling raises average earnings. However, several conceptual 
problems with this approach are now well known (Card 1999, Angrist and Krueger 
1999). Firstly, researchers may measure observed years of education with error, arising 
either where individuals mis-state their completed schooling or where the appropriate 
measure of education differs from that provided. Secondly, equation (2) assumes that 
each additional year of education has the same marginal effect on earnings and that the 
effect is constant across all individuals. However, several researchers have argued that 
the return to education may be non-linear: varying across qualification boundaries 
(school-leaving, undergraduate, postgraduate) and across types of individual (Card 
1999). 
Thirdly, unobserved individual attributes and selection effects present a series of 
challenges to empirical specifications such as (2). In particular, if there is a positive 
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correlation between the level of acquired schooling and an agent’s unobserved innate 
ability, cross-sectional ordinary-least squares (OLS) techniques may attribute the impact 
of both variables to the coefficient on schooling,   . Formally, the coefficient on 
schooling is attenuated by the covariance between the observed explanatory variable 
and the omitted variable. 
 All of these conceptual problems have required economists to use inventive 
methods to generate unbiased estimates of the return to education. To this end, some 
researchers have sought to control for unobserved ability directly. Using measures such 
as IQ, cognitive test scores, or scores from numerical and verbal reasoning tests (Altonji 
and Dunn 1995, 1996a, 1996b), these researchers assume that their new measures of 
ability capture the relevant, formerly unobserved variable for identification.  
Concern about the effectiveness of this strategy has encouraged other 
economists to adopt an instrumental variables approach, using information on quarter of 
birth (Angrist and Krueger 1991, Staiger and Stock 1997) or the proximity of 
educational establishments (Card 1995) as instruments for completed schooling. Still 
others have used regression discontinuity designs such as a change in compulsory 
schooling laws to instrument for acquired schooling (Harmon and Walker 1995) or 
historical events such as the Vietnam War (Angrist and Krueger 1992). In each case, 
researchers make the maintained assumption that their instrument does not affect their 
outcome of interest, except through its influence on obtained schooling. A third 
empirical approach involves identifying individuals who might plausibly have similar 
unobservable characteristics but who make different choices about their levels of 
education. Researchers using this approach often gather data on identical twins, as they 
share a common genetic inheritance and (often) the same family setting and upbringing 
(Griliches 1979, Ashenfelter and Rouse 1998, Ashenfelter and Krueger 1994, Miller et 
al. 1995).  
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 Those researchers who have sought to relate individual economic outcomes to 
the spatial context in which they are based must confront one further conceptual 
problem which complicates empirical analysis. These researchers usually begin with a 
reduced form similar to that of (2), and add information about individual i's area of 
residence, j, to the list of explanatory variables: 
 
                          
               (3) 
 
In equation (3),    is some variable of interest defined for the region in which the agent 
lives. If    captures the unemployment rate in area j, then    relates individual wages to 
unemployment in the individual’s region of residence. A positive, significant estimate 
of    would suggest that higher unemployment rates raise the wages of those in 
employment, while a negative estimate of    would indicate the reverse.  
 The conceptual difficulty with this approach is that it assumes individuals are 
randomly assigned to regions. In this case, a regression such as (3) produces consistent 
and unbiased estimates of the impact of regional unemployment on wages. However, if 
agents sort into areas of residence based on unobserved characteristics which also affect 
their wage, then the    coefficient is also likely to suffer from endogeneity bias 
(Gobillon, Selod and Zenou 2007, Dujardin, Selod and Thomas 2008). In this case, the 
OLS procedure has difficulty distinguishing between the impact of living in the region 
and the impact of the characteristics which encouraged the individual to sort into the 
region.   
 Controlling for the impact of selection into particular spatial areas is still 
relatively rare in the empirical economics literature, although a growing number of 
researchers are beginning to consider its potentially detrimental impact on parameter 
estimates. In their examination of wage inequality in Great Britain, Gibbons, Overman 
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and Pelkonen (2011) include controls for selection into areas of residence. They 
conclude that regional economic effects contribute little to earnings disparities after 
controlling for selection into particular regions. Dahl (2002) examines the returns to 
education in the United States and explicitly models the individual’s location choice, 
arguing that skilled individuals will tend to move towards states offering high returns on 
their investment in human capital. He concludes that not controlling for selection into 
different spatial areas tends to over-state the return to education. Finally, Moretti (2011) 
examines real wage differences between high- and low-ability groups and the share of 
high-ability residents in cities in the United States. He concludes that failing to control 
for price differences across geographical locations tends to over-state the real wage 
premium associated with high-level qualifications. 
 
1.2 Regional economic disparities and empirical approaches 
 
While a broad range of empirical difficulties have beset attempts to identify the effects 
of schooling on wages, a large literature has sought to relate average skill levels in a 
given spatial area to aggregate economic outcomes. In urban economics and economic 
geography, concentrations of skilled workers are thought to bring about stronger 
economic performance at the local level. Areas which have larger stocks of human 
capital are thought to be more innovative (Faggian and McCann 2009) and better able to 
absorb new knowledge following a shift in the technological frontier (Faggian and 
McCann 2006, Acs et al., 2007; Falvey et al., 2007). A renewed interest in the 
economics of space (Krugman 1991) has led economists to revisit the early 
contributions of Alonso (1964), Weber (1909) and Hotelling (1929), and to develop 
increasingly elaborate models to explain the concentration of economic output in space, 
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as well as inter-regional trade flows (Fujita, Krugman and Venables 2001) which 
conflict with neo-classical notions of competitive economics (Starett 1978).  
Alongside the direct effects of the skills of the resident population, economists 
have proposed a range of non-market methods by which skills and knowledge affect 
local economic outcomes. ‘Jacobs’ inter-industry (Jacobs 1969) and Marshall-Arrow-
Romer (MAR) intra-industry knowledge spillovers (Döring and Schnellenbach 2006, 
Henderson, 2003; Jaffe et al., 1993, Moreno et al., 2005; LeSage et al., 2007, Moretti 
2004) have been used by several researchers to help explain the willingness of firms and 
workers to locate in cities. Still other economists argue that concentrations of human 
capital can become self-perpetuating, as workers resident in these concentrations learn 
new skills from the other individuals with whom they interact (Glaeser 1999, Glaeser 
and Maré 1994, Glaeser et al. 1992).   
At the national level, models of economic growth suggest that nations which 
invest in the skills of their workforce have the potential to develop more quickly. 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) argue that investing in human capital has the potential 
to increase the level of income in a country, while endogenous growth theory (Lucas 
1988, Romer 1990, Jones 2004) relates the rate of technological advance to the ratio of 
skilled to unskilled workers. In these models, larger stocks of human capital may 
enhance not only the level, but also the long-term steady-state growth rate of an 
economy.  
As with empirical investigations of the impact of education at the individual 
level, estimates of many of these hypothesised effects are plagued by equally, if not 
more serious conceptual problems. Firstly, aggregating up the Mincerian wage equation 
to a regional level produces an equation such as (4), where    and    capture average 
regional wages and the averaged observed characteristics of the resident population 
respectively.     and   reflect the average years of schooling and the average level of 
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ability in region r respectively, while    reflects the marginal contribution to regional 
average income of an additional average year of education.  
 
                      (4) 
 
As in equation (2), a positive estimate of    is considered to be evidence of a 
positive relationship between average wages and average years of schooling. However, 
as is made clear by the inclusion of  , equation (4) suffers from a similar form of 
endogeneity bias as equation (2). If the average level of innate ability and average years 
of schooling are correlated, estimates of    are biased as before.   
Secondly, when estimated using cross-sectional data, equation (4) will fail to 
take into account the likely reverse causation which exists between the wage growth and 
average years of schooling. While concentrations of highly skilled individuals may 
increase average incomes, higher average incomes will tend to attract skilled individuals 
who wish to earn a higher wage. In the short term, areas with growing wages would 
expect to see the inward migration of skilled labour. In the longer term, these workers 
may be supplemented through ‘home grown’ human capital, generated as school leavers 
respond to the greater local return to education.  
 This discussion makes clear that both at an aggregate and at an individual level, 
estimating the effects of schooling and human capital on economic outcomes is far from 
straightforward. While the majority of studies have found that there are significant, 
positive returns to education both at the individual and local levels, doubt remains about 
the magnitude of this effect. Empirical work in this area suffers from several different 
forms of potential bias arising from sorting behaviour.  
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1.3 Higher education policy reform in the UK 
 
The primary focus of the three papers in this thesis is the impact of individual, academic 
and local economic characteristics on graduate choices about the type and level of 
training they obtain and the labour market outcomes which result. This section provides 
a brief over-view of recent changes to higher education policy in the United Kingdom, 
which forms the context for much of the work that follows. 
 Higher education in the United Kingdom has undergone rapid change over 
recent decades, both in terms of the aggregate size of the sector and the mechanisms by 
which teaching is funded. Between 2000/01 and 2010/11, the total number of 
undergraduates at UK institutions increased from 1.54m to 1.91m, while the total 
number of postgraduates increased by more than 31% from 448,695 to 588,720. 
Although the number of overseas students has increased significantly over this time 
period, the majority of the increase in numbers at undergraduate level has come from 
greater participation among students domiciled in the UK: the number of these students 
increased by 19.4% between 2000/01 and 2010/11 (HESA 2011).  
According to HEFCE (2010) the growing numbers in higher education are 
attributable to both demographic changes and an increase in the take-up rate among 
school-leavers. The participation rate of young people in higher education has increased 
steadily between 1995/96 and 2009/10, rising from 30% to 36%, although wide 
differences remain in the participation rates of individuals from different economic 
backgrounds. HEFCE (2010) reports that participation among young people from the 
most disadvantaged backgrounds increased from 13% to 19% over this period, while 
participation among students from the wealthiest neighbourhoods increased from 50% 
to 57%.  
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  Examining trends in participation over a much longer time-frame indicates that 
the recent period of growth is exceptional. Using data from the Labour Force Survey, 
Dolton and Lin (2011) find that the university entrance rate remained relatively static 
for males between the late 1960s and the early 1990s. For female students, participation 
increased gradually over this time period. Coinciding with both an economic downturn 
and the introduction of the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) 
examinations, a significant change took place at the start of the 1990s. Wyness (2010) 
presents data on participation rates between the early 1960s and the present day, which 
suggests that the participation rate grew from just 5% in 1963 to 17% in 1990, but more 
than doubled to 42% by 2006.
2
 Both Blanden and Machin (2004) and Greenaway and 
Haynes (2003) report that the total number of students in higher education (UK 
domiciled and overseas, undergraduate and postgraduate, full-time and part time) 
increased from 400,000 in 1960 to more than two million in 2000.  
 The expansion of the higher education sector has placed growing demands on 
the public exchequer, which governments since the early 1990s have been increasingly 
unwilling to meet. Prior to 1990, undergraduate students in the UK enjoyed higher 
education free at the point of use. As a means of encouraging the growth of a skilled 
labour force, the publicly-funded Local Education Authorities paid the tuition fee 
associated with each individual’s programme and provided a maintenance grant to help 
cover living costs.  
                                                          
2
 Wyness (2010) acknowledges a break in the participation rate series in 2001. Prior to 
2001, participation was measured using the Initial Entry Rate (IER), which was defined 
as the number of students aged 18 to 30 entering higher education for the first time, 
expressed as a proportion of the total population of these age groups. The IER was 
discontinued in 2001 and replaced with the Higher Education Initial Entry Participation 
Rate (HEIPR). This measure was calculated as the number of students aged 18 to 30 
who enter higher education for the first time and are still studying six months later, as a 
proportion of the 18 to 30 year old population. Both measures differ from the Youth 
Participation rates presented in HEFCE (2010), which are calculated as the percentage 
of students aged 18 and 19 who enter higher education for the first time. 
20 
 
 Following the introduction of mortgage-style, interest-free student loans in 1990 
which partially replaced maintenance grants, three sets of reforms have taken place 
which have gradually shifted the burden of financing away from the general tax-payer 
and onto individual students. The first of these occurred after the publication of the 
Dearing Report in 1997. The report made some 93 recommendations, among which was 
the introduction of means-tested, up-front tuition fees of £1,000 for all undergraduate 
courses from September 1998 onwards. These fees reflected an estimated 25% of the 
costs of educating an undergraduate and were seen as a means of channelling greater 
funding to universities from the private sector (Wyness 2010). Maintenance grants were 
cut and replaced with an expanded system of interest-free, income-contingent loans 
which students repaid as a fraction of their salaries above £10,000. 
  The growing number of students in higher education, concerns about access for 
poorer students and the rising costs of this system led to a further set of reforms 
embodied in the Higher Education Act 2004. The single, centrally-set, up-front 
undergraduate tuition fee was abolished and institutions were given the ability to vary 
fees up to a cap of £3,000. Payment of these fees was deferred until after graduation 
through a further expansion of the student loans system. Students would now repay their 
loans at a marginal rate of 9% once they reached an income of £15,000. A regulatory 
body, the Office for Fair Access, was created to ensure that universities remained 
accessible to students from all backgrounds and a set of tax-financed scholarships were 
established. Maintenance grants were re-introduced for students from poorer 
backgrounds and a series of access obligations were placed on universities who wanted 
to charge the maximum rate. 
 The third and most recent set of reforms represent the most radical changes to 
university funding of recent times. As set out by Barr (2010) in response to the Browne 
Review (Browne 2010), the cap on tuition fees will be lifted from £3,000 to £9,000 to 
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allow greater scope for competition among providers.
3
 The level of public subsidy for 
undergraduate teaching will be significantly reduced and the system of income 
contingent loans will be expanded to allow for the increase in fees. The threshold at 
which repayment begins will also be lifted from £15,000 to £21,000, although the zero 
real interest rate is to be abolished. While the introduction of these reforms has been 
controversial, it remains too early to assess their impact. The funding of postgraduate 
study has remained relatively static over this time period and is reviewed in more detail 
in a subsequent chapter.  
 
1.4 Contributions and context 
 
The preceding sections provide the context and motivation for the following 
contributions. Drawing together empirical and theoretical research in the economics of 
education field with the institutional arrangements for higher education in the United 
Kingdom, the papers of this thesis seek to address three questions about the supply of 
highly skilled labour in the UK. In each case the methodology adopted is designed to 
correct for a range of potentially biasing effects, allowing closer identification of the 
extent to which individual, academic and local economic characteristics condition agent 
behaviour.  
The first of the three contributions offers a micro-level examination of degree 
choice, considering how individual agents choose which academic field to study at 
university. While the debate about whether qualifications enhance, or simply signal, 
                                                          
3
 Some critics of the Higher Education Act 2004 argued that the low level of the cap on 
tuition fees inhibited institutions from competing for students on the basis of price. The 
vast majority of institutions responded to the Act by setting the price for all their 
courses at the capped level, eliminating the effect of competition on tuition fees. By 
lifting the price ceiling, the most recent set of reforms are intended to create scope for 
greater price differentiation and to encourage the creation of a market for higher 
education. 
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human capital remains unresolved (Spence 1973, Stiglitz 1975), empirical evidence 
suggests that students of different academic subjects have different labour market 
experiences and career paths (Dolton and Makepeace 1990, Blundell et al. 2000). These 
differences raise questions about how students choose their area of specialism. Building 
on prior work, a large micro-level dataset and a detailed classification of academic 
subjects are used to identify the impact of individual, academic and local economic 
characteristics on the probability of taking each subject. The primary contributions of 
this paper include (1) a more detailed study of degree choice than has previously been 
carried out, involving larger sample sizes and a more detailed classification of academic 
subjects, (2) a more rigorous empirical approach to selection into secondary schools, 
controlling for all time-invariant, unobserved characteristics of each school attended and 
(3) a more carefully specified examination of local economic effects, controlling for 
selection into different labour market areas of residence. The results suggest that 
individual, academic and local economic factors all play a significant role in 
determining students’ degree specialism. 
The second paper assesses the probability that an undergraduate chooses to 
progress to a postgraduate degree. Having considered the nature of the skills students 
choose to acquire in the first chapter, this paper examines the academic level to which 
students from different backgrounds study. Special attention is given to the role of 
postgraduate tuition fees in determining demand for courses beyond undergraduate 
level. The primary contributions of this paper include (1) introducing a large, new 
dataset of postgraduate tuition fees by subject and institution which was developed 
through extensive data collection, (2) a detailed examination of participation above 
undergraduate level, identifying the influence of individual, academic and local 
economic characteristics, (3) the development of a strategy designed to control for the 
endogeneity of postgraduate fees and (4) a more rigorous study of postgraduate 
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participation than has previously been carried out, including controls for endogenous 
selection into university courses and areas of residence. The results suggest that 
postgraduate fees, socio-economic group, academic performance and local economic 
conditions all play a role in determining progression probabilities. 
Graduate labour market outcomes in the context of differences in local economic 
characteristics are examined in the final paper. Drawing on previous work, this third 
paper models both the probability that graduates find employment after completing their 
studies and the probability that they needed their degree for their first labour market 
position. The primary contributions of this paper include (1) a critical discussion of 
previous work in the field of ‘over-education’ with a particular focus on empirical 
approaches and methodologies, (2) a contextual framework which highlights the 
empirical challenges of future work in this field and (3) an assessment of the probability 
of a graduate finding (a) employment and (b) employment commensurate with their 
qualifications in the context of differences in individual, academic, parental and local 
economic characteristics. The results suggest that all four groups of variables have a 
significant impact on graduate labour market outcomes and provide some evidence that 
the well-documented advantages of being born in wealthy circumstances stretch beyond 
education and into the labour market.  
The concluding section of this thesis draws on the results of all three papers to 
provide a summary of my findings. It discusses the limitations of the work presented 
here and offers thoughts for further work. 
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2. Geography or Economics? A micro-level analysis of the determinants of degree 
choice in the context of regional economic disparities in the UK 
 
It is now widely accepted that human capital has an important impact on economic 
outcomes at the individual, local and national levels. Individuals who have more human 
capital are thought to be more productive (Becker 1975), less likely to suffer 
unemployment (Nickell 1979, Ashenfelter and Ham 1979, Mincer 1991, Katz 1974) and 
are more highly paid (Hansen, Weisbrod and Scanlon 1970, Mincer 1974, Angrist 1995, 
Harmon and Walker 1995, Blundell et al. 2000) than individuals who are less well 
endowed. Regions with strong workforce skills are thought to absorb new knowledge 
more easily and innovate more readily (Faggian and McCann 2006) and economies with 
larger human capital stocks are thought to grow more quickly (Midelfart-Knarvik, 
Overman and Venables 2001, Glaeser et al. 1992). 
Although the debate over whether qualifications enhance human capital or 
simply signal higher ability remains unresolved (Spence 1973, Stiglitz 1975), there is 
evidence that individuals with degrees in different subjects have different labour market 
experiences. Dolton and Makepeace (1990) and Blundell et al. (2000) find that 
graduates who undertake degrees in economics and law earn significantly more than 
individuals with qualifications in other subjects. Bratti, Naylor and Smith (2005), Bratti 
and Mancini (2003) and Fengliang et al. (2009) confirm these results. Dolton and 
Makepeace (1990) also find evidence that the subject studied strongly affects which 
industry a graduate enters, and Department for Education and Skills (DFES) (2004) 
finds evidence that career paths within a chosen industry can vary significantly between 
disciplines. 
While these results suggest that degree specialism can influence labour market 
outcomes, the opposite may equally hold: that labour market outcomes can influence 
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training decisions and, more specifically, can influence degree specialism. While 
students may choose the subject which maximises the expected return on their 
investment in higher education, their expectations are likely to be based on the earnings 
and employment experience of their friends, family or community. As a result, the link 
between degree subject, industry of employment and subsequent career progress also 
presents a potential insight into how graduates perceive and respond to labour market 
signals. Despite the importance of this link for individuals and firms, relatively few 
papers have explored subject choice at university level and related the choice to local 
labour market conditions. 
This paper seeks to address this deficiency through a micro-level study of degree 
choice among graduates from British universities between 2004/05 and 2008/09 and 
makes several contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, it uses a detailed set of 19 
subjects to allow a systematic examination of individual, academic and parental 
influences on degree choice. Secondly, it considers degree choice in the context of local 
labour market conditions to assess whether local patterns of employment, wages and 
worklessness affect students’ decisions. Thirdly, it uses a dataset composed of multiple 
cross-sectional surveys to identify the effect of individual, academic, parental and 
economic characteristics in a linear probability model with travel to work area (TTWA) 
and school level fixed effects, controlling for several potential sources of endogeneity. 
The analysis shows that individual and academic characteristics, such as gender, 
ethnicity and prior academic attainment, strongly affect degree choice. I also find 
evidence of endogenous residential and school selection and that local labour market 
signals encourage individuals to take up particular degrees in preference to others.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2.1 presents a review of 
the existing literature. Section 2.2 sets out the empirical framework. Sections 2.3 and 
2.4 present the methodology and data respectively and Section 2.5 presents the results. 
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Section 2.6 details my robustness checks and the limitations of my work, while Section 
2.7 offers some conclusions. 
 
2.1 Literature review 
 
The expansion of higher education in the UK and a growing interest in spatial 
economics has led to a number of papers exploring the effect of local economic 
conditions on investment in human capital (Rice 1999, 2000, Gibbons and Vignoles 
2009). However, recent contributions to the subject choice literature have ignored the 
effect of local labour demand conditions on students’ choice of degree. This section will 
first survey these recent contributions before examining how economic conditions can 
influence the decision to invest in human capital. 
 
2.1.1 Choice of degree subject 
 
Although the literature on subject choice at university level is relatively small, several 
recent contributions have sought to estimate how individual, academic and parental 
characteristics shape students’ decisions.  
Davies and Guppy (1997) use micro-level data from the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth in the United States to examine the factors which lead students to enter 
relatively ‘lucrative’ fields.4 Through a series of ordinary least squares and logistic 
regressions they estimate the expected return to a degree subject and examine how 
gender, ethnicity, socio-economic background and ability (measured by a series of tests 
of reasoning and knowledge) affect the probability of a student choosing to study in a 
relatively high-return field. They conclude that male students and students with higher 
                                                          
4
 Davies and Guppy (1997) define ‘lucrative’ fields in terms of the expected earnings of 
graduating students. 
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measures of ability are more likely to enter lucrative fields, as are students from the 
lower socio-economic groups. Davies and Guppy (1997) find no evidence of significant 
ethnic group effects. 
Simpson (2001) focuses explicitly on trends in subject choice among students 
from different ethnic groups. Using the High School and Beyond national longitudinal 
survey in the United States, Simpson estimates a series of multinomial logistic 
regressions for Asian, African, European, Hispanic and Native American students who 
choose among five broad subject areas. Conditional on gender, family background and 
income, prior academic training and some measures of ‘cultural capital’, Simpson finds 
significant differences in choice of college major between ethnic groups. Asian 
Americans are more likely to study Health and Life Sciences than European and 
Hispanic Americans, and less likely to study Business or Public Service majors than 
African Americans. European Americans are more likely to take a Liberal Arts major 
than African Americans. Simpson (2001) also finds that females are significantly less 
likely to take a Technical major (such as Computer Science, Engineering, Mathematics 
or Physics) than males. Prior academic attainment, parental income and type of school 
attended are all found to influence subject choice in different ways for each ethnic 
group. 
Van de Werfhorst et al. (2003) use a similar methodology to assess subject 
choice among British students. Using longitudinal micro-level data from the National 
Child Development Study, they estimate a multinomial logistic regression in a choice of 
six subjects (Medicine and Law, Engineering, Science, Economics, Social Studies and 
Arts) conditional on family background, ability, prior academic attainment and 
measures of ‘economic’ and ‘cultural capital’. They conclude (1) that students choose 
subjects in which they have performed comparatively well, (2) that students who 
perform well in reading tests are more likely to take degrees in Social Studies or Arts 
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and that (3) students who are relatively good at maths are more likely to take 
Engineering, Science or Economics degrees. Van de Wefhorst et al. (2003) also find 
that although students from wealthy backgrounds are more likely to take degrees in Law 
and Medicine, there is little other evidence of large and significant differences by socio-
economic class.  
Montmarquette et al. (2002) also start by estimating a series of multinomial 
logistic regressions in subject choice. Using Canadian micro-data from the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth, they examine the factors which determine college major 
among a choice of four subject areas (Business, Liberal Arts, Science and Education). 
To control for differences in future earnings across degree types, Montmarquette et al. 
(2002) use reported student expectations to estimate expected income for each student. 
They conclude that gender and expected income are important determinants of degree 
choice.  
While multinomial logistic regressions are an attractive method of estimating 
students’ choices among several subjects, the method imposes the Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives assumption (IIA). This assumption requires that the probability 
of each outcome is a function of the characteristics of that outcome and independent of 
changes in the characteristics of the alternatives. If this assumption fails, then the 
probability of one outcome may be correlated with the probability of another, leading to 
inconsistent parameter estimates. In the context of the subject choice literature this is a 
particular concern, as students with particular skills may be more suited to a subset of 
academic subjects. Students with strong language skills, for example, may be more 
likely to take a languages degree than Mathematics, but the probabilities of them taking 
a degree in French, German or Italian are likely to be correlated. This problem becomes 
more acute as classifications which involve more disaggregated subject typologies are 
utilised. 
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Two researchers have sought to relax the IIA assumption by adopting an 
alternative estimation strategy. Both Montmarquette et al. (2002) and Bratti (2006) 
estimate multinomial probits in their examinations of subject choice in an attempt to 
model the error structure more carefully. These studies allow the probability of taking 
different subjects to be correlated. Bratti (2006) provides a useful measure against 
which to examine the results presented in this paper. Using British micro-data from the 
Universities Statistical Record for each cohort entering university between 1981 and 
1991, Bratti (2006) estimates a multinomial probit in three subject choices: (1) ‘Non-
quantitative subjects’ (including Social Studies, Communications, Languages, Creative 
Arts and Education, excluding Economics), (2) ‘Quantitiative subjects’ (including 
Sciences, Engineering, Architecture and Economics) and (3) Law and Medicine. 
Bratti’s primary focus is on patterns of subject choice among students from different 
socio-economic backgrounds, conditional on age, gender, prior academic attainment and 
school type. He concludes that gender and prior academic attainment are important 
determinants of degree choice, but finds no effect of socio-economic class.  
 
2.1.2 Local economic conditions 
 
Despite these relatively recent and sophisticated contributions to the literature on 
subject choice, none of the above papers incorporate spatial and local economic effects 
on students’ decisions. Local economic conditions are likely to affect the individual’s 
choice through two mechanisms. Firstly, levels of wages and unemployment help to 
determine the opportunity cost of a course of study. If wages are high and 
unemployment low, then the cost of study in terms of forgone wages is relatively high. 
Conversely, students whose local labour markets can be characterised by low wages and 
high unemployment are likely to see a course of study as less costly. As a result, a 
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stronger local economy may actually deter investment in human capital through a steady 
supply of well-paid jobs (Rice 1999, 2000). 
 Secondly, local labour market demand may inform students about the 
availability of employment opportunities in the short term. Students may respond to the 
expansion of a particular local industry by seeking to acquire a qualification which will 
allow them to access employment opportunities in that industry. Conversely, students 
may choose not to take qualifications which lead to employment in an industry which is 
in decline. In both cases, recent labour market developments and the implied likelihood 
of finding employment in the short-term influence degree choice. 
Longer-term perceptions of the relative risks and returns of different subject 
specialisms may also be inferred from local economic conditions. Students from areas 
in which the wage premium attached to a specific degree is particularly high (low) may 
be more (less) drawn to a particular subject. To the extent that they are observed or 
inferred by individual students, differential rates of worklessness between qualification 
groups may also affect the attractiveness of particular academic courses. In these cases, 
local labour market trends may help students to form expectations about the varying 
career paths associated with particular degree subjects.  
Growing interest in spatial economic issues has steadily increased the level of 
sophistication with which papers have approached the estimation of these effects. 
Pissarides (1981) includes national unemployment rates and wage ratios in his 
aggregate analysis of the rate of ‘staying-on at school’ and concludes that national 
unemployment (for men) and wages (for men and women) affect the post-compulsory 
schooling participation decision.
5
 Whitfield and Wilson (1990) also find that national 
unemployment plays a role in determining whether students choose to remain in 
                                                          
5
 Pissarides (1981) is interested in the pay-off to further education and so includes the 
ratio of average wages in high occupational groups (for which an FE degree is a 
qualifying criterion) to average wages in low occupational groups (which do not require 
an FE qualification).  
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education after age 16, while McVicar and Rice (2000) attribute some of the increase in 
further education participation during the 1990s to higher national unemployment rates. 
In each case, poorer macroeconomic conditions increase the probability of participation. 
Developing this approach, subsequent papers have sought to relate economic 
conditions at the student’s point of domicile to their education decisions, attempting to 
capture the ‘relevant market’ to which a student is responding. The wide differences in 
economic performance within the UK are a powerful argument in favour of this shift 
(Gibbons, Overman and Pelkonen 2010, Gibbons, Overman and Resende 2010). Rice 
(1999) finds that unemployment at the local authority level affects participation 
decisions – although it has greatest impact on relatively poorly qualified males. Rice 
(2000) confirms these results, but adds that poorly qualified males from ethnic 
minorities are less affected by local labour market signals than poorly qualified white 
males. Rice (1999) also concludes that a higher ratio between the earnings of 
managerial and manual occupations tends to increase participation in further education 
– highlighting the potential for greater expected returns to encourage investment in 
human capital. 
 
2.1.3 Variation in the return to a degree 
 
There is a wealth of evidence which suggests that on average, there is a relatively large 
pecuniary return to holding a higher education qualification.
6
 Blundell et al. (2000) 
report that holding a degree increases the probability that an individual is in work at age 
22 and find that starting salaries among these individuals are significantly higher than 
for those who opted not to invest in a degree. Office for National Statistics (2003) and 
                                                          
6
 A discussion of the empirical difficulties of estimating the returns to education – 
including the appropriate counterfactual and unobserved characteristics – is included in 
the introduction and is returned to in Section 4.1. 
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Dolton and Makepeace (1990) conclude similarly that in spite of the increased supply of 
well-qualified individuals, the return to a degree remains large and significant.  
At a more detailed level these papers also suggest that the return to a 
qualification depends on the subject of the degree. Blundell et al. (2000) find evidence 
that graduates of economics, accounting and law earn significantly more than graduates 
of other subjects after controlling for individual characteristics. Dolton and Makepeace 
(1990) also find that starting salaries and subsequent earnings vary significantly across 
subjects. Their study of the cohort graduating in 1980 found that starting salaries ranged 
from £5,116 per year for law graduates to £8,518 for engineering students and that 
earnings six years after graduation ranged from £9,607 per year for sociology students 
to £16,460 for graduates in computer science. Bratti, Naylor and Smith (2005), Bratti 
and Mancini (2003) and Fengliang et al. (2009) all find similar evidence of significant 
differences in the return to degrees of different subjects, both in terms of immediate 
starting salaries and earnings some years later. Although there are likely to be large non-
pecuniary benefits to some courses of study, such wide differences in the return to a 
degree raise questions about how graduates choose their subject of study.  
 
2.2 Empirical framework 
 
The empirical framework for this analysis draws on a simple, adapted model of 
investment in human capital (Rice 1999). The present discounted value of the expected 
net benefit, B, of an individual, i, taking a degree subject, d, at a university, U, is given 
by: 
 
                         (1) 
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Where    captures the present discounted value of the expected lifetime consumption 
path where the individual acquires the degree and    captures the expected lifetime 
consumption benefits of entering employment, less the pecuniary and other costs of 
working.    reflects the tuition costs associated with acquiring the degree while        
captures the psychic costs of acquiring the degree to the individual, which depend on 
the individual’s personal, academic and parental characteristics,   . If       < 0, it 
follows that subject d is excluded as a possible subject of study. Note that participation 
will only take place if, for at least one subject,      > 0.  
While tuition fees may play a role in determining the probability of participation 
in tertiary education (Dynarski 2003, 2005, Kane 2003, 2004, Dearden et al. 2011, 
Dolton and Lin 2011), an assessment of their impact on subject choice is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Tuition fees for undergraduate study in the UK were capped by the 
Higher Education Act 2004. In an effort to establish a market for higher education, the 
same Act afforded universities the right to charge reduced fees where they felt 
appropriate. Yet, in practice, all but one institution chose to charge the maximum 
amount,
7
 which in this context means that the tuition costs of any two subjects are 
effectively identical, except where the lengths of the degree courses differ. As a 
consequence, I neglect differences in undergraduate tuition fees from the following 
analysis. 
In common with other models of revealed choice, the workings of this model are 
largely unobserved. The two elements which are observed are (1) the participation 
condition: individuals will choose to attend university if at least one subject offers a 
strictly positive expected return, and (2) the final choice of subject. As the data used in 
this paper only includes students who have chosen to participate the conclusions drawn 
                                                          
7
 The only institution not to do so was Leeds Metropolitan University, which offered 
courses at a discounted rate between 2006/07 and 2008/09 (Times Higher Education 
2011). 
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here are necessarily limited to those who choose to enter higher education. 
Consequently, the findings of this paper shed light on the factors determining subject 
choice conditional on participation, but cannot be applied to school leavers as a whole 
with precision. 
 
2.3 Estimation issues and strategy  
 
The primary empirical objective of this paper is to explore the determinants of degree 
choice at the individual level. Building on the framework set out above, the empirical 
strategy uses a micro-level discrete choice model to examine how individuals choose 
the academic field of their undergraduate degree. Two estimation issues complicate this 
approach. 
 
2.3.1 Estimation issues 
 
The first of these two estimation issues arises out of a process of endogenous residential 
selection (Dujardin, Selod and Thomas 2008). The essence of this problem can be 
simply stated like this: suppose we are interested in the effect of unemployment in an 
individual’s home town on his propensity to take a science degree. To proceed we run a 
regression of the binary ‘science degree indicator’ against the local unemployment rate. 
A significant coefficient is interpreted as evidence in favour of some form of a 
relationship.  
However, suppose that the individual chose to live in his town because of some 
unobserved characteristic – high ability, for instance – which means he prefers to live in 
an area with low unemployment. In this case the estimated coefficient would reflect 
both the influence of that unobserved characteristic – ability – and the local 
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unemployment rate. In these circumstances the estimated parameter captures both the 
effect of the local unemployment rate and the effect of the unobserved attribute.
8
  
To some extent this problem is mitigated by the fact that in most cases it is the 
parents, not the individual students, who have chosen their residential location prior to 
university. Consequently, the difficulty is really a problem of endogenous residential 
selection one generation removed. To help control for this problem, papers examining 
spatial labour market mismatch have used the employment experiences of young 
workers living at home, whose residential location was chosen by their parents 
(Dujardin, Selod and Thomas 2008). However, because it is widely thought that parents 
pass on many of their characteristics to their children there is still a risk that parameter 
estimates will be influenced by residential sorting. 
The second estimation issue concerns the school attended. Previous work by 
Simpson (2001) and Bratti (2006) suggests that school type is an important determinant 
of subject choice, as students from Private schools are found to have a greater 
propensity to do some subjects than students from State schools. At least two effects 
may undermine parameter estimates in this setting. Firstly, analogously to the argument 
set out above, suppose students select into particular school types based on an 
unobserved attribute – musical ability, for example – which also influences their degree 
choice. In this case, the parameter estimate on a given school type would capture both 
the effect of the school and the effect of the unobserved musical ability.
9
 Secondly, 
variation in school resources, class-sizes, teacher quality or ethos may all have an 
impact on subject choice and consequently should enter the specification. Variables 
                                                          
8
 Formally, the estimated coefficient on local unemployment would be attenuated by the 
covariance between the unobserved attribute – ability – and the unemployment measure.  
9
 Analogously to the earlier case, the formal problem is that the coefficient on school 
type is attenuated by the covariance between the observed school type and the 
unobserved attribute – musical ability. 
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which are wholly or partly unobservable – arguably including teacher quality or school 
ethos – present a particular problem.  
Research elsewhere also suggests that there is significant variation in higher 
education outcomes and behaviour within school types. Smith and Naylor (2005) find 
that males (females) who attended an Independent school are 6.5% (5.4%) less likely to 
attain a ‘good’ degree at university, but on closer inspection they find significant 
variation between the highest- and lowest-performing Private schools. Relative to 
(average) State school students and conditional on personal, academic and parental 
characteristics, males (females) who attended the best Independent schools are 7% 
(13.3%) more likely to achieve a good degree, while those at the worst performing 
Independent schools are 17.8% (18.7%) less likely to achieve a good degree. More 
cause for concern about within school type variation is derived from recent education 
policy reforms which have encouraged schools to specialise in particular areas such as 
‘performing arts’, ‘science’ and ‘sports’. These changes may have influenced school 
level trends in applications to take some degree types, particularly where different State 
schools have specialised in different subject areas. As a consequence, a simple set of 
‘State’ and ‘Private’ school dummies may not be sufficient to reliably identify the true 
school level effect.  
 
2.3.2 Estimation strategy 
 
To mitigate these problems and to explore the determinants of degree choice 
systematically, this paper implements two levels of investigation. In the first part a 
linear probability model is implemented (Angrist and Krueger 1999, Kuhn and 
Weinberger 2005) for each of the 19 subject areas of the form: 
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                                (2) 
 
This specification, based on (1), states that the probability of taking a degree subject, d, 
is a function of the future consumption benefits of the degree,       , and the psychic 
costs of taking the degree,   . The subscripts i, j, s and t index individuals, labour 
market areas, schools and time respectively. 
As these quantities are not observed directly, several variables are used as 
proxies. Following prior work (Rice 1999, 2000), the return to a degree is modelled as a 
function of local labour market conditions, including employment by industry, earnings 
and the local unemployment rate. Note that by including labour market conditions 
across the range of industrial sectors, this makes no assumptions about the career path 
or employment choice that individuals make after completing their studies, but allows 
estimation of how labour market signals from a range of different industries affect 
degree choice through their impact on the expected return. 
The relative psychic costs of a degree are also unobserved and must be 
accounted for by another set of proxy variables. Individual characteristics including age, 
gender and ethnicity, prior academic attainment and type of school attended, as well as 
parental socio-economic class are included to try to model the systematic components 
of this variable. This specification provides a baseline set of results. 
The second level of analysis involves a set of linear regressions of the form:  
 
                                            (3) 
 
Equation (3) outlines a similar strategy: to regress the indicator for each subject 
against individual, academic and parental characteristics as well as local economic 
conditions. However, this time a full set of fixed effects are introduced for each travel to 
work area (TTWA) of domicile,   , for each school attended,   , and for each cohort,   . 
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This amounts to using the multiple cross-section nature of the data to allow each school 
and each TTWA of residence before university to have a single, intercept shifting effect 
on the probability of taking a particular subject. In this specification the return to a 
degree is identified using changes in local economic characteristics rather than level 
effects. 
Introducing these arrays of fixed effects helps to control for some of the 
selection effects outlined above, but involves three additional identifying assumptions. 
Firstly, to control for endogenous residential selection, I assume that all individuals 
from a given TTWA have a common, time-invariant set of unobserved characteristics 
which influence (1) their location decision and (2) their degree specialism. Specifying 
an array of domicile TTWA fixed effects allows areas of residence to have a single, 
intercept-shifting impact on the probability of taking a given subject. TTWAs are 
defined by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) using census data on commuter 
flows. They identify geographical areas in which the majority of individuals both reside 
and work and consequently more closely reflect the geography of the labour market 
than administrative boundaries. This paper uses the 1998 TTWA edition from the ONS, 
which is based on commuting data from the 1991 census and identifies 297 TTWAs 
across England, Wales and Scotland. This allows the analysis to move towards a more 
causal interpretation of the coefficients on local labour market conditions, to the extent 
that the unobserved characteristics of individuals from the same area are both common 
and time-invariant.
10
   
Secondly, fixed effects for each secondary school are introduced to partially 
control for (1) endogenous sorting into schools and (2) differences in school resources. 
                                                          
10
 If the set of common unobservable characteristics associated with a particular TTWA 
varies over time, then the analysis carried out here remains susceptible to the impact of 
endogenous residential selection. Tabulations of observable characteristics for each 
TTWA suggest this risk is small, but this is essentially an un-testable, maintained 
assumption. 
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Analogously to the TTWA fixed effects, this allows attendance at each secondary 
school to have a single, intercept-shifting impact on the probability of taking a given 
degree subject. There are roughly 5,000 registered secondary schools in the UK, of 
which some 4,127 (4,459) appear in the dataset for males (females). As before, this 
requires the assumption that both relative school resources and school sorting have an 
essentially time-invariant impact on subject choice probabilities. 
A third and final maintained assumption is introduced regarding the impact of 
unobserved ability. As detailed measures of ability are not available, this analysis 
includes measures of performance in school-leaving exams (A level tariff point score). 
For identification, either (1) this variable must capture any aspects of student ability that 
are relevant for degree choice or (2) those components of unobserved ability that 
influence degree choice must be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables in the 
regression. Both versions of this maintained assumption are quite strong. I return to the 
question of unobserved individual heterogeneity in Section 2.6.  
The simple linear regression approach adopted for this paper represents a 
compromise between the desire to model subject choice in as detailed a manner as 
possible and the need for a consistent and computationally achievable method of 
estimation. As set out above, previous work in the field has used a multinomial 
specification to model students’ choices among relatively few degree specialisms from 
relatively small samples. Bratti (2006) utilises the most coherent empirical framework 
of the work surveyed here, using a multinomial probit to relax the IIA assumption, yet 
limits his analysis to three broad subjects. However, because this paper seeks to model 
students’ choices among a more detailed set of nineteen academic fields, to incorporate 
a large number of fixed effects and to utilise a relatively large dataset, the multinomial 
probit is computationally infeasible. To compensate for the well-known short-comings 
of the linear approach I adopt, the regressions were run with clustered standard errors 
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based on the TTWA of domicile. However, this framework requires me to assume that 
students compare a particular degree subject relative to the average of all other courses. 
This is a key limitation of the paper which I return to in Section Six. 
Finally, to check the robustness of the analysis and to ensure the results did not 
arise from the nature of the model adopted, a series of logistic regressions were also run 
for each subject (excluding fixed effects), but the findings were not significantly 
different to those based on the ordinary least squares approach in the first part. A series 
of fixed effect conditional logit regressions were also run for a subset of subjects and 
students, which yielded similar results to the second part of the analysis presented here. 
 
2.4 Data 
 
The data used in this paper come from a wide range of sources, linked together using 
the student’s reported postcode district of domicile.11  
 
2.4.1 Individual level data 
 
The student level data used in this paper are drawn from the Destination of Leavers 
from Higher Education (DLHE) survey provided by the Higher Education Statistics 
Agency (HESA 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009) which has been used and analysed 
extensively elsewhere (Faggian and McCann 2006, 2009, Faggian, McCann and 
Sheppard, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, Naylor and Smith 2004, Smith and Naylor 2005).
12
 The 
DLHE is a survey of graduates from universities in the UK six to nine months after they 
leave higher education. It includes a wealth of information on their previous schooling, 
                                                          
11
 There are 2,971 postcode districts currently in use in the UK.  
12
 Data from the Higher Education Statistics Agency is available from www.hesa.ac.uk. 
HESA cannot accept responsibility for any inferences or conclusions derived from the 
data by third parties. 
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their academic attainment at school and at university, as well as a range of individual 
characteristics such as age, gender and ethnicity. The dataset also includes geographical 
information at the postcode district level which details where the student lived before 
they went to university.  
In addition to information about the individual student, the dataset also includes 
indicators provided by the University and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS). These 
variables provide the socio-economic classification of the student’s household prior to 
starting university.  
As the primary aim of this paper is to assess how students make their choice of 
degree subject, the target population is restricted to full-time undergraduates completing 
their first-degree between 2004/05 and 2008/09, who were domiciled, educated and 
attended university in Great Britain. Limiting my work to students aged between 20 and 
24 at graduation who held A-level or equivalent qualifications before commencing their 
degree studies yields a target sample of 764,680 individuals.  
From this target group, I remove several other groups because of missing or 
unmatchable data. Firstly, students who study joint degree programmes complicate the 
analysis of ‘subject choice’. As the DLHE dataset provides information about how 
much of a student’s degree was devoted to a particular subject, only students who spent 
at least half of their time on one subject area are included. Students who split their time 
equally between two subjects were dropped. This ensures that the sample only includes 
individuals who have made a specific subject choice. Secondly, students who do not 
report which school they attended or who do not provide an A-Level tariff score are 
dropped. Finally, student’s whose postcode district of domicile could not be confidently 
assigned to a single TTWA were also dropped.
13
 This leaves a sample of 574,210 
                                                          
13
 Students were assigned to a domicile TTWA using their reported domicile postcode 
district. This method linked 60% of the final sample to a single domicile TTWA. Where 
postcode districts did not map directly into TTWAs, data on the number of 17, 18 and 
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individuals. An analysis of the individuals who were dropped suggested that the lower 
socio-economic groups are slightly over-represented, as are students with poorer than 
average A-level results. However, these differences are relatively slight and the age, 
gender and ethnic profiles of these students are broadly similar to that of the sample as a 
whole. 
Summary statistics for included students from all five cohorts combined are 
reported in Table 2.1. Taken together, there are 24.7% more females in the sample than 
males and more than 80% of all students are white. A slightly higher proportion of 
males were educated at Private schools than females, and 52% of the students surveyed 
had parents in Professional and Managerial occupations.  
Finally, the individual level data also provided information about the subject 
each student chose to study at university, broken down into the 162 subject codes of the 
Joint Academic Classification of Subjects (JACS). These were aggregated to the 20 
JACS2 subjects (see Appendix 2A for more details) for reasons of practicality. Table 
2.2 provides information about the number of students taking each subject. For males 
the most popular subjects are Mathematics, Social Studies, Biological Science and 
Engineering, which account for more than 40% of male students. The most popular 
subjects among female students are Biological Science, Social Studies, Art & Music, 
and Degrees Related to Medicine, which together account for 43% of female students. 
The greatest differences between men and women are the in the proportions taking 
Mathematics and Engineering (which are more popular with male students) and 
Biological Science and Degrees Related to Medicine (which are more popular with 
female students). 
                                                                                                                                                                          
19 year olds normally resident in each Output Area from the 2001 census was used to 
generate the likelihood of an individual coming from each possible TTWA. 0.9% of the 
final sample is dropped because of uncertainty about their domicile TTWA. Of those 
remaining, 92% can be assigned to a single TTWA with greater than 80% certainty. 
86% can be assigned to a single TTWA with greater than 90% certainty. Further tests 
were carried out to ensure that the results are robust to different methods of attribution.  
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2.4.2 Local economic data 
 
In addition to the DLHE, a wide range of data from different sources was included to 
generate information about the local economy at each individual’s point of domicile. 
Using the postcode district of domicile as a spatial reference, data at the TTWA level 
was included on a range of labour market conditions. As discussed above, TTWAs are 
defined by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) using census data on commuter 
flows and more closely reflect the geography of the labour market than administrative 
Table 2.1: Summary statistics of student characteristics 
 Male Female 
 
Frequency % Frequency % 
Total 255,590  318,620  
Ethnicity     
 White 211,350 82.7 263,765 82.8 
 Black 4,870 1.9 8,445 2.7 
 Asian 28,060 11.0 33,330 10.5 
 Other 7,330 2.9 9,720 3.1 
 Unknown 3,980 1.6 3,360 1.1 
Schooling     
 Private 43,960 17.2 44,385 13.9 
 State 210,865 82.5 273,205 85.7 
 Unknown 765 0.3 1,030 0.3 
Parent’s socio-economic class     
 Higher Managerial & Professional 62,935 24.6 73,305 23.0 
 Lower Managerial & Professional 71,265 27.9 89,955 28.2 
 Intermediate  30,520 11.9 38,405 12.1 
 Small Employers  15,115 5.9 20,220 6.3 
 Lower Super. & Technical  10,520 4.1 13,750 4.3 
 Semi-routine  20,665 8.1 27,760 8.7 
 Routine, Unemployed 9,190 3.6 12,900 4.0 
 Unknown 35,380 13.8 42,325 13.3 
Disability classification     
 Some form of Disability 12,955 5.1 15,060 4.7 
 None Reported 242,635 94.9 303,565 95.3 
Note(s): (1) 44.5% (55.4%) of the sample are male (female). Numbers are rounded to nearest 5. (2) Source: 
Higher Education Statistics Agency, Destination of Leavers from Higher Education Survey, 2004/05-
2008/09 
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boundaries. I use the 1998 TTWA boundaries from the ONS, which are based on 
commuting data from the 1991 census and identify 297 TTWAs across England, Wales 
and Scotland. 
 Several different indicators of local economic performance are included in my 
analysis. Firstly, the extent of unemployment is measured using the number of 
claimants of the Job Seekers Allowance, which was drawn from the Department for 
Work and Pensions datasets. Secondly, average full-time hourly earnings were extracted 
from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. Thirdly, the industrial composition of 
Table 2.2: Subject choice and gender 
Subject Males % Females % Total 
Combined Degrees 735 0.3 1,715 0.5 2,450 
Other Languages 1,065 0.4 1,700 0.5 2,765 
Veterinary Science 1,390 0.5 3,460 1.1 4,845 
Education 2,375 0.9 15,175 4.8 17,545 
Mineral Technology 2,500 1.0 1,410 0.4 3,910 
European Languages 2,765 1.1 7,515 2.4 10,275 
Medicine & Dentistry 4,850 1.9 7,735 2.4 12,585 
Architecture 7,645 3.0 3,345 1.1 10,990 
Communications 7,900 3.1 12,125 3.8 20,020 
Medicine Related 8,370 3.3 26,980 8.5 35,350 
Lang., Ling. & Classics 8,755 3.4 23,600 7.4 32,355 
Law 12,325 4.8 22,845 7.2 35,170 
Art & Music 18,255 7.1 30,755 9.7 49,010 
History 18,265 7.1 20,435 6.4 38,700 
Physical Science 20,645 8.1 14,670 4.6 35,315 
Engineering 21,615 8.5 3,090 1.0 24,705 
Biological Science 25,015 9.8 48,420 15.2 73,440 
Social Studies 26,935 10.5 31,685 9.9 58,620 
Mathematics 29,935 11.7 9,880 3.1 39,815 
Note(s): (1) Numbers are rounded to nearest 5. (2) Source: Higher Education Statistics Agency, Destination 
of Leavers from Higher Education Survey, 2004/05-2008/09 
 
 
 
54 
 
the local workforce was measured using employment in twelve sectors from the Annual 
Business Inquiry (See Appendix 2A for Industries included). Finally, to control for 
differences in the size of the potential workforce, data on the size of the working age 
population was included from the ONS’s Mid-Year Population Estimates. All these 
variables were defined at the TTWA level and entered in log form. 
 
2.5 Results 
 
The primary aim of this paper is to explore the determinants of degree choice at the 
individual level in the context of local economic conditions. To assess these 
empirically, two levels of investigation were carried out. First, a series of linear 
probability models were estimated in the probability of taking a particular subject as a 
function of individual, academic, parental and local economic characteristics as set out 
in (2) above. In these regressions, a significant coefficient on a local economic variable 
is interpreted as evidence of some kind of relationship between labour market signals 
and the probability of taking a particular subject. This estimation provides a baseline set 
of results. 
The second level of analysis involved the estimation of a further set of linear 
probability models, this time including a full set of fixed effects for the student’s 
residential location prior to university and the school which they attended, as detailed in 
(3). This represents a much ‘harder test’ for the local economic variables, as the fixed 
effects control for local factors which remain unchanged through time. The full results 
of this second part are reported in Appendix 2B. Each pair of columns in Appendix 2B 
represents a regression for a different subject including individual, academic, parental 
and local economic characteristics. Results are reported separately for men and women. 
Results from the first level of analysis, which does not include these sets of fixed 
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effects, are reported in Appendix 2C. As there are many common findings between 
these two sets, the discussion is focussed on the preferred set of results which include 
fixed effects. An analysis of the differences between the simple OLS and the OLS with 
fixed effects is deferred until Section 2.6. 
Before proceeding to the full results, Table 2.3 underlines the importance of 
running the analysis for males and females separately. An initial set of pooled 
regressions were run for each subject, conditioning on individual, academic, parental 
and local economic characteristics as well as a gender dummy variable and the full set 
of explanatory variables interacted with the gender dummy. Column (1) reports the 
coefficient on the Female dummy variable from these regressions. The estimated 
coefficients suggest that conditional on a wide range of other variables, female students 
are more likely to take degrees in Biological Science (+32.6%), Engineering (+32.1%) 
and Language, Linguistics & Classics (+29.6%), but less likely to take degrees in 
Medicine & Dentistry (-27.8%), Mathematics (-23.8%) and Physical Science (-17.7%). 
Some of these relatively large effects correspond with the descriptive statistics 
presented in Table 2.2: more than three times as many males take Mathematics than 
females, while females outnumber males in Language, Linguistics & Classics by more 
than two to one. However, several results confound the simple descriptive statistics. The 
difference between men and women in Engineering in particular is surprising: there are 
more than six times as many male engineers as female engineers in my sample, yet the 
coefficient on the female dummy variable is large, positive and statistically significant.  
Part of the cause of this effect is shown in the third column of Table 2.3, which 
shows the results of F-tests for the joint significance of all explanatory variables 
interacted with the female dummy. While the coefficient on the female dummy is 
insignificant at the 5% level in nine subject regressions, the results of F-tests on the 
exclusion of the female interaction terms are significant at the 1% level for all subjects. 
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Table 2.3: Gender effects 
Subject Female T-Stat F-Test 
Medicine & Dentistry -0.278*** -7.76 32.61*** 
Mathematics -0.238*** -3.18 198.35*** 
Physical Science -0.177*** -3.71 54.77*** 
Art & Music -0.160*** -3.08 23.03*** 
Business Studies -0.150* -1.89 22.43*** 
European Languages -0.133*** -3.93 32.79*** 
Medicine Related -0.079 -1.42 100.82*** 
Social Studies -0.065 -0.99 58.16*** 
Veterinary Science -0.046** -2.3 10.45*** 
Mineral Technology -0.025 -1.47 15.69*** 
Other Languages -0.016 -1.44 2.17*** 
Architecture 0.029 1.03 79.93*** 
Communications 0.068* 1.78 19.48*** 
History 0.073 1.55 11.90*** 
Education 0.086 1.49 72.56*** 
Law 0.166*** 4.02 51.35*** 
Lang, Ling & Classics 0.296*** 6.04 70.93*** 
Engineering 0.321*** 3.32 197.66*** 
Biological Science 0.326*** 4.56 75.17*** 
Note(s): (1) Results reported from a set of regressions of the probability of taking each subject against 
personal, academic, parental and local economic characteristics, where all the explanatory variables have 
also been interacted with a dummy variable taking a value one for female students, zero otherwise. Column 
1 shows the estimated coefficient on this female dummy variable and Column 2 shows the t-statistic 
associated with that coefficient. Column 3 shows the result of a F-Test on the joint significance of the 
interacted terms. (2) *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
This suggests that the ‘female effect’ cannot be limited to a dummy variable and that the 
included variables have different impacts on male and female students. As a result, the 
following analyses were conducted separately for men and women. 
 
 
 
 
57 
 
2.5.1 Ethnicity and disability 
 
Although prior work in this area has been limited, among the strongest results from 
Simpson’s (2001) analysis suggested patterns of subject choice varied significantly 
among ethnic groups. The models estimated here confirm these results and add detail to 
the nature of these different choices. 
Taken from Appendix 2B, Panel A of Figure 2.1 shows the estimated coefficient 
on the Asian dummy variable for men and women for nineteen subjects. The dotted 
lines illustrate the 95% confidence intervals (based on clustered standard errors)
14
 
around these coefficients and demonstrate the significance of the estimates in all but one 
subject (Social Studies). As the results of the baseline and fixed effects estimation were 
very similar, Figure 2.1 shows the results from the preferred, fixed effects analysis. 
Asian males are significantly more likely than white males to take Mathematics 
(+7.5%), Business Studies (+7.0%) and Degrees Related to Medicine (+6.7%) and less 
likely to take degrees in History (-6.4%), Art & Music (-6.0%) and Physical Science (-
4.1%). Similar, significant differences between Asian females and White females are 
also evident, which broadly mirror the choices of Asian males. Asian females are more 
likely to take Degrees Related to Medicine (+7.1%), Law (+6.8%) and Business Studies 
(+6.7%), and less likely to take degrees in Art & Music (-7.1%), History (-4.5%) and 
Languages, Linguistics & Classics (-4.3%) than White females. 
As should be clear from this discussion, conditional on family, academic and 
economic characteristics, being Asian appears to be associated with a particular pattern 
of subject choice irrespective of gender, as the same effects are evident for both men 
 
                                                          
14
 Standard errors are clustered on the TTWA of domicile to control for the spatial 
aspects of the error structure and to deal with heteroscedasticity in the linear probability 
model. 
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Figure 2.1: Effect of  ethnicity on subject choice 
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Note(s): (1) Dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals, based on standard errors clustered on domicile travel-to-work-areas 
Panel B: Black students 
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and women. Mathematics, Business Studies and Degrees Related to Medicine appear to 
attract Asian students more than White students, while conversely, History and Art & 
Music both appear less attractive to Asian students. However, in some cases the 
difference between Asian and White females is of a different magnitude to the 
difference between Asian and White males. Asian females, for instance, are more likely 
to do Law relative to White females, than Asian males relative to White males. As a 
result, the pattern of subject specialisation appears to be deeper than simple ethnic 
groups, with individuals of different gender and ethnic groups specialising in different 
ways.  
The fixed effects results for Black students are similarly significant (Panel B), 
but suggest a different pattern of subject specialisation. Black males are more likely 
than white students to take Business Studies (+5.8%), Law (+5.3%) and Degrees 
Related to Medicine (+4.2%) and less likely to take degrees in History (-5.8%), Art & 
Music (-4.1%) and Physical Science (-3.8%). Black females are more likely to take Law 
(+9.6%), Business Studies (+5.0%) and Degrees Related to Medicine (+4.6%) and less 
likely to take Art & Music (-4.9%), Language, Linguistics & Classics (-4.9%) and 
Education (-4.5%) than White females.  
However, as with Asian students, the results also suggest that there are strong 
intra-ethnic group differences between men and women. The difference between Black 
and White males and Black and White females varies particularly strongly for Law and 
Education. The size and significance of these results varies very little with the inclusion 
of the fixed effects.  
Figure 2.2 shows the impact of having a disability on the probability of taking 
particular subjects. Once again, the OLS and OLS with fixed effects results are largely 
consistent. Having a disability has a relatively small effect on subject choice and 
appears to affect men and women in largely the same way. The only exceptions to this 
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result are the coefficients for Art & Music, Law, Business Studies and Language, 
Linguistics and Classics. Reporting a disability, either physical or mental, is associated 
with a significantly higher probability of taking an Art & Music degree for both males 
(+2.4%) and females (+4.0%), and a significantly lower probability of taking a Business 
Studies degree (-2.6% and -2.8% for males and females respectively). As can be seen in 
Figure 2.2, the effect of disability is statistically significant for several other subjects, 
but relatively small in magnitude. 
 
2.5.2 Parental background and schooling 
 
Beyond the individual’s personal characteristics, the results indicate that parental and 
academic characteristics also have a bearing on degree choice, although their effect 
varies from subject to subject. The non-fixed effects results suggest that for men 
(women), coming from a higher occupational background is associated with a lower 
probability of studying Business Studies, Communications, Art & Music or Education 
-4% 
-2% 
0% 
2% 
4% 
6% 
B
u
si
n
es
s 
S
tu
d
ie
s 
S
o
ci
al
 S
tu
d
ie
s 
L
an
g,
 L
in
g 
&
 C
la
ss
ic
s 
E
n
gi
n
ee
ri
n
g 
L
aw
 
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 L
an
g.
 
M
at
h
em
at
ic
s 
M
ed
ic
in
e 
&
 D
en
ti
st
ry
 
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
s 
B
io
lo
gi
ca
l 
S
ci
en
ce
 
O
th
er
 L
an
gu
ag
es
 
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 
A
rc
h
it
ec
tu
re
 
M
in
er
al
 T
ec
h
n
o
lo
gy
 
M
ed
ic
in
e 
R
el
at
ed
 
H
is
to
ry
 
V
et
er
in
ar
y 
S
ci
en
ce
 
P
h
ys
ic
al
 S
ci
en
ce
 
A
rt
 &
 M
u
si
c 
Figure 2.2: Effect of  disability on subject choice 
Male Female 
Note(s): (1) Dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals, based on standard errors clustered on domicile travel-to-work-areas 
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(Business Studies and Education), and a higher probability of studying Medicine & 
Dentistry and Social Studies (Medicine & Dentistry, Veterinary Science,  Architecture 
and History).  
In the second set of results, which include domicile travel to work area fixed 
effects, the magnitude of these coefficients is reduced, but they remain significant in 
many cases. Male (female) students with Higher Managerial or Professional parents are 
1.2-1.5% (1.2%-1.8%) more likely to study Medicine & Dentistry and 1.1%-1.9% 
(0.6%-2.1%) less likely to take a Business Studies degree than students from less 
wealthy occupational groups. Students from poorer backgrounds appear to be both 
relatively more likely to take degrees in Education, and relatively less likely to take 
History degrees. The findings also broadly echo Micklewright’s (1989) conclusion that 
women’s decisions appear more affected by parental background than men’s, based on 
both the magnitude and significance of the two sets of estimated coefficients. However, 
the results are not consistent with the earlier findings of Bratti (2006) and Davies and 
Guppy (1997) who found no significant impact of socio-economic background.    
To incorporate the effects of prior academic attainment on choice of subject, 
four dummy variables were used to describe the individual’s A-level point score relative 
to the rest of their cohort. These were defined as achieving a point score (1) less than 
one standard deviation below the mean, (2) between one standard deviation below the 
mean and the mean, (3) between the mean and one standard deviation above the mean, 
and (4) more than one standard deviation above the mean. The reference category 
excluded from the regressions was a point score between the mean and one standard 
deviation above the mean and the coefficients on the remaining three variables are 
shown in Appendix 2B. Panel A of Figure 2.3 shows the results for males. They suggest 
that poor academic attainment at A-level (defined as a point score below the mean) is  
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Figure 2.3: Effect of  prior academic attainment on subject choice 
Low Medium-Low High 
Panel A: Males 
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Note(s): (1) High is here defined as having a Tariff point score more than one standard deviation (s.d.)above the mean, Medium-Low 
is defined as being between the mean and one s.d. below the mean and Low is defined as a tariff point score less than one s.d.below 
the mean. (2) All coefficients significant at conventional levels except those points which are 'white-filled' and listed here. (3) For 
males, all coefficients significant at conventional levels except Social Studies (High), Medicine Related(High) and Other Languages 
(Medium-Low), Veterinary Science (High), History (High), Mathematics (Medium-Low). (4) For females, all coefficients significant at 
conventional levels except Medicine-Related (Medium-Low), Other Languages (Medium-Low), European Languages (High), 
Architecture (Medium-Low) and Engineering(Low), Mathematics (Low). 
Panel B: Females 
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associated with a higher probability of taking a Business Studies, Biological Science or 
Art & Music degree. Male students who achieve a point score less than one standard 
deviation below the mean point score are 7.8% more likely to take a Business Studies 
degree and 3.2% more likely to take an Art & Music degree than males who achieved 
point scores between the mean and one standard deviation above the mean.  
By contrast, male students who achieved among the highest point scores are 
more likely to study Mathematics, Medicine & Dentistry, Law and Physical Science 
than individuals with lower point scores. Taking the coefficient estimates together, 
males who performed best in their cohort are 13.4% less likely to take a Business 
Studies degree and 4.8% less likely to take a degree in Art & Music compared to the 
lowest performing students. Conversely, the results suggest that the best performing 
males are 4.9% more likely to take a degree in Medicine & Dentistry and 5.5% more 
likely to take Law than the lowest performing male students. 
Panel B of Figure 2.3 shows the equivalent set of results for females, which 
mirrors many of the effects evident for males. Female students who performed 
relatively poorly at A-level are more likely to undertake degrees in Business Studies, 
Education and Art & Music, while those performing at the very highest levels are more 
likely to take Law, Medicine & Dentistry, Mathematics and Language, Linguistics & 
Classics. Based on these results, high performing female students are 4.6% less likely to 
take an Arts & Music degree, 8.2% less likely to take an Education degree and 10.1% 
less likely to take a Business Studies degree than the lowest performing female students. 
Conversely, they are 6.8% more likely to take a Law degree, 5.8% more likely to take a 
Language, Linguistics & Classics degree and 4.0% more likely to take a History degree. 
The non-fixed effects results also suggest that school type plays a role in 
determining subject choice. Relative to attending a State school, Figure 2.4 shows that 
attending a Private school significantly affects the probability of taking 16 of 19  
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subjects shown for both males and females. Private schooling is associated with a 
higher probability of taking Social Studies, History and Languages, Linguistics & 
Classics for both males and females, and associated with a lower probability of taking a 
degree in Art & Music, Mathematics and Communications.  
The strength of these school type effects in the baseline results are consistent 
with the findings of Simpson (2001) and Bratti (2006), but also support a more detailed 
investigation of how schools influence subject choice. This was carried out in the 
second analysis using fixed school and domicile effects. For males, fixed effects for 
some 4,127 schools and 297 TTWAs were estimated. For females the analysis included 
4,459 schools and 297 TTWA effects. Table 2.4 details the F-statistics associated with a 
test of the significance of the estimated school fixed effects (columns one and four), the 
significance of the TTWA effects (columns two and five) and the joint significance of 
both the school and TTWA effects (columns three and six). For males, school and 
domicile TTWA characteristics appear to make a significant contribution to all but one  
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Figure 2.4: Effect of  Private schooling on subject choice 
Male Female 
Note(s): (1) Dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals, based on standard errors clustered on domicile travel-to-work-areas 
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Table 2.4: F-tests for the significance of fixed effects 
 
Males Females 
Subject School Domicile Total School Domicile Total 
Medicine & Dentistry 1.63*** 17.14*** 3.15*** 1.90*** 36.56*** 5.15*** 
Medicine Related 1.17*** 1.05 1.19*** 1.52*** 1.10 1.60*** 
Biological Science 1.49*** 2.55*** 1.65*** 1.67*** 2.39*** 1.81*** 
Veterinary Science 1.71*** 3.87*** 1.87*** 1.67*** 3.32*** 1.82*** 
Physical Science 1.51*** 1.29*** 1.60*** 1.39*** 1.12* 1.41*** 
Mathematics 2.00*** 2.24*** 2.12*** 1.43*** 0.84 1.44*** 
Engineering 1.58*** 7.73*** 2.60*** 1.23*** 2.23*** 1.35*** 
Mineral Technology 1.25*** 1.15** 1.27*** 0.94 0.07* 0.97 
Architecture 1.41*** 1.44*** 1.46*** 1.03* 1.27** 1.07*** 
Social Studies 1.63*** 3.14*** 1.86*** 1.70*** 2.80*** 1.87*** 
Law 1.39*** 1.65*** 1.46*** 1.63*** 1.46*** 1.70*** 
Business Studies 1.79*** 1.14* 1.89*** 1.84*** 2.33*** 2.22*** 
Communications 1.88*** 1.77*** 1.98*** 1.74*** 1.29*** 1.81*** 
Lang, Ling & Classics 1.46*** 1.77*** 1.59*** 1.45*** 2.64*** 1.71*** 
European Languages 1.48*** 3.19*** 1.65*** 1.45*** 8.89*** 2.23*** 
Other Languages 1.01 1.04 1.01 1.03* 1.20** 1.08*** 
History 1.59*** 2.99*** 1.86*** 2.02*** 2.64*** 2.22*** 
Art & Music 6.39*** 2.97*** 6.49*** 9.58*** 346*** 9.61*** 
Education 1.81*** 1.59*** 1.87*** 1.87*** 1.43*** 2.17*** 
Note(s): (1) F-test of the joint significance of school and domicile travel-to-work-areas fixed effects. (2) *, ** 
and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively 
 
 
 
of the possible subject choices and are particularly important in determining the 
probabilities of taking degrees in Medicine & Dentistry, Art & Music and Engineering.  
The results for females are similarly strong. The F-statistics for the joint 
significance of all the fixed effects suggests that school and domicile characteristics 
contribute significantly to all but one subject choice. As with male students, these 
effects appear to be particularly important in determining the probability of students 
choosing to take degrees in Medicine & Dentistry and Art & Music. Taken together 
these results suggest that students from the same school in the same areas make similar 
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choices about what subject to study at degree level and highlight the need to adopt a 
systematic approach to controlling for potential sources of endogeneity.  
 
2.5.3 Local economic conditions 
 
Alongside personal, academic and parental characteristics, a range of variables designed 
to capture local economic conditions were incorporated into the regressions in both 
stages. These variables included youth unemployment, average full-time hourly wages 
and employment levels in different industries at the TTWA level. As detailed in the 
Appendices, the results suggest that local economic conditions play a significant role in 
determining student degree specialism, although these effects are an order of magnitude 
smaller than the impact of individual and academic characteristics. Taken as a whole, 
youth unemployment enters significantly in 13 (10) of the detailed 19 subject 
regressions for males (females), and average full-time hourly wages enter significantly 
in 17 (18) cases.  
Figure 2.5 shows the estimated coefficients on youth unemployment from the 
fixed effects analysis. After controlling for time-invariant characteristics of schools and 
residences, higher rates of youth unemployment significantly increase the probabilities 
of both males and females taking History, Biological Science, Social Studies and Art & 
Music degrees. High youth unemployment reduces the probability of female students 
taking Business Studies and European Languages, and reduces the probability of male 
students taking Engineering, Mathematics and Business Studies.  
However, while these effects are significant, their impact is very small. The 
estimated coefficient of largest absolute size for males (females) affects the probability 
of taking Engineering (European Languages). For males, a five percent increase in 
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Youth unemployment reduces the probability of taking an Engineering degree by 
0.27%. For females, a similar increase in unemployment reduces the probability of 
taking a European Language degree by just 0.18%.  
By contrast, the estimated coefficients on average full-time hourly earnings 
(Figure 2.6) are significant and substantially larger than those on youth unemployment. 
Growing average full-time hourly earnings has a significant and positive impact on the 
probability of male and female students taking Social Studies, History, Biological 
Science and Art & Music. Among male students, earnings growth tends to reduce the 
likelihood of taking degrees in Engineering, Medicine & Dentistry and Mathematics. 
Among female students, earnings growth reduces the probability of taking Medicine & 
Dentistry, European Languages and Business Studies.  
 The largest estimated effects of earnings affect the probability of males (female) 
taking Engineering (Medicine & Dentistry) degrees. For males, a five percent increase 
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Figure 2.5: Effect of  youth unemployment on subject choice 
Males Females 
Note(s): (1) Dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals, based on standard errors clustered on travel-to-work-areas 
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in average earnings is associated with a 3.5% fall in the likelihood of taking an 
Engineering degree. For females, a similar increase in earnings is associated with a 
3.6% fall in the probability of taking Medicine & Dentistry degree.  
To estimate the impact of the industrial composition of employment on subject 
choice, the levels employment in eleven broad sectors were included in the 
regressions.
15
 After controlling for time-invariant characteristics of school and domicile, 
the impact of growing employment in different sectors enters significantly in several 
subject choice regressions. For females, 76 of the 209 estimated coefficients in the main 
19-subject regressions are significant at the five percent level or above. For males, 80 of 
the 209 estimated effects are significant. As with the youth unemployment coefficients, 
                                                          
15
 A breakdown of twelve industries is used, corresponding to the categories level of the 
SIC code classification. Financial Intermediation is excluded as the base industry, 
resulting in eleven estimated coefficients, for nineteen subjects, for males and females, 
generating 418 estimated coefficients. See Appendix 2A for the full breakdown of 
included industries. 
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Figure 2.6: Effect of  local earnings on subject choice 
Male Female 
Note(s): (1) Dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals, based on standard errors clustered on domicile travel-to-work-areas 
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many of these effects are small, but offer a direct examination of how employment 
changes around the student’s domicile affect degree choice.  
While many of the estimated effects defy explanation, several are suggestive. 
Employment growth in Manufacturing of five percent in their TTWA of domicile is 
associated with a higher probability that male students take degrees in Mathematics 
(+0.34%) and Engineering (+0.5%) and reduces the probability of students taking 
degrees in Social Studies (-0.42%), History (-0.25%) and Art & Music (-0.22%). For 
females, a similar increase in Manufacturing employment reduces the likelihood of 
taking History (-0.25%), Art & Music (-0.28%) as well as Languages, Linguistics & 
Classics (-0.33%). Meanwhile, growth in Business Activities encourages both male and 
female students to take degrees in Social Studies and Law. These results suggest that 
labour market signals do affect students’ decisions about training.  
  
2.6 Robustness tests and limitations 
 
Several different methods were used to test the robustness of the results. Firstly, for an 
earlier version of this paper, a similar micro-level analysis was carried out using a 
subset of the individual level DLHE data. This earlier paper differed in several 
important respects. Firstly, it utilised data for only the first three years considered here: 
including students who completed their first-degree between 2004/05 and 2006/07, 
rather than between 2004/05 and 2008/09. Secondly, the earlier version of this paper 
used economic data at the Local Authority District (LA) level to examine the impact of 
local labour markets on degree specialism. There are 432 LAs in England, Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland, of which the 408 of Great Britain were included in the 
analysis. Measures of youth and adult unemployment and inactivity as well as 
employment and earnings growth by industry were incorporated. Earnings and 
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employment growth by industry were calculated relative to a fixed point three years 
prior to the student’s university commencement. Thirdly, to control for endogenous 
residential selection, the earlier paper incorporated fixed effects for each postcode 
district of domicile. Controlling at this level involved the estimation of some 2,611 
(2,646) fixed effects for males (females). Fixed effects for each school were 
incorporated in a similar way as in this paper.  
The results of this earlier paper are shown in Appendix 2D, and are consistent 
with many of the findings presented here. Individual and academic characteristics are 
found to be similarly important and the magnitude of their impact on degree specialism 
is largely the same. The greatest differences between the papers arise from the estimated 
effects of wages and employment. While both papers find evidence that local economic 
variables have a statistically significant impact on degree choice, the results of the 
earlier paper suggest that these impacts are slightly larger. These disparities I attribute to 
three methodological differences. Firstly, the most obvious difference lies in the use of 
spatial scale – both of the explanatory variables and the fixed effects – and may reflect 
the well documented modifiable areal unit problem (Briant, Combes and Lafourcade 
2008). By using travel to work areas, this paper offers a more rigorous examination of 
the ‘local’ labour markets with which student’s would be familiar. In many parts of the 
country, LAs are too small and disregard the geography of economic activity.  
Secondly, as more data became available the results of the later analysis should 
be more rigorous as they depend on larger samples. This may particularly affect the 
local economic variables as the methodology depends on changes over time for 
identification: using five cohorts instead of three involves more variation and should 
provide more robust results. Finally, this variation may have been significantly 
increased by the onset of the financial crisis in the more recent data, as economic 
conditions became more changeable across the labour market. 
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In addition to this sub-analysis, a series of checks were carried out to ensure that 
the results were not affected by the methodological constraints of the linear probability 
model. Logit models were estimated and compared to the first stage OLS results 
without fixed effects and the variables were introduced gradually to ensure that results 
are not dependent on co-linearities in the explanatory variables. These results are not 
reported for concision, while the first stage OLS results are shown in Appendix 2C. 
 However, perhaps the most serious risks associated with the results of this paper 
lie in the largely un-testable, maintained assumptions on which I depend for 
identification. As outlined in Section Three, the analysis is founded on a total of four 
maintained assumptions: (1) that the impact of selection into a particular school can be 
treated as a time-invariant effect, (2) that the impact of residential selection can be 
treated as a time-invariant effect, (3) that students make their choice of subject by 
comparing a particular degree specialism with the average for all other possible courses 
and (4) that unobserved individual attributes such as ability, are either (a) uncorrelated 
with the other explanatory variables or (b) perfectly captured by student performance at 
A-level. Of these, the third and fourth present the greatest risk to the parameter 
estimates. In the former case, students may only consider an inter-dependent subset of 
all possible degree courses which may render the parameter estimates presented here 
inconsistent. In the latter case, if unobserved ability – or some aspect of ability such as 
mathematical or musical ability – is correlated with other explanatory variables then 
parameter estimates may also be biased.  
 
2.7 Conclusions 
 
The primary objective of this paper is to examine the determinants of degree choice in 
the context of differences in local economic performance in the UK. Previous research 
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has suggested that gender and ethnicity, prior academic attainment and parental socio-
economic class all affect an individual’s decision to invest in human capital and that 
many of these same factors also affect the subject of study.  
In this analysis a more detailed breakdown of subjects has been utilised than 
ever before and several forms of endogeneity are controlled for through the fixed effects 
estimation strategy. The results suggest that there are significant differences in subject 
choice between men and women and between people from different ethnic groups. Prior 
academic attainment is also an important determinant of subject choice: strongly 
suggesting that students who do not perform well at the end of their school careers make 
different (or perhaps constrained) decisions compared to the highest performers.  
This analysis also suggests that socio-economic background contributes to the 
probability of taking some specific subjects. The evidence presented here is that 
students from particular socio-economic groups are more likely to do some subjects 
than others, but that the magnitude of these effects is small relative to other individual 
characteristics. The results support the notion that there are unobserved characteristics 
common to individuals within particular neighbourhoods and schools which may 
determine both where they choose to live and what they choose to study at university.  
Taken together, the results of this study present several important conclusions 
for higher education policy and local economic development. Firstly, they suggest that 
students do respond to local labour market signals when choosing which subject to 
study at university. In particular, growing average wages appear to be associated with a 
higher probability of students taking more arts subjects, including History, Social 
Studies and Art & Music. However, after controlling for time-invariant characteristics 
of residence, the magnitude of all these effects is relatively small. While local wages do 
appear to play a role, it is the individual characteristics of students in a local area which 
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make the largest and most significant contribution to student choice of subject and 
therefore to the supply of individuals with different skills. 
Secondly, while socio-economic group has a relatively small impact, the 
estimated effects strongly suggest that multiple layers of advantage tend to make 
particular subject choices additively more likely. Conversely, multiple layers of 
disadvantage tend to increase the probability of other choices. Well-qualified students, 
white students, students who were educated at Private schools and students who live in 
areas with growing average earnings appear more likely to take History or Languages, 
Linguistics & Classics degrees than students who are poorly qualified, ethnic minority 
students or from less prosperous areas, who are more likely to take Business Studies 
degrees. This result suggests that simply ensuring that every student has the means to 
study at university is not enough. Access to common and high standards of secondary 
schooling is a key enabler through which students will have a fair chance to study the 
subject to which they aspire. 
Thirdly, the results suggest that in spite of the impact of these multiple layers of 
advantage, groups which have hitherto been under-represented in particular professions 
are gaining the qualifications they need to break into occupations dominated by 
particular genders or ethnic groups. All else equal, highly qualified male students from 
ethnic minorities are more likely to study Engineering or Mathematics than equivalently 
well-qualified white students, and highly qualified female students from ethnic 
minorities are more likely to study Medicine or Law than white female students. 
Research is needed to explore the extent to which these trends reflect different 
preferences over academic fields, relative to the impact of different rates of higher 
education participation between ethnic groups.  
Finally, the results also have implications for the evolution of economic 
inequalities across the UK. Given the importance placed on improved educational 
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quality and choice as a means of reducing regional inequalities, the results are distinctly 
mixed. On one hand, they suggest that students do respond to labour market signals 
from around their domicile when choosing their degree subject and as a consequence, 
local industry may be helping to create the next generation of employees. On the other 
hand the relative weakness of these effects suggests that there is a signalling failure 
between local employers and students. The importance of individual level 
characteristics and strong patterns of migration among students (Abreu, Faggian and 
McCann 2010) suggest that local industry in many parts of the country is failing to 
inspire students to study for employment. Further research is needed to examine how 
the skills acquired are being used, where they are being used and whether local industry 
can more effectively attract and inspire young people in their subject and later career 
choices. 
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2A Appendix A: Classifications 
 
Table A.1: Classification of Industries1 
Industry SIC2003 Code 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry, & Fishing A & B 
Mining and quarrying C 
Manufacturing D 
Electricity, gas and water supply E 
Construction F 
Wholesale and retail trade G 
Hotels and restaurants H 
Transport, storage and communication I 
Financial intermediation J 
Real estate, renting and business activities K 
Public administration and defence L 
Education M 
Note(s): (1) Listings available at www.ons.gov.uk 
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Table A.2: Joint Academic Classification of Subjects1 
JACS2 Subject JACS3 Codes 
Degrees related to Medicine  B0-B9 
Biological Science C0-C9 
Veterinary Science D0-D9 
Physical Science F0-F9 
Mathematics G0-G92 
Engineering H0-H9 
Mineral Technology J1-J9 
Architecture K0-K9 
Social Sciences L0-L9 
Law M0-M9 
Business Studies N0-N9 
Communications P0-P9 
Lang, Ling and Classics Q0-Q9 
European Languages R1-R9 
Other Languages T1-T9 
History V0-V9 
Art and Music W0-W9 
Education X0-X9 
Combined degrees Y0 
Note(s): (1) Listings available at www.hesa.ac.uk 
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2B Appendix: Table B.1: Males1, 2, 3, 11 
 
Medicine & Dent. Medicine Related Biological Science Veterinary Science Physical Science Mathematics Engineering 
Age4 0.018*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) -0.015*** (0.002) 0.002*** (0.000) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.011*** (0.001) 0.021*** (0.002) 
Ethnicity  Black 0.017*** (0.002) 0.042*** (0.003) -0.005* (0.003) -0.004*** (0.000) -0.038*** (0.004) 0.001 (0.003) 0.031*** (0.003) 
 
Asian 0.043*** (0.002) 0.067*** (0.004) -0.033*** (0.003) -0.005*** (0.001) -0.041*** (0.003) 0.075*** (0.007) 0.010** (0.004) 
 
Other 0.021*** (0.002) 0.021*** (0.002) 0.003 (0.003) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.021*** (0.003) 0.011** (0.005) 0.005 (0.003) 
 
Unknown 0.003 (0.003) 0.005 (0.003) -0.032*** (0.004) -0.001 (0.001) -0.007 (0.006) 0.007 (0.006) -0.011** (0.005) 
Disability -0.003*** (0.001) 0.002* (0.001) 0.002 (0.003) 0.002* (0.001) 0.012*** (0.003) 0.000 (0.003) -0.001 (0.003) 
Parental Occ.  Lower Manag. & Prof. -0.012*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.002) 0.000 (0.000) -0.006*** (0.002) -0.006*** (0.002) -0.008*** (0.001) 
 
Intermediate -0.012*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) 0.004** (0.002) 0.000 (0.000) -0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) -0.003 (0.002) 
 
Small Employers -0.015*** (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) 0.003 (0.003) 0.018*** (0.003) -0.010*** (0.003) -0.004 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 
 
Lower Super. & Tech. -0.012*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) 0.010*** (0.003) 0.000 (0.001) -0.002 (0.003) 0.013** (0.005) 0.015*** (0.004) 
 
Semi-routine -0.015*** (0.001) -0.003* (0.002) 0.005** (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) -0.003 (0.002) 0.012*** (0.003) 0.011*** (0.003) 
 
Routine, Unemp. -0.012*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.002) 0.005 (0.003) 0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.003) 0.004 (0.004) -0.006* (0.003) 
 
Unknown -0.012*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) 0.004* (0.002) 0.000 (0.000) -0.003* (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) -0.003 (0.002) 
School Results5  4th Quartile -0.018*** (0.001) -0.023*** (0.002) 0.028*** (0.002) 0.003*** (0.001) -0.026*** (0.002) 0.025*** (0.003) -0.012*** (0.003) 
 
3rd Quartile  -0.015*** (0.001) -0.008*** (0.001) 0.016*** (0.002) 0.002*** (0.001) -0.006*** (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) -0.012*** (0.002) 
 
Top Quartile  0.031*** (0.001) 0.002* (0.001) -0.024*** (0.002) 0.000 (0.000) 0.021*** (0.002) 0.046*** (0.003) 0.010*** (0.002) 
Economic Effects6 Youth Unemp.7  0.005 (0.007) -0.003 (0.004) 0.030*** (0.008) 0.001 (0.002) -0.019*** (0.007) -0.031*** (0.009) -0.054*** (0.01) 
 
Mean FT Earnings8 -0.460*** (0.049) 0.029* (0.017) 0.343*** (0.032) -0.040*** (0.009) -0.190*** (0.026) -0.262*** (0.040) -0.709*** (0.056) 
 
Working Age Pop.9 -0.888*** (0.154) 0.069 (0.052) 0.556*** (0.132) 0.019 (0.024) -0.228*** (0.082) -0.596*** (0.183) -1.042*** (0.225) 
Emp. by Ind.6, 10 Agric., Fish., Mining. 0.001 (0.003) -0.005** (0.002) 0.006 (0.004) 0.000 (0.001) -0.003 (0.004) -0.014*** (0.005) -0.018*** (0.006) 
 
Manufacturing 0.098*** (0.019) 0.006 (0.007) -0.074*** (0.013) 0.001 (0.004) 0.034*** (0.012) 0.067*** (0.016) 0.100*** (0.026) 
 
Elect., Gas, Water 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
 
Construction 0.002 (0.007) 0.005 (0.004) -0.001 (0.007) 0.001 (0.002) -0.012* (0.006) -0.010 (0.009) 0.000 (0.010) 
 
Wholesale, Retail 0.001 (0.019) -0.004 (0.010) -0.052** (0.023) 0.007 (0.006) 0.047** (0.019) 0.030 (0.026) 0.121*** (0.030) 
 
Hotels, Restaurants -0.022*** (0.008) -0.010** (0.004) 0.016** (0.008) -0.004* (0.002) 0.006 (0.008) -0.021** (0.009) -0.010 (0.012) 
 
Transport, Comms. 0.018** (0.009) -0.007* (0.004) -0.015* (0.008) -0.001 (0.002) 0.003 (0.008) 0.014 (0.009) 0.027** (0.012) 
 
Business Activities -0.035*** (0.009) -0.002 (0.004) 0.019** (0.009) -0.005** (0.002) -0.012* (0.007) -0.022** (0.009) -0.067*** (0.01) 
 
Public Admin., Def. 0.000 (0.007) -0.005 (0.004) 0.005 (0.008) 0.003 (0.002) 0.001 (0.006) -0.015* (0.008) -0.015 (0.009) 
 
Education -0.047*** (0.011) 0.002 (0.006) 0.017* (0.010) -0.001 (0.003) -0.016** (0.008) -0.024** (0.012) -0.048*** (0.013) 
 
Health, Social Work -0.088*** (0.016) 0.003 (0.007) 0.044*** (0.015) -0.015 (0.009) -0.013 (0.013) -0.075*** (0.017) -0.123*** (0.027) 
Controls School, Domicile, Year YES:(4,127), (297), (5) YES:(4,127), (297), (5) YES:(4,127), (297), (5) YES:(4,127), (297), (5) YES:(4,127), (297), (5) YES:(4,127), (297), (5) YES:(4,127), (297), (5) 
Notes: (1) Dep. Var. takes a value one if student chooses a given subject, zero o/w. (2) Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the TTWA level. (3) Subjects defined at the single digit JACS level – See Appendix 2A for 
details. (4) These variables are quasi-continuous. (5) School results are split into cohort quartiles based on the UCAS tariff point score obtained. The best performing students in each cohort appear in the Top Quartile. (6) These 
variables are defined at the TTWA level.  (7) Youth Unemp. is defined as the number of 18-24 year old males/females who are claiming the Job-Seekers Allowance. (8) Average FT Earnings are defined as the average hourly 
earnings of males/females in FT employment. (9) Working Age Pop. is defined as the number of people aged 16-retirement, allowing for different retirement ages of men and women. (10) Emp. by Industry variables are the 
number of FT employees in each sector. See Appendix 2A for industrial classification. (11) *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include 255,591 observations. 
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2B Appendix: Table B.1 (Cont): Males1, 2, 3, 11 
 
Mineral Tech. Architecture Social Studies  Law  Business Studies  Communications  Lang, Ling & Class  
Age4 0.001*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.001) -0.009*** (0.001) -0.010*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.002*** (0.001) 
Ethnicity  Black -0.004** (0.001) -0.009*** (0.002) 0.007** (0.003) 0.053*** (0.005) 0.058*** (0.004) -0.007*** (0.002) -0.023*** (0.002) 
 
Asian -0.003*** (0.001) -0.008*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.003) 0.031*** (0.005) 0.070*** (0.004) -0.023*** (0.002) -0.032*** (0.003) 
 
Other 0.000 (0.001) -0.006*** (0.002) 0.009** (0.004) 0.019*** (0.003) 0.009** (0.005) -0.004* (0.002) -0.011*** (0.002) 
 
Unknown 0.001 (0.002) -0.005* (0.003) 0.016*** (0.005) 0.009*** (0.003) -0.003 (0.006) 0.000 (0.003) 0.015*** (0.005) 
Disability 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) -0.002 (0.004) -0.005*** (0.002) -0.026*** (0.003) -0.001 (0.002) -0.005*** (0.002) 
Parental Occ.  Lower Manag. & Prof. 0.000 (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) -0.002 (0.001) 0.015*** (0.002) 0.006*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 
 
Intermediate 0.000 (0.001) -0.006*** (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) -0.003* (0.002) 0.011*** (0.002) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
 
Small Employers -0.003*** (0.001) 0.008*** (0.002) -0.012*** (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) 0.019*** (0.003) 0.003* (0.001) 0.000 (0.002) 
 
Lower Super. & Tech. 0.000 (0.001) 0.006*** (0.002) -0.014*** (0.003) -0.002 (0.002) 0.007 (0.004) 0.000 (0.002) -0.004** (0.002) 
 
Semi-routine 0.000 (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.011*** (0.003) -0.007*** (0.002) 0.005 (0.005) 0.007*** (0.002) 0.003** (0.002) 
 
Routine, Unemp. -0.002** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.002) -0.004 (0.003) -0.004 (0.002) 0.013*** (0.004) 0.004 (0.002) 0.003* (0.002) 
 
Unknown 0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.009*** (0.003) 0.000 (0.002) 0.009*** (0.002) 0.007*** (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) 
School Results5 4th Quartile 0.011*** (0.001) 0.015*** (0.001) -0.038*** (0.003) -0.034*** (0.002) 0.078*** (0.005) 0.014*** (0.001) -0.022*** (0.001) 
 
3rd Quartile  0.006*** (0.001) 0.011*** (0.001) -0.014*** (0.002) -0.017*** (0.001) 0.038*** (0.003) 0.011*** (0.001) -0.012*** (0.001) 
 
Top Quartile  -0.003*** (0.000) -0.008*** (0.002) -0.003 (0.003) 0.021*** (0.003) -0.056*** (0.002) -0.011*** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.002) 
Economic Effects6 Youth Unemp.7  -0.007*** (0.002) -0.006 (0.004) 0.028*** (0.009) 0.009** (0.005) -0.029*** (0.007) 0.016*** (0.004) 0.012*** (0.004) 
 
Mean FT Earnings8 -0.011 (0.013) -0.076*** (0.018) 0.465*** (0.045) 0.173*** (0.023) -0.079** (0.031) 0.139*** (0.018) 0.136*** (0.020) 
 
Working Age Pop.9 0.009 (0.025) -0.106** (0.052) 0.608*** (0.187) 0.254*** (0.07) -0.205** (0.101) 0.214*** (0.062) 0.367*** (0.074) 
Emp. by Ind.6, 10 Agric., Fish., Mining. 0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) 0.012** (0.006) 0.004 (0.002) -0.006 (0.004) 0.006*** (0.002) 0.005* (0.003) 
 
Manufacturing 0.003 (0.003) 0.012* (0.007) -0.083*** (0.024) -0.023** (0.01) -0.014 (0.013) -0.026*** (0.008) -0.034*** (0.008) 
 
Elect., Gas, Water 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 
 
Construction 0.002 (0.002) -0.001 (0.003) -0.008 (0.009) 0.008 (0.005) 0.009 (0.007) 0.007** (0.003) 0.001 (0.004) 
 
Wholesale, Retail -0.001 (0.006) 0.014 (0.01) -0.054** (0.026) -0.024* (0.014) 0.033 (0.023) -0.023* (0.012) -0.024** (0.012) 
 
Hotels, Restaurants -0.001 (0.002) 0.005 (0.004) 0.006 (0.009) 0.005 (0.006) -0.002 (0.009) 0.014*** (0.005) -0.001 (0.005) 
 
Transport, Comms. -0.004* (0.002) -0.001 (0.004) -0.007 (0.009) -0.002 (0.005) 0.016** (0.007) -0.005 (0.004) -0.007 (0.005) 
 
Business Activities 0.005** (0.002) -0.002 (0.005) 0.034*** (0.009) 0.015*** (0.005) -0.001 (0.008) 0.008* (0.005) 0.017*** (0.005) 
 
Public Admin., Def. -0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.003) 0.015* (0.008) 0.000 (0.005) -0.001 (0.008) -0.001 (0.004) 0.009** (0.004) 
 
Education -0.007** (0.003) -0.001 (0.005) 0.051*** (0.011) 0.015* (0.008) -0.005 (0.011) 0.012** (0.005) 0.007 (0.007) 
 
Health, Social Work 0.000 (0.004) 0.013* (0.007) 0.069*** (0.020) 0.032*** (0.010) 0.003 (0.014) 0.030*** (0.009) 0.026*** (0.009) 
Controls School, Domicile, Year YES:(4,127), (297), (5) YES:(4,127), (297), (5) YES:(4,127), (297), (5) YES:(4,127), (297), (5) YES:(4,127), (297), (5) YES:(4,127), (297), (5) YES:(4,127), (297), (5) 
Notes: (1) Dep. Var. takes a value one if student chooses a given subject, zero o/w. (2) Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the TTWA level. (3) Subjects defined at the single digit JACS level – See Appendix 2A for 
details. (4) These variables are quasi-continuous. (5) School results are split into cohort quartiles based on the UCAS tariff point score obtained. The best performing students in each cohort appear in the Top Quartile. (6) These 
variables are defined at the TTWA level.  (7) Youth Unemp. is defined as the number of 18-24 year old males/females who are claiming the Job-Seekers Allowance. (8) Average FT Earnings are defined as the average hourly 
earnings of males/females in FT employment. (9) Working Age Pop. is defined as the number of people aged 16-retirement, allowing for different retirement ages of men and women. (10) Emp. by Industry variables are the 
number of FT employees in each sector. See Appendix 2A for industrial classification. (11) *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include 255,591 observations. 
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2B Appendix: Table B.1 (Cont.): Males1, 2, 3, 11 
 
Euro. Languages  Other Languages  History  Art & Music  Education  Combined  
Age4 0.006*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) -0.009*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 
Ethnicity  Black -0.009*** (0.002) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.058*** (0.006) -0.041*** (0.003) -0.007*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
 
Asian -0.013*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.064*** (0.006) -0.060*** (0.002) -0.008*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.000) 
 
Other -0.005* (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) -0.031*** (0.004) -0.014*** (0.002) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.000) 
 
Unknown 0.000 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 0.020*** (0.008) -0.014*** (0.004) -0.003*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
Disability -0.005*** (0.001) -0.001* (0.001) 0.006* (0.003) 0.024*** (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.000) 
Parental Occ.  Lower Manag. & Prof. 0.001* (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.002 (0.002) 0.006*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.000) 0.001** (0.000) 
 
Intermediate 0.001 (0.001) -0.001** (0.000) 0.000 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
 
Small Employers -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.010*** (0.003) 0.006** (0.003) 0.002** (0.001) -0.001*** (0.000) 
 
Lower Super. & Tech. -0.002** (0.001) -0.001** (0.001) -0.010*** (0.003) -0.005* (0.003) 0.003*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.000) 
 
Semi-routine 0.001 (0.001) -0.001** (0.000) -0.006*** (0.002) 0.004* (0.002) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
 
Routine, Unemp. 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 0.004*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 
 
Unknown 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) -0.004** (0.002) 0.012*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
School Results5 4th Quartile -0.007*** (0.001) -0.002*** (0.000) -0.037*** (0.003) 0.032*** (0.002) 0.013*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
 
3rd Quartile  -0.003*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) -0.019*** (0.002) 0.017*** (0.002) 0.006*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.000) 
 
Top Quartile  -0.003*** (0.001) -0.002*** (0.000) -0.005 (0.004) -0.016*** (0.002) -0.004*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
Economic Effects6 Youth Unemp.7  -0.013*** (0.003) -0.002* (0.001) 0.038*** (0.006) 0.026*** (0.006) 0.000 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) 
 
Mean FT Earnings8 -0.136*** (0.017) -0.022*** (0.005) 0.372*** (0.036) 0.286*** (0.027) 0.038*** (0.008) 0.005 (0.004) 
 
Working Age Pop.9 -0.226*** (0.061) -0.037** (0.017) 0.636*** (0.130) 0.494*** (0.093) 0.076** (0.029) 0.025* (0.014) 
Emp. by Ind.6, 10 Agric., Fish., Mining. -0.006*** (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) 0.009** (0.004) 0.010*** (0.003) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
 
Manufacturing 0.025*** (0.008) 0.003 (0.002) -0.050*** (0.017) -0.043*** (0.012) -0.003 (0.004) 0.002 (0.002) 
 
Elect., Gas, Water 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
 
Construction 0.000 (0.003) 0.000 (0.001) 0.007 (0.007) -0.006 (0.006) -0.003 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 
 
Wholesale, Retail 0.029*** (0.008) 0.004 (0.004) -0.053** (0.021) -0.056*** (0.017) 0.007 (0.006) -0.001 (0.003) 
 
Hotels, Restaurants -0.002 (0.003) -0.003** (0.002) 0.010 (0.008) 0.013* (0.007) 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 
 
Transport, Comms. -0.001 (0.003) 0.003* (0.001) -0.015* (0.008) -0.010 (0.007) -0.005* (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) 
 
Business Activities -0.009*** (0.003) -0.002 (0.001) 0.027*** (0.007) 0.025*** (0.007) 0.005* (0.002) 0.002 (0.001) 
 
Public Admin., Def. -0.003 (0.003) -0.001 (0.001) -0.007 (0.008) 0.015*** (0.006) -0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 
 
Education -0.004 (0.004) 0.000 (0.002) 0.020** (0.010) 0.028*** (0.009) 0.000 (0.003) 0.001 (0.001) 
 
Health, Social Work -0.019*** (0.006) -0.004** (0.002) 0.049*** (0.015) 0.068*** (0.012) -0.001 (0.004) 0.002 (0.002) 
Controls School, Domicile, Year YES:(4,127), (297), (5) YES:(4,127), (297), (5) YES:(4,127), (297), (5) YES:(4,127), (297), (5) YES:(4,127), (297), (5) YES:(4,127), (297), (5) 
Notes: (1) Dep. Var. takes a value one if student chooses a given subject, zero o/w. (2) Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the TTWA level. (3) Subjects defined at the single digit JACS level – See Appendix 2A for 
details. (4) These variables are quasi-continuous. (5) School results are split into cohort quartiles based on the UCAS tariff point score obtained. The best performing students in each cohort appear in the Top Quartile. (6) These 
variables are defined at the TTWA level.  (7) Youth Unemp. is defined as the number of 18-24 year old males/females who are claiming the Job-Seekers Allowance. (8) Average FT Earnings are defined as the average hourly 
earnings of males/females in FT employment. (9) Working Age Pop. is defined as the number of people aged 16-retirement, allowing for different retirement ages of men and women. (10) Emp. by Industry variables are the 
number of FT employees in each sector. See Appendix 2A for industrial classification. (11) *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include 255,591 observations. 
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2B Appendix: Table B.2: Females1, 2, 3, 11 
 
Medicine & Dent. Medicine Related Biological Science Veterinary Science Physical Science Mathematics Engineering 
Age4 0.028*** (0.002) 0.013*** (0.001) -0.022*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) -0.001** (0.001) -0.002*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.000) 
Ethnicity  Black 0.017*** (0.001) 0.046*** (0.002) -0.018*** (0.003) -0.009*** (0.001) -0.019*** (0.002) 0.005** (0.002) 0.012*** (0.001) 
 
Asian 0.037*** (0.002) 0.071*** (0.005) -0.023*** (0.004) -0.011*** (0.001) -0.019*** (0.002) 0.045*** (0.004) 0.007*** (0.001) 
 
Other 0.017*** (0.002) 0.008*** (0.003) -0.006* (0.003) -0.006*** (0.001) -0.017*** (0.002) 0.003 (0.002) 0.003*** (0.001) 
 
Unknown 0.001 (0.003) -0.004 (0.004) -0.009 (0.007) -0.007*** (0.002) -0.002 (0.003) 0.006 (0.004) 0.003* (0.002) 
Disability -0.006*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) 0.003 (0.003) -0.001 (0.001) 0.009*** (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 0.002** (0.001) 
Parental Occ.  Lower Manag. & Prof. -0.014*** (0.001) -0.006*** (0.001) -0.004** (0.002) -0.002*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.002*** (0.001) 
 
Intermediate -0.012*** (0.001) -0.003 (0.002) 0.006** (0.003) -0.002*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.002* (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 
 
Small Employers -0.017*** (0.001) -0.003 (0.003) 0.005* (0.003) 0.007*** (0.002) -0.003** (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.002*** (0.001) 
 
Lower Super. & Tech. -0.012*** (0.001) 0.007** (0.003) 0.007* (0.004) 0.000 (0.001) 0.004** (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 
 
Semi-routine -0.016*** (0.001) -0.005* (0.003) 0.007*** (0.002) -0.002* (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) 0.004* (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 
 
Routine, Unemp. -0.018*** (0.001) -0.006** (0.003) 0.005 (0.004) -0.002*** (0.001) -0.003 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) 
 
Unknown -0.014*** (0.002) -0.008*** (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) -0.002*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.001** (0.001) 
School Results5 4th Quartile -0.018*** (0.001) -0.019*** (0.002) -0.026*** (0.003) 0.007*** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.002) -0.001* (0.001) 
 
3rd Quartile  -0.016*** (0.001) 0.003* (0.002) -0.006** (0.003) 0.002*** (0.001) -0.003** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.001** (0.000) 
 
Top Quartile  0.040*** (0.002) -0.012*** (0.002) -0.021*** (0.002) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.001) 0.027*** (0.002) 0.004*** (0.001) 
Economic Effects6 Youth Unemp.7  -0.007 (0.009) -0.014*** (0.005) 0.022*** (0.007) 0.002 (0.002) -0.005 (0.004) -0.002 (0.003) -0.005** (0.002) 
 
Mean FT Earnings8 -0.717*** (0.067) -0.051* (0.028) 0.402*** (0.039) -0.101*** (0.013) -0.068*** (0.020) -0.036** (0.014) -0.091*** (0.011) 
 
Working Age Pop.9 -1.247*** (0.24) -0.074 (0.104) 0.773*** (0.135) -0.169*** (0.040) -0.122** (0.057) -0.081* (0.046) -0.137*** (0.040) 
Emp. by Ind.6, 10 Agric., Fish., Mining. -0.002 (0.005) -0.013*** (0.003) 0.008* (0.004) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.003) -0.002 (0.002) -0.003** (0.001) 
 
Manufacturing 0.144*** (0.028) 0.014 (0.011) -0.046*** (0.017) 0.007 (0.004) 0.013* (0.008) 0.007 (0.005) 0.017*** (0.005) 
 
Elect., Gas, Water 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
 
Construction 0.001 (0.011) -0.006 (0.006) -0.008 (0.008) -0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.005) 0.003 (0.004) -0.003 (0.002) 
 
Wholesale, Retail 0.000 (0.031) 0.024 (0.018) -0.058** (0.024) 0.006 (0.008) 0.030** (0.012) 0.012 (0.010) 0.014** (0.007) 
 
Hotels, Restaurants -0.027** (0.011) 0.000 (0.007) 0.008 (0.009) -0.005** (0.003) -0.012** (0.005) 0.003 (0.004) -0.003 (0.002) 
 
Transport, Comms. 0.018 (0.012) -0.001 (0.007) -0.002 (0.008) 0.004 (0.003) -0.004 (0.005) 0.001 (0.003) 0.002 (0.002) 
 
Business Activities -0.058*** (0.013) -0.009 (0.007) 0.026** (0.010) -0.007** (0.003) -0.005 (0.006) 0.000 (0.004) -0.007*** (0.002) 
 
Public Admin., Def. -0.004 (0.011) -0.005 (0.006) 0.006 (0.009) -0.001 (0.003) 0.002 (0.004) -0.001 (0.004) -0.003 (0.002) 
 
Education -0.065*** (0.015) 0.008 (0.010) 0.010 (0.011) -0.008** (0.003) -0.005 (0.008) -0.008* (0.004) -0.006** (0.003) 
 
Health, Social Work -0.147*** (0.025) -0.003 (0.013) 0.051*** (0.016) -0.025*** (0.009) -0.013 (0.009) -0.008 (0.006) -0.020*** (0.005) 
Controls School, Domicile, Year YES:(4,459), (297), (5) YES:(4,459), (297), (5) YES:(4,459), (297), (5) YES:(4,459), (297), (5) YES:(4,459), (297), (5) YES:(4,459), (297), (5) YES:(4,459), (297), (5) 
Notes: (1) Dep. Var. takes a value one if student chooses a given subject, zero o/w. (2) Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the TTWA level. (3) Subjects defined at the single digit JACS level – See Appendix 2A for 
details. (4) These variables are quasi-continuous. (5) School results are split into cohort quartiles based on the UCAS tariff point score obtained. The best performing students in each cohort appear in the Top Quartile. (6) These 
variables are defined at the TTWA level.  (7) Youth Unemp. is defined as the number of 18-24 year old males/females who are claiming the Job-Seekers Allowance. (8) Average FT Earnings are defined as the average hourly 
earnings of males/females in FT employment. (9) Working Age Pop. is defined as the number of people aged 16-retirement, allowing for different retirement ages of men and women. (10) Emp. by Industry variables are the 
number of FT employees in each sector. See Appendix 2A for industrial classification. (11) *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include 318,621 observations. 
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2B Appendix: Table B.2 (Cont): Females1, 2, 3, 11 
 
Mineral Tech. Architecture Social Studies  Law  Business Studies  Communications  Lang, Ling & Class  
Age4 0.001*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.007*** (0.001) -0.016*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) -0.007*** (0.001) -0.009*** (0.001) 
Ethnicity  Black 0.001 (0.001) 0.002* (0.001) 0.024*** (0.004) 0.096*** (0.002) 0.050*** (0.003) 0.004 (0.002) -0.049*** (0.005) 
 
Asian 0.002** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) -0.003 (0.003) 0.068*** (0.008) 0.067*** (0.004) -0.019*** (0.001) -0.043*** (0.005) 
 
Other 0.002*** (0.001) 0.003* (0.001) 0.004 (0.004) 0.037*** (0.005) 0.005* (0.003) 0.006*** (0.002) -0.004 (0.003) 
 
Unknown 0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.003 (0.006) 0.021*** (0.005) -0.001 (0.005) 0.011*** (0.004) 0.009 (0.006) 
Disability 0.001 (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.003) -0.010*** (0.002) -0.028*** (0.003) -0.004** (0.002) -0.006*** (0.002) 
Parental Occ.  Lower Manag. & Prof. 0.001*** (0.000) -0.002** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) -0.003** (0.001) 0.008*** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 
 
Intermediate 0.000 (0.000) -0.002*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) 0.006*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.002) 
 
Small Employers 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.005** (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.021*** (0.003) 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) 
 
Lower Super. & Tech. 0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.008*** (0.003) -0.005* (0.002) 0.014*** (0.003) 0.000 (0.002) -0.005** (0.002) 
 
Semi-routine 0.000 (0.000) -0.003*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) -0.004** (0.002) 0.009*** (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.002) 
 
Routine, Unemp. 0.000 (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) 0.002 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) 0.017*** (0.003) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 
 
Unknown 0.000 (0.000) -0.002*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) 0.006*** (0.002) 0.013*** (0.002) 0.004*** (0.001) -0.004** (0.002) 
School Results5 4th Quartile 0.003*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.001) 0.019*** (0.003) -0.039*** (0.003) 0.072*** (0.006) 0.017*** (0.001) -0.040*** (0.002) 
 
3rd Quartile  0.002*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) 0.010*** (0.001) -0.022*** (0.001) 0.031*** (0.002) 0.014*** (0.001) -0.024*** (0.002) 
 
Top Quartile  -0.002*** (0.000) 0.001* (0.001) -0.013*** (0.002) 0.029*** (0.003) -0.029*** (0.002) -0.014*** (0.001) 0.018*** (0.003) 
Economic Effects6 Youth Unemp.7  -0.002* (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) 0.018** (0.007) -0.001 (0.004) -0.035*** (0.006) 0.009** (0.004) 0.027*** (0.005) 
 
Mean FT Earnings8 -0.022*** (0.006) -0.019** (0.009) 0.392*** (0.037) 0.112*** (0.022) -0.270*** (0.032) 0.085*** (0.017) 0.259*** (0.031) 
 
Working Age Pop.9 0.001 (0.018) -0.017 (0.020) 0.540*** (0.145) 0.076 (0.073) -0.437*** (0.106) 0.204*** (0.058) 0.339*** (0.125) 
Emp. by Ind.6, 10 Agric., Fish., Mining. 0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.011** (0.005) 0.008*** (0.003) -0.006* (0.003) 0.001 (0.002) 0.004 (0.004) 
 
Manufacturing 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.003) -0.057*** (0.019) -0.042*** (0.009) 0.053*** (0.011) -0.024*** (0.006) -0.066*** (0.014) 
 
Elect., Gas, Water 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000* (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 
 
Construction 0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) 0.008 (0.008) -0.002 (0.004) 0.002 (0.007) -0.002 (0.003) -0.001 (0.006) 
 
Wholesale, Retail 0.007* (0.004) 0.002 (0.006) -0.077*** (0.021) -0.001 (0.014) 0.052*** (0.018) -0.027*** (0.009) -0.027 (0.019) 
 
Hotels, Restaurants 0.000 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) 0.023*** (0.008) -0.001 (0.005) -0.007 (0.008) 0.000 (0.004) 0.015** (0.007) 
 
Transport, Comms. 0.002 (0.001) 0.004* (0.002) -0.012 (0.008) 0.011** (0.005) -0.001 (0.007) -0.003 (0.004) -0.008 (0.007) 
 
Business Activities -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.003) 0.021** (0.008) 0.015*** (0.006) -0.021*** (0.008) 0.003 (0.004) 0.026*** (0.007) 
 
Public Admin., Def. 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.003) 0.008 (0.008) 0.005 (0.005) 0.001 (0.005) -0.002 (0.003) 0.007 (0.007) 
 
Education 0.000 (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) 0.022** (0.010) 0.015** (0.007) -0.001 (0.009) 0.004 (0.005) 0.026*** (0.009) 
 
Health, Social Work 0.000 (0.002) -0.002 (0.004) 0.070*** (0.016) 0.021* (0.011) -0.037*** (0.014) 0.022*** (0.007) 0.063*** (0.013) 
Controls School, Domicile, Year YES:(4,459), (297), (5) YES:(4,459), (297), (5) YES:(4,459), (297), (5) YES:(4,459), (297), (5) YES:(4,459), (297), (5) YES:(4,459), (297), (5) YES:(4,459), (297), (5) 
Notes: (1) Dep. Var. takes a value one if student chooses a given subject, zero o/w. (2) Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the TTWA level. (3) Subjects defined at the single digit JACS level – See Appendix 2A for 
details. (4) These variables are quasi-continuous. (5) School results are split into cohort quartiles based on the UCAS tariff point score obtained. The best performing students in each cohort appear in the Top Quartile. (6) These 
variables are defined at the TTWA level.  (7) Youth Unemp. is defined as the number of 18-24 year old males/females who are claiming the Job-Seekers Allowance. (8) Average FT Earnings are defined as the average hourly 
earnings of males/females in FT employment. (9) Working Age Pop. is defined as the number of people aged 16-retirement, allowing for different retirement ages of men and women. (10) Emp. by Industry variables are the 
number of FT employees in each sector. See Appendix 2A for industrial classification. (11) *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include 318,621 observations. 
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Euro. Languages  Other Languages  History  Art & Music  Education  Combined  
Age4  0.013*** (0.001) 0.002*** (0.000) -0.009*** (0.001) 0.002 (0.001) 0.002** (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
Ethnicity  Black -0.016*** (0.002) -0.003*** (0.000) -0.045*** (0.004) -0.049*** (0.005) -0.045*** (0.001) -0.001* (0.001) 
 
Asian -0.022*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.045*** (0.005) -0.071*** (0.002) -0.035*** (0.002) -0.001*** (0.000) 
 
Other -0.001 (0.002) 0.004*** (0.001) -0.017*** (0.005) -0.014*** (0.003) -0.027*** (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 
 
Unknown 0.000 (0.002) 0.002* (0.001) 0.010* (0.006) -0.020*** (0.004) -0.021*** (0.004) -0.002** (0.001) 
Disability  -0.007*** (0.001) -0.001** (0.001) 0.014*** (0.002) 0.040*** (0.003) -0.009*** (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) 
Parental Occ.  Lower Manag. & Prof. 0.003*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) -0.001 (0.001) 0.008*** (0.002) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
 
Intermediate 0.002 (0.001) -0.001 (0.000) -0.003 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) 0.009*** (0.002) 0.000 (0.000) 
 
Small Employers 0.000 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.011*** (0.002) -0.001 (0.003) 0.012*** (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 
 
Lower Super. & Tech. -0.003** (0.001) -0.002*** (0.000) -0.009*** (0.002) -0.007** (0.003) 0.017*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 
 
Semi-routine 0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.000) -0.003* (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) 0.013*** (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 
 
Routine, Unemp. 0.000 (0.002) -0.001** (0.001) -0.006** (0.002) -0.008*** (0.003) 0.017*** (0.003) 0.000 (0.001) 
 
Unknown 0.002 (0.001) -0.001 (0.000) -0.007*** (0.002) 0.013*** (0.002) 0.003** (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
School Results5 4th Quartile -0.017*** (0.001) -0.002*** (0.000) -0.036*** (0.002) 0.027*** (0.002) 0.061*** (0.003) 0.000 (0.001) 
 
3rd Quartile  -0.010*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) -0.019*** (0.002) 0.014*** (0.002) 0.030*** (0.002) -0.001** (0.000) 
 
Top Quartile  -0.002 (0.001) -0.002*** (0.001) 0.004** (0.002) -0.019*** (0.002) -0.021*** (0.002) 0.000 (0.000) 
Economic Effects6 Youth Unemp.7  -0.036*** (0.005) -0.001 (0.001) 0.021*** (0.005) 0.018*** (0.006) -0.006 (0.005) 0.000 (0.001) 
 
Mean FT Earnings8 -0.389*** (0.026) -0.036*** (0.007) 0.233*** (0.026) 0.323*** (0.029) -0.026 (0.025) 0.020*** (0.006) 
 
Working Age Pop.9 -0.516*** (0.115) -0.090*** (0.021) 0.508*** (0.114) 0.401*** (0.085) -0.009 (0.079) 0.057** (0.024) 
Emp. by Ind.6, 10 Agric., Fish., Mining. -0.013*** (0.004) -0.001 (0.001) 0.004 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) 0.004 (0.003) -0.001 (0.001) 
 
Manufacturing 0.070*** (0.015) 0.011*** (0.003) -0.050*** (0.012) -0.055*** (0.011) 0.008 (0.008) -0.003 (0.003) 
 
Elect., Gas, Water 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 
 
Construction 0.007 (0.006) -0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.006) 0.000 (0.006) 0.004 (0.005) -0.001 (0.002) 
 
Wholesale, Retail 0.055*** (0.016) 0.001 (0.004) -0.011 (0.017) -0.035** (0.016) 0.037** (0.015) -0.002 (0.004) 
 
Hotels, Restaurants -0.016*** (0.006) 0.000 (0.002) 0.010 (0.006) 0.003 (0.008) 0.011** (0.006) -0.001 (0.002) 
 
Transport, Comms. 0.014** (0.006) 0.003** (0.001) -0.010 (0.007) -0.012* (0.007) -0.006 (0.005) -0.001 (0.002) 
 
Business Activities -0.024*** (0.007) -0.002 (0.002) 0.014** (0.006) 0.025*** (0.007) 0.005 (0.006) -0.003** (0.001) 
 
Public Admin., Def. -0.009* (0.005) -0.002* (0.001) 0.007 (0.006) -0.002 (0.006) -0.007 (0.005) 0.001 (0.001) 
 
Education -0.023*** (0.007) -0.004** (0.002) 0.020*** (0.007) 0.022** (0.011) -0.010 (0.007) 0.003 (0.002) 
 
Health, Social Work -0.046*** (0.011) -0.006** (0.003) 0.038*** (0.011) 0.061*** (0.013) -0.025*** (0.009) 0.005* (0.003) 
Controls School, Domicile, Year YES:(4,459), (297), (5) YES:(4,459), (297), (5) YES:(4,459), (297), (5) YES:(4,459), (297), (5) YES:(4,459), (297), (5) YES:(4,459), (297), (5) 
Notes: (1) Dep. Var. takes a value one if student chooses a given subject, zero o/w. (2) Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the TTWA level. (3) Subjects defined at the single digit JACS level – See Appendix 2A for 
details. (4) These variables are quasi-continuous. (5) School results are split into cohort quartiles based on the UCAS tariff point score obtained. The best performing students in each cohort appear in the Top Quartile. (6) These 
variables are defined at the TTWA level.  (7) Youth Unemp. is defined as the number of 18-24 year old males/females who are claiming the Job-Seekers Allowance. (8) Average FT Earnings are defined as the average hourly 
earnings of males/females in FT employment. (9) Working Age Pop. is defined as the number of people aged 16-retirement, allowing for different retirement ages of men and women. (10) Emp. by Industry variables are the 
number of FT employees in each sector. See Appendix 2A for industrial classification. (11) *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include 318,621 observations. 
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2C Appendix: Table C.1: Males1, 2, 3, 11 
 
Medicine & Dent. Medicine Related Biological Science Veterinary Science Physical Science Mathematics Engineering 
Age4  0.030*** (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001) -0.026*** (0.002) 0.002*** (0.000) -0.003*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.038*** (0.002) 
Ethnicity  Black 0.009*** (0.002) 0.039*** (0.002) -0.014*** (0.002) -0.004*** (0.000) -0.040*** (0.003) 0.023*** (0.007) 0.033*** (0.004) 
 
Asian 0.041*** (0.002) 0.066*** (0.004) -0.041*** (0.003) -0.005*** (0.001) -0.043*** (0.003) 0.089*** (0.009) 0.011* (0.006) 
 
Other 0.021*** (0.002) 0.021*** (0.002) 0.000 (0.004) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.022*** (0.003) 0.015** (0.006) 0.005 (0.003) 
 
Unknown 0.001 (0.003) 0.004 (0.003) -0.032*** (0.004) -0.002 (0.001) -0.009 (0.006) 0.006 (0.007) -0.012** (0.005) 
Disability  -0.005*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.003) 0.002* (0.001) 0.010*** (0.003) -0.002 (0.003) -0.003 (0.003) 
Parental Occ.  Lower Manag. & Prof. -0.014*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.002) 0.000 (0.000) -0.006*** (0.001) -0.006*** (0.002) -0.010*** (0.002) 
 
Intermediate -0.014*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) 0.005** (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) 0.005** (0.002) -0.005** (0.002) 
 
Small Employers -0.018*** (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) 0.004 (0.003) 0.018*** (0.003) -0.010*** (0.003) -0.003 (0.003) -0.001 (0.003) 
 
Lower Super. & Tech. -0.015*** (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) 0.010*** (0.003) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.003) 0.019*** (0.005) 0.013*** (0.003) 
 
Semi-routine -0.019*** (0.001) -0.003** (0.001) 0.005** (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.004* (0.002) 0.019*** (0.003) 0.008*** (0.002) 
 
Routine, Unemp. -0.018*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.003) 0.004 (0.003) -0.001 (0.001) -0.003 (0.003) 0.015*** (0.004) -0.013*** (0.003) 
 
Unknown -0.018*** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001) 0.005** (0.002) -0.001 (0.000) -0.004** (0.002) 0.003 (0.002) -0.009*** (0.002) 
School Results5 4th Quartile -0.024*** (0.002) -0.025*** (0.002) 0.026*** (0.002) 0.003*** (0.001) -0.028*** (0.002) 0.034*** (0.004) -0.022*** (0.004) 
 
3rd Quartile  -0.018*** (0.001) -0.008*** (0.001) 0.015*** (0.002) 0.002*** (0.001) -0.006*** (0.002) 0.003 (0.002) -0.015*** (0.002) 
 
Top Quartile  0.034*** (0.002) 0.002 (0.001) -0.023*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.000) 0.019*** (0.002) 0.042*** (0.003) 0.014*** (0.002) 
Economic Effects6 Youth Unemp.7  0.016*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) -0.005** (0.002) 0.004*** (0.001) -0.020*** (0.002) -0.059*** (0.002) -0.017*** (0.002) 
 
Mean FT Earnings8 -0.003 (0.006) 0.011 (0.010) -0.008 (0.011) -0.002 (0.002) -0.018** (0.009) -0.042*** (0.009) -0.022* (0.013) 
 
Working Age Pop.9 -0.004 (0.004) 0.000 (0.001) -0.002 (0.003) -0.002** (0.001) -0.010*** (0.003) 0.001 (0.004) -0.007 (0.005) 
Emp. by Ind.6, 10 Agric., Fish., Mining. -0.091*** (0.019) -0.004 (0.006) 0.032** (0.014) -0.012*** (0.004) -0.070*** (0.012) -0.059*** (0.015) -0.124*** (0.029) 
 
Manufacturing -0.004** (0.002) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.003 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.005** (0.002) -0.010 (0.006) 0.007 (0.005) 
 
Elect., Gas, Water -0.001 (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.000) -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) 0.009** (0.005) 
 
Construction 0.003 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) -0.002 (0.003) -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.003) 0.006 (0.004) 0.000 (0.004) 
 
Wholesale, Retail 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 
 
Hotels, Restaurants -0.007** (0.003) 0.004* (0.002) 0.003 (0.004) 0.000 (0.001) -0.009** (0.004) 0.000 (0.005) -0.004 (0.006) 
 
Transport, Comms. 0.023*** (0.008) -0.003 (0.003) -0.005 (0.007) 0.006*** (0.002) 0.015** (0.007) 0.008 (0.010) 0.003 (0.013) 
 
Business Activities 0.001 (0.003) -0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.004) 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.004) -0.004 (0.005) 0.008 (0.006) 
 
Public Admin., Def. 0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.007*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.002) 0.003 (0.003) 0.003 (0.004) 
 
Education -0.002 (0.003) -0.005** (0.002) -0.004 (0.005) -0.003*** (0.001) 0.002 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004) 0.008 (0.010) 
 
Health, Social Work 0.003 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) -0.002 (0.003) 0.001 (0.001) 0.007*** (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) 0.007* (0.004) 
Controls Year, School Type YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) 
Notes: (1) Dep. Var. takes a value one if student chooses a given subject, zero o/w. (2) Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the TTWA level. (3) Subjects defined at the single digit JACS level – See Appendix 2A for 
details. (4) These variables are quasi-continuous. (5) School results are split into cohort quartiles based on the UCAS tariff point score obtained. The best performing students in each cohort appear in the Top Quartile. (6) These 
variables are defined at the TTWA level.  (7) Youth Unemp. is defined as the number of 18-24 year old males/females who are claiming the Job-Seekers Allowance. (8) Average FT Earnings are defined as the average hourly 
earnings of males/females in FT employment. (9) Working Age Pop. is defined as the number of people aged 16-retirement, allowing for different retirement ages of men and women. (10) Emp. by Industry variables are the 
number of FT employees in each sector. See Appendix 2A for industrial classification. (11) *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include 255,591 observations. 
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2C Appendix: Table C.1 (Cont): Males1, 2, 3, 11 
 
Mineral Tech. Architecture Social Studies  Law  Business Studies  Communications  Lang, Ling & Class  
Age4  0.001*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.001) -0.020*** (0.001) -0.014*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.007*** (0.001) -0.006*** (0.001) 
Ethnicity  Black -0.004*** (0.001) -0.012*** (0.002) 0.006** (0.002) 0.054*** (0.005) 0.059*** (0.005) -0.009*** (0.002) -0.021*** (0.003) 
 
Asian -0.004*** (0.001) -0.010*** (0.001) 0.002 (0.003) 0.036*** (0.005) 0.068*** (0.006) -0.027*** (0.001) -0.030*** (0.003) 
 
Other 0.000 (0.001) -0.008*** (0.002) 0.011** (0.004) 0.020*** (0.002) 0.003 (0.005) -0.005*** (0.002) -0.008*** (0.002) 
 
Unknown 0.001 (0.002) -0.006** (0.003) 0.018*** (0.005) 0.010*** (0.003) -0.004 (0.006) 0.001 (0.003) 0.016*** (0.004) 
Disability  0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.004) -0.004** (0.002) -0.026*** (0.003) 0.001 (0.002) -0.006*** (0.002) 
Parental Occ.  Lower Manag. & Prof. 0.000 (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.002 (0.003) -0.002 (0.001) 0.015*** (0.002) 0.007*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 
 
Intermediate 0.000 (0.001) -0.007*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.002) -0.003 (0.002) 0.011*** (0.002) 0.006*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
 
Small Employers -0.003*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.002) -0.016*** (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.019*** (0.003) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) 
 
Lower Super. & Tech. -0.001 (0.001) 0.004* (0.002) -0.019*** (0.003) 0.000 (0.002) 0.008* (0.005) 0.002 (0.002) -0.004** (0.002) 
 
Semi-routine -0.001 (0.001) -0.006*** (0.001) -0.016*** (0.003) -0.006*** (0.002) 0.006 (0.005) 0.009*** (0.002) 0.004** (0.002) 
 
Routine, Unemp. -0.003*** (0.001) -0.009*** (0.002) -0.009*** (0.003) 0.000 (0.002) 0.013*** (0.004) 0.007*** (0.002) 0.004** (0.002) 
 
Unknown 0.000 (0.001) -0.003** (0.001) -0.010*** (0.003) 0.003* (0.001) 0.008*** (0.003) 0.009*** (0.001) 0.004** (0.001) 
School Results5 4th Quartile 0.010*** (0.001) 0.013*** (0.001) -0.043*** (0.004) -0.028*** (0.002) 0.073*** (0.006) 0.019*** (0.001) -0.021*** (0.002) 
 
3rd Quartile  0.005*** (0.001) 0.011*** (0.001) -0.016*** (0.002) -0.015*** (0.001) 0.037*** (0.003) 0.012*** (0.001) -0.013*** (0.002) 
 
Top Quartile  -0.003*** (0.000) -0.007*** (0.001) -0.006* (0.003) 0.020*** (0.003) -0.052*** (0.002) -0.012*** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.002) 
Economic Effects6 Youth Unemp.7  -0.002*** (0.000) 0.008*** (0.002) 0.043*** (0.003) -0.004* (0.002) 0.003 (0.003) -0.016*** (0.001) 0.020*** (0.002) 
 
Mean FT Earnings8 -0.003 (0.004) -0.006 (0.006) -0.002 (0.009) 0.006 (0.007) -0.066*** (0.010) 0.004 (0.008) 0.012* (0.006) 
 
Working Age Pop.9 -0.004*** (0.001) -0.003* (0.001) 0.009* (0.005) 0.010*** (0.002) -0.003 (0.004) 0.003** (0.001) 0.009*** (0.002) 
Emp. by Ind.6, 10 Agric., Fish., Mining. -0.015*** (0.004) -0.023*** (0.006) 0.125*** (0.022) 0.010 (0.008) 0.001 (0.019) 0.017** (0.008) 0.048*** (0.010) 
 
Manufacturing 0.000 (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) -0.006 (0.004) 0.001 (0.002) 0.012** (0.005) -0.001 (0.002) -0.003* (0.002) 
 
Elect., Gas, Water -0.001** (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
 
Construction 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.002) -0.009*** (0.003) -0.002 (0.002) 0.009** (0.004) -0.003* (0.002) -0.004** (0.002) 
 
Wholesale, Retail 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 
 
Hotels, Restaurants 0.000 (0.001) 0.005** (0.002) -0.001 (0.005) 0.008*** (0.002) 0.008 (0.005) 0.003 (0.002) -0.001 (0.003) 
 
Transport, Comms. 0.004** (0.002) -0.008** (0.004) -0.010 (0.009) -0.012** (0.005) 0.010 (0.010) -0.004 (0.004) -0.005 (0.005) 
 
Business Activities 0.001 (0.001) 0.004* (0.002) -0.007 (0.005) -0.004* (0.002) 0.003 (0.006) 0.001 (0.003) -0.004* (0.002) 
 
Public Admin., Def. -0.001** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.004* (0.003) -0.002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.004) 0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) 
 
Education 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.006) 0.000 (0.003) 0.000 (0.006) 0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) 
 
Health, Social Work -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.003) -0.002 (0.002) -0.001 (0.004) -0.004** (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) 
Controls Year, School Type YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) 
Notes: (1) Dep. Var. takes a value one if student chooses a given subject, zero o/w. (2) Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the TTWA level. (3) Subjects defined at the single digit JACS level – See Appendix 2A for 
details. (4) These variables are quasi-continuous. (5) School results are split into cohort quartiles based on the UCAS tariff point score obtained. The best performing students in each cohort appear in the Top Quartile. (6) These 
variables are defined at the TTWA level.  (7) Youth Unemp. is defined as the number of 18-24 year old males/females who are claiming the Job-Seekers Allowance. (8) Average FT Earnings are defined as the average hourly 
earnings of males/females in FT employment. (9) Working Age Pop. is defined as the number of people aged 16-retirement, allowing for different retirement ages of men and women. (10) Emp. by Industry variables are the 
number of FT employees in each sector. See Appendix 2A for industrial classification. (11) *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include 255,591 observations. 
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2C Appendix: Table C.1 (Cont.): Males1, 2, 3, 11 
 
Euro. Languages  Other Languages  History  Art & Music  Education  Combined  
Age4  0.010*** (0.001) 0.002*** (0.000) -0.018*** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.001) -0.001*** (0.000) 0.000* (0.000) 
Ethnicity  Black -0.009*** (0.002) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.057*** (0.006) -0.040*** (0.003) -0.009*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.000) 
 
Asian -0.013*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.063*** (0.006) -0.065*** (0.002) -0.009*** (0.001) -0.001** (0.000) 
 
Other -0.004* (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) -0.029*** (0.004) -0.013*** (0.003) -0.005*** (0.001) -0.001** (0.000) 
 
Unknown 0.000 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 0.022*** (0.007) -0.012*** (0.004) -0.003** (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
Disability  -0.006*** (0.001) -0.002** (0.001) 0.006* (0.003) 0.033*** (0.003) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.000) 
Parental Occ.  Lower Manag. & Prof. 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.002 (0.002) 0.008*** (0.001) 0.001** (0.000) 0.001** (0.000) 
 
Intermediate 0.001 (0.001) -0.001** (0.000) 0.001 (0.002) 0.003 (0.002) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
 
Small Employers -0.002** (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.008*** (0.002) 0.010*** (0.003) 0.002** (0.001) -0.001*** (0.000) 
 
Lower Super. & Tech. -0.003*** (0.001) -0.001** (0.001) -0.011*** (0.003) -0.002 (0.003) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
 
Semi-routine 0.000 (0.001) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.007*** (0.002) 0.010*** (0.002) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
 
Routine, Unemp. 0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.003) 0.011*** (0.003) 0.004*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 
 
Unknown -0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) -0.002 (0.002) 0.019*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
School Results5 4th Quartile -0.010*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.000) -0.036*** (0.003) 0.052*** (0.002) 0.011*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
 
3rd Quartile  -0.005*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) -0.019*** (0.003) 0.022*** (0.002) 0.006*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
 
Top Quartile  -0.001* (0.001) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.008** (0.003) -0.021*** (0.002) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.001* (0.000) 
Economic Effects6 Youth Unemp.7  0.015*** (0.002) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.037*** (0.003) -0.026*** (0.002) -0.002** (0.001) 0.002*** (0.000) 
 
Mean FT Earnings8 -0.002 (0.004) -0.004*** (0.001) 0.010 (0.011) 0.133*** (0.044) 0.000 (0.004) 0.002 (0.003) 
 
Working Age Pop.9 -0.004*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.000) 0.003 (0.004) 0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
Emp. by Ind.6, 10 Agric., Fish., Mining. -0.015*** (0.006) -0.001 (0.002) 0.110*** (0.016) 0.070*** (0.016) -0.001 (0.004) 0.002 (0.002) 
 
Manufacturing -0.002** (0.001) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.002 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) 0.002** (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
 
Elect., Gas, Water -0.001** (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) -0.002 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
 
Construction 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.003 (0.003) -0.003 (0.003) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
 
Wholesale, Retail 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 
 
Hotels, Restaurants -0.003** (0.001) -0.002*** (0.001) -0.004 (0.004) 0.000 (0.005) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
 
Transport, Comms. 0.017*** (0.003) 0.003*** (0.001) -0.014* (0.007) -0.019** (0.007) -0.004 (0.003) -0.003** (0.001) 
 
Business Activities 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) -0.007 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
 
Public Admin., Def. -0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
 
Education -0.004** (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.005) 0.000 (0.005) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
 
Health, Social Work -0.002* (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) -0.005* (0.003) -0.002 (0.003) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
Controls Year, School Type YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) 
Notes: (1) Dep. Var. takes a value one if student chooses a given subject, zero o/w. (2) Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the TTWA level. (3) Subjects defined at the single digit JACS level – See Appendix 2A for 
details. (4) These variables are quasi-continuous. (5) School results are split into cohort quartiles based on the UCAS tariff point score obtained. The best performing students in each cohort appear in the Top Quartile. (6) These 
variables are defined at the TTWA level.  (7) Youth Unemp. is defined as the number of 18-24 year old males/females who are claiming the Job-Seekers Allowance. (8) Average FT Earnings are defined as the average hourly 
earnings of males/females in FT employment. (9) Working Age Pop. is defined as the number of people aged 16-retirement, allowing for different retirement ages of men and women. (10) Emp. by Industry variables are the 
number of FT employees in each sector. See Appendix 2A for industrial classification. (11) *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include 255,591 observations. 
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2C Appendix: Table C.2: Females1, 2, 3, 11 
 
Medicine & Dent. Medicine Related Biological Science Veterinary Science Physical Science Mathematics Engineering 
Age4  0.045*** (0.001) 0.012*** (0.001) -0.035*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.001) -0.002*** (0.001) -0.002** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.000) 
Ethnicity  Black 0.011*** (0.002) 0.041*** (0.002) -0.014*** (0.004) -0.009*** (0.001) -0.020*** (0.002) 0.010*** (0.003) 0.012*** (0.001) 
 
Asian 0.038*** (0.003) 0.075*** (0.006) -0.023*** (0.005) -0.010*** (0.001) -0.020*** (0.002) 0.048*** (0.005) 0.008*** (0.001) 
 
Other 0.017*** (0.002) 0.006** (0.003) -0.007** (0.003) -0.006*** (0.001) -0.017*** (0.002) 0.005* (0.003) 0.003*** (0.001) 
 
Unknown 0.001 (0.003) -0.006 (0.004) -0.009 (0.007) -0.007*** (0.002) -0.003 (0.003) 0.007 (0.004) 0.003* (0.002) 
Disability  -0.010*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) 0.003 (0.003) -0.002** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) 0.002* (0.001) 
Parental Occ.  Lower Manag. & Prof. -0.017*** (0.001) -0.007*** (0.001) -0.003* (0.002) -0.002*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.002*** (0.001) 
 
Intermediate -0.015*** (0.001) -0.003 (0.002) 0.006*** (0.002) -0.003*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 
 
Small Employers -0.023*** (0.001) -0.005* (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) 0.007*** (0.002) -0.004*** (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) 
 
Lower Super. & Tech. -0.016*** (0.001) 0.005 (0.003) 0.008** (0.004) -0.001 (0.001) 0.004** (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) 
 
Semi-routine -0.022*** (0.001) -0.008** (0.003) 0.008*** (0.002) -0.003*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) 0.005** (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 
 
Routine, Unemp. -0.025*** (0.001) -0.011*** (0.003) 0.005 (0.004) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004* (0.002) 0.004* (0.002) -0.002** (0.001) 
 
Unknown -0.023*** (0.002) -0.012*** (0.003) 0.001 (0.002) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001) 0.002* (0.001) -0.002*** (0.001) 
School Results5 4th Quartile -0.027*** (0.003) -0.027*** (0.002) -0.027*** (0.004) 0.005*** (0.001) -0.008*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) -0.003*** (0.001) 
 
3rd Quartile  -0.020*** (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) -0.005* (0.003) 0.001*** (0.000) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.002*** (0.000) 
 
Top Quartile  0.042*** (0.002) -0.010*** (0.002) -0.019*** (0.002) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.001) 0.025*** (0.002) 0.005*** (0.001) 
Economic Effects6 Youth Unemp.7  0.020*** (0.003) -0.005** (0.002) -0.029*** (0.002) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.011*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) 
 
Mean FT Earnings8 -0.018*** (0.005) 0.023 (0.023) -0.013 (0.012) 0.000 (0.003) -0.022*** (0.007) 0.000 (0.005) -0.004* (0.002) 
 
Working Age Pop.9 -0.009* (0.005) -0.005** (0.002) 0.003 (0.003) -0.002* (0.001) -0.002* (0.001) 0.004** (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 
Emp. by Ind.6, 10 Agric., Fish., Mining. -0.119*** (0.024) -0.035*** (0.012) 0.037** (0.014) -0.022*** (0.004) -0.030*** (0.006) 0.001 (0.005) -0.014*** (0.004) 
 
Manufacturing -0.004 (0.003) 0.005** (0.003) -0.001 (0.003) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.003** (0.001) -0.004** (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 
 
Elect., Gas, Water 0.000 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.000) 
 
Construction 0.008** (0.003) 0.006** (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 
 
Wholesale, Retail 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000* (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 
 
Hotels, Restaurants -0.010** (0.004) 0.005 (0.004) 0.008 (0.005) -0.002 (0.001) -0.005** (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) -0.002* (0.001) 
 
Transport, Comms. 0.035*** (0.010) -0.009 (0.007) -0.018** (0.009) 0.009*** (0.002) 0.010** (0.005) -0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.002) 
 
Business Activities 0.002 (0.004) 0.001 (0.003) -0.004 (0.004) 0.000 (0.001) -0.003 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.002* (0.001) 
 
Public Admin., Def. 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.003) 0.002*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
 
Education -0.007 (0.004) -0.010** (0.005) 0.009* (0.005) -0.002 (0.001) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 
 
Health, Social Work 0.005* (0.003) -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.003) 0.000 (0.001) 0.003** (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
Controls Year, School Type YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) 
Notes: (1) Dep. Var. takes a value one if student chooses a given subject, zero o/w. (2) Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the TTWA level. (3) Subjects defined at the single digit JACS level – See Appendix 2A for 
details. (4) These variables are quasi-continuous. (5) School results are split into cohort quartiles based on the UCAS tariff point score obtained. The best performing students in each cohort appear in the Top Quartile. (6) These 
variables are defined at the TTWA level.  (7) Youth Unemp. is defined as the number of 18-24 year old males/females who are claiming the Job-Seekers Allowance. (8) Average FT Earnings are defined as the average hourly 
earnings of males/females in FT employment. (9) Working Age Pop. is defined as the number of people aged 16-retirement, allowing for different retirement ages of men and women. (10) Emp. by Industry variables are the 
number of FT employees in each sector. See Appendix 2A for industrial classification. (11) *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include 318,621 observations. 
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2C Appendix: Table C.2 (Cont): Females1, 2, 3, 11 
 
Mineral Tech. Architecture Social Studies  Law  Business Studies  Communications  Lang, Ling & Class  
Age4  0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) -0.017*** (0.001) -0.019*** (0.001) 0.010*** (0.001) -0.009*** (0.000) -0.017*** (0.001) 
Ethnicity  Black 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.023*** (0.003) 0.104*** (0.002) 0.054*** (0.004) 0.006** (0.002) -0.042*** (0.005) 
 
Asian 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) 0.073*** (0.006) 0.069*** (0.005) -0.022*** (0.002) -0.040*** (0.004) 
 
Other 0.002** (0.001) 0.002 (0.001) 0.005 (0.004) 0.038*** (0.005) 0.003 (0.004) 0.006*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 
 
Unknown 0.000 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) 0.006 (0.006) 0.022*** (0.006) 0.001 (0.005) 0.013*** (0.004) 0.008 (0.005) 
Disability  0.001 (0.001) 0.002** (0.001) 0.001 (0.003) -0.010*** (0.002) -0.031*** (0.003) -0.003 (0.002) -0.005*** (0.002) 
Parental Occ.  Lower Manag. & Prof. 0.001*** (0.000) -0.002** (0.001) 0.003** (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.008*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 
 
Intermediate 0.000 (0.000) -0.002*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.007*** (0.002) 0.002** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
 
Small Employers 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.007*** (0.002) 0.003 (0.002) 0.021*** (0.003) 0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 
 
Lower Super. & Tech. 0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.011*** (0.003) -0.001 (0.002) 0.016*** (0.003) 0.002 (0.002) -0.004** (0.002) 
 
Semi-routine 0.000 (0.000) -0.003*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.010*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) 
 
Routine, Unemp. 0.000 (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.003) 0.009*** (0.003) 0.018*** (0.003) 0.002 (0.002) 0.003 (0.002) 
 
Unknown 0.000 (0.000) -0.002*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) 0.011*** (0.002) 0.012*** (0.003) 0.006*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.002) 
School Results5 4th Quartile 0.003*** (0.000) -0.002*** (0.000) 0.015*** (0.004) -0.031*** (0.002) 0.068*** (0.008) 0.020*** (0.002) -0.035*** (0.002) 
 
3rd Quartile  0.002*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) 0.007*** (0.002) -0.018*** (0.001) 0.030*** (0.003) 0.016*** (0.001) -0.022*** (0.002) 
 
Top Quartile  -0.001*** (0.000) 0.002** (0.001) -0.012*** (0.002) 0.027*** (0.003) -0.022*** (0.002) -0.014*** (0.001) 0.014*** (0.003) 
Economic Effects6 Youth Unemp.7  0.001 (0.000) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.023*** (0.004) -0.014*** (0.004) -0.007* (0.004) -0.020*** (0.001) 0.017*** (0.002) 
 
Mean FT Earnings8 0.005 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) -0.005 (0.010) -0.009 (0.007) -0.053*** (0.009) -0.014*** (0.005) 0.003 (0.009) 
 
Working Age Pop.9 0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.008** (0.004) 0.008*** (0.002) -0.001 (0.005) -0.002 (0.002) 0.007* (0.004) 
Emp. by Ind.6, 10 Agric., Fish., Mining. -0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.004) 0.078*** (0.015) -0.024** (0.010) -0.007 (0.023) 0.010 (0.008) 0.052*** (0.017) 
 
Manufacturing 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.003) 0.003 (0.002) 0.010* (0.006) -0.003* (0.002) -0.007** (0.003) 
 
Elect., Gas, Water 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 0.003** (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.005 (0.003) -0.001 (0.001) -0.003 (0.002) 
 
Construction 0.002*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.006* (0.003) -0.004 (0.003) -0.003 (0.004) -0.002 (0.002) -0.004 (0.003) 
 
Wholesale, Retail 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000* (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000* (0.000) 
 
Hotels, Restaurants 0.000 (0.001) -0.002* (0.001) 0.007 (0.005) 0.002 (0.003) 0.009 (0.006) 0.001 (0.002) -0.008* (0.004) 
 
Transport, Comms. 0.002 (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) -0.032*** (0.009) -0.002 (0.007) 0.004 (0.012) -0.001 (0.004) -0.004 (0.009) 
 
Business Activities 0.003*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.004) -0.005* (0.003) 0.002 (0.005) 0.000 (0.003) 0.004 (0.003) 
 
Public Admin., Def. -0.001* (0.000) -0.001 (0.000) -0.003 (0.002) -0.004* (0.002) 0.002 (0.004) 0.000 (0.001) -0.004 (0.003) 
 
Education -0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.003 (0.005) 0.001 (0.004) 0.001 (0.007) 0.005** (0.003) 0.002 (0.006) 
 
Health, Social Work -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.002 (0.003) 0.000 (0.002) 0.006 (0.004) -0.003 (0.002) -0.003 (0.003) 
Controls Year, School Type YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) 
Notes: (1) Dep. Var. takes a value one if student chooses a given subject, zero o/w. (2) Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the TTWA level. (3) Subjects defined at the single digit JACS level – See Appendix 2A for 
details. (4) These variables are quasi-continuous. (5) School results are split into cohort quartiles based on the UCAS tariff point score obtained. The best performing students in each cohort appear in the Top Quartile. (6) These 
variables are defined at the TTWA level.  (7) Youth Unemp. is defined as the number of 18-24 year old males/females who are claiming the Job-Seekers Allowance. (8) Average FT Earnings are defined as the average hourly 
earnings of males/females in FT employment. (9) Working Age Pop. is defined as the number of people aged 16-retirement, allowing for different retirement ages of men and women. (10) Emp. by Industry variables are the 
number of FT employees in each sector. See Appendix 2A for industrial classification. (11) *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include 318,621 observations. 
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2C Appendix: Table C.2 (Cont.): Females1, 2, 3, 11 
 
Euro. Languages  Other Languages  History  Art & Music  Education  Combined  
Age4  0.021*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.000) -0.016*** (0.001) 0.010*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
Ethnicity  Black -0.014*** (0.002) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.042*** (0.006) -0.058*** (0.003) -0.056*** (0.002) -0.001** (0.001) 
 
Asian -0.020*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.044*** (0.007) -0.086*** (0.003) -0.043*** (0.003) -0.001** (0.001) 
 
Other 0.001 (0.002) 0.004*** (0.001) -0.015*** (0.005) -0.015*** (0.005) -0.033*** (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) 
 
Unknown -0.002 (0.002) 0.002* (0.001) 0.011* (0.006) -0.022*** (0.005) -0.021*** (0.004) -0.002** (0.001) 
Disability  -0.009*** (0.001) -0.002** (0.001) 0.016*** (0.002) 0.053*** (0.003) -0.010*** (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 
Parental Occ.  Lower Manag. & Prof. 0.002 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) -0.002 (0.001) 0.011*** (0.002) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
 
Intermediate 0.000 (0.001) -0.001** (0.000) -0.004* (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.010*** (0.002) 0.000 (0.000) 
 
Small Employers -0.002 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.010*** (0.002) 0.004 (0.003) 0.012*** (0.002) 0.000 (0.000) 
 
Lower Super. & Tech. -0.005*** (0.001) -0.002*** (0.001) -0.010*** (0.002) -0.002 (0.003) 0.019*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 
 
Semi-routine -0.003** (0.001) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.004** (0.002) 0.004* (0.002) 0.013*** (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 
 
Routine, Unemp. -0.003 (0.002) -0.002*** (0.001) -0.005** (0.002) 0.000 (0.003) 0.018*** (0.003) -0.001 (0.001) 
 
Unknown -0.002 (0.001) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.006*** (0.002) 0.023*** (0.002) 0.002 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
School Results5 4th Quartile -0.022*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.000) -0.037*** (0.002) 0.053*** (0.002) 0.056*** (0.003) 0.000 (0.001) 
 
3rd Quartile  -0.012*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) -0.019*** (0.002) 0.023*** (0.002) 0.028*** (0.002) -0.001** (0.000) 
 
Top Quartile  0.000 (0.001) -0.001** (0.001) 0.000 (0.002) -0.026*** (0.002) -0.019*** (0.002) 0.000 (0.000) 
Economic Effects6 Youth Unemp.7  0.017*** (0.001) 0.001*** (0.000) 0.041*** (0.003) -0.035*** (0.003) -0.016*** (0.002) 0.002*** (0.001) 
 
Mean FT Earnings8 -0.019*** (0.003) -0.005*** (0.001) -0.007 (0.006) 0.155*** (0.053) -0.018** (0.007) -0.001 (0.002) 
 
Working Age Pop.9 -0.008*** (0.002) -0.001*** (0.000) 0.001 (0.004) -0.002 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.001) 
Emp. by Ind.6, 10 Agric., Fish., Mining. -0.051*** (0.009) -0.001 (0.003) 0.067*** (0.015) 0.087*** (0.018) -0.034** (0.016) 0.005* (0.003) 
 
Manufacturing -0.005** (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.004 (0.004) 0.005 (0.003) 0.006 (0.004) 0.001** (0.001) 
 
Elect., Gas, Water -0.002* (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.000) 
 
Construction 0.003* (0.002) 0.002*** (0.001) -0.002 (0.003) -0.004 (0.004) -0.001 (0.003) 0.002 (0.001) 
 
Wholesale, Retail 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 
 
Hotels, Restaurants -0.009*** (0.003) -0.002*** (0.001) -0.004 (0.004) 0.007 (0.005) 0.005 (0.005) 0.000 (0.001) 
 
Transport, Comms. 0.025*** (0.006) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.006) -0.005 (0.009) -0.012* (0.007) -0.005** (0.002) 
 
Business Activities 0.002 (0.003) 0.001 (0.001) -0.006* (0.003) -0.003 (0.005) -0.002 (0.004) 0.002** (0.001) 
 
Public Admin., Def. 0.002 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) -0.001 (0.003) 0.000 (0.003) 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.000) 
 
Education -0.002 (0.003) -0.001* (0.001) -0.001 (0.004) 0.001 (0.005) 0.002 (0.005) -0.001 (0.001) 
 
Health, Social Work 0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.002) -0.005 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003) 0.000 (0.001) 
Controls Year, School Type YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) YES:(5), (2) 
Notes: (1) Dep. Var. takes a value one if student chooses a given subject, zero o/w. (2) Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the TTWA level. (3) Subjects defined at the single digit JACS level – See Appendix 2A for 
details. (4) These variables are quasi-continuous. (5) School results are split into cohort quartiles based on the UCAS tariff point score obtained. The best performing students in each cohort appear in the Top Quartile. (6) These 
variables are defined at the TTWA level.  (7) Youth Unemp. is defined as the number of 18-24 year old males/females who are claiming the Job-Seekers Allowance. (8) Average FT Earnings are defined as the average hourly 
earnings of males/females in FT employment. (9) Working Age Pop. is defined as the number of people aged 16-retirement, allowing for different retirement ages of men and women. (10) Emp. by Industry variables are the 
number of FT employees in each sector. See Appendix 2A for industrial classification. (11) *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include 318,621 observations. 
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2D Appendix: Table D.1: Males1, 2, 4 
 
Medicine & Dent. Medicine Related Biological Science Veterinary Science Physical Science Mathematics Engineering 
Disability 0.000 (0.001) 0.003 (0.002) 0.000 (0.003) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.018*** (0.003) 0.000 (0.003) 0.006* (0.003) 
Parental Occ.  Top 0.001 (0.002) -0.002 (0.003) -0.005 (0.005) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.004) -0.001 (0.006) -0.001 (0.004) 
 
Middle -0.004** (0.002) -0.005 (0.003) -0.005 (0.005) 0.006*** (0.001) -0.003 (0.004) 0.007 (0.006) 0.014*** (0.004) 
 
Unknown 0.002 (0.002) -0.007** (0.003) -0.009* (0.005) -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.004) -0.005 (0.006) 0.006 (0.005) 
School Results5 4th Quartile 0.000 (0.000) -0.013*** (0.001) 0.013*** (0.003) 0.002*** (0.001) -0.018*** (0.002) 0.032*** (0.003) 0.009*** (0.002) 
 
3rd Quartile  0.011*** (0.001) 0.009*** (0.001) -0.024*** (0.002) -0.002*** (0.001) 0.013*** (0.002) 0.006*** (0.002) 0.010*** (0.002) 
 
Top Quartile  0.040*** (0.002) 0.006*** (0.002) -0.046*** (0.003) -0.002*** (0.001) 0.038*** (0.003) 0.065*** (0.003) 0.022*** (0.003) 
Economic Effects3 Unemp. Rate 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001* (0.000) -0.002* (0.001) 0.003** (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 
 
Inactivity Rate 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) -0.001* (0.000) 
 
Youth Unemp. Rate 0.003* (0.002) -0.005** (0.002) -0.010** (0.005) 0.001 (0.001) 0.007 (0.004) 0.010** (0.005) 0.009** (0.004) 
Emp. Growth  by 
Ind3 
Agric., Hunting, For.  0.002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.004) -0.012 (0.009) -0.001 (0.001) 0.020** (0.008) -0.003 (0.008) -0.001 (0.008) 
Mining & Quarrying 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.000) 0.004*** (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 
 
Manufacturing 0.021* (0.012) 0.018 (0.016) -0.028 (0.029) 0.000 (0.008) 0.018 (0.029) -0.019 (0.033) 0.054** (0.026) 
 
Elect., Gas, Water 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.003* (0.002) 
 
Construction 0.002 (0.006) -0.006 (0.007) 0.014 (0.015) 0.002 (0.004) 0.011 (0.015) -0.010 (0.016) -0.013 (0.014) 
 
Hotels, Restaurants -0.012** (0.006) -0.014* (0.008) 0.024 (0.017) -0.005 (0.004) -0.011 (0.015) -0.010 (0.017) 0.025* (0.014) 
 
Transport, Comms. 0.005 (0.006) -0.008 (0.009) -0.029 (0.018) 0.005 (0.004) 0.008 (0.015) 0.010 (0.019) -0.001 (0.014) 
 
Financial Intermed. -0.001 (0.005) -0.003 (0.007) -0.012 (0.017) -0.006 (0.005) 0.006 (0.013) 0.008 (0.018) 0.023* (0.013) 
 
Other Business Act. -0.002 (0.007) -0.001 (0.009) -0.021 (0.019) -0.001 (0.005) 0.008 (0.016) -0.006 (0.02) 0.005 (0.015) 
 
Business Activities -0.003 (0.005) -0.008 (0.007) -0.007 (0.013) 0.005 (0.003) 0.028** (0.012) 0.004 (0.014) -0.003 (0.012) 
 
Public Admin., Def. -0.005 (0.007) 0.008 (0.008) -0.033* (0.017) -0.006 (0.005) -0.009 (0.017) 0.002 (0.020) -0.010 (0.016) 
 
Education -0.011 (0.008) -0.001 (0.012) -0.042** (0.020) -0.009 (0.006) -0.006 (0.018) -0.019 (0.023) 0.018 (0.018) 
 
Health, Social Work 0.018** (0.007) 0.007 (0.010) 0.019 (0.018) 0.000 (0.004) 0.004 (0.017) 0.032 (0.021) 0.005 (0.015) 
Wages Growth by 
Ind. 3 
Agric., Hunting, For.  0.070*** (0.022) -0.028 (0.032) -0.059 (0.057) -0.002 (0.013) 0.091** (0.046) 0.287*** (0.063) 0.042 (0.046) 
Mining & Quarrying 0.007 (0.011) 0.023 (0.015) -0.006 (0.029) 0.008 (0.007) -0.018 (0.027) 0.039 (0.031) 0.110*** (0.025) 
 Manufacturing -0.101 (0.085) -0.071 (0.124) -0.713*** (0.221) 0.060 (0.058) 0.795*** (0.204) 0.735*** (0.251) 1.938*** (0.195) 
 Elect., Gas, Water -0.040** (0.016) -0.005 (0.021) 0.011 (0.040) -0.006 (0.010) -0.010 (0.037) -0.054 (0.045) -0.052 (0.033) 
 Construction 0.227*** (0.045) -0.045 (0.057) -0.146 (0.122) 0.021 (0.030) 0.082 (0.117) 0.280** (0.118) 0.029 (0.097) 
 Hotels, Restaurants 0.115*** (0.020) 0.054* (0.032) -0.153** (0.063) 0.022 (0.017) 0.075 (0.059) 0.197*** (0.066) 0.314*** (0.053) 
 Transport, Comms. 0.331*** (0.093) -0.093 (0.091) 0.126 (0.178) 0.119** (0.053) -0.351** (0.159) 0.144 (0.187) -0.661*** (0.154) 
 Financial Intermed. 0.114*** (0.037) 0.037 (0.058) -0.123 (0.110) -0.003 (0.025) -0.011 (0.090) 0.010 (0.115) 0.242*** (0.083) 
 Other Business Act. 0.073** (0.033) 0.050 (0.043) -0.230*** (0.079) 0.015 (0.019) 0.225*** (0.071) 0.538*** (0.089) 0.396*** (0.066) 
 Business Activities 0.480*** (0.089) -0.002 (0.105) -0.152 (0.204) 0.090* (0.053) -0.171 (0.189) 0.553** (0.240) 0.447** (0.175) 
 Public Admin., Def. -0.229*** (0.082) -0.090 (0.119) 0.248 (0.210) -0.065 (0.056) -0.324* (0.187) 0.200 (0.236) -1.003*** (0.196) 
 Education -0.442*** (0.083) -0.068 (0.093) 0.167 (0.164) -0.085* (0.047) 0.044 (0.156) 0.185 (0.196) -0.249 (0.154) 
 Health, Social Work -0.106*** (0.030) -0.004 (0.030) 0.040 (0.059) -0.031* (0.018) 0.024 (0.051) 0.002 (0.062) 0.044 (0.052) 
Notes: (1) Dep. Var. takes a value 1(0) if the subject is (not) taken. (2) Standard errors (in brackets) clustered by Postcode District. (3) Economic variables vary by Local Authority. All other variables as defined above.  (4) *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include 132,254 observations, as well as fixed effects for School (3,070), Domicile Postcode District (2,611), Age (5) and Ethnicity (5). 
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2D Appendix: Table D.1 (Cont): Males1, 2, 4 
 
Mineral Technology Architecture Social Studies Law Business Studies Communications 
Disability 0.001 (0.001) 0.007*** (0.002) -0.001 (0.004) -0.009*** (0.002) -0.027*** (0.004) -0.005*** (0.002) 
Parental Occ.  Top 0.002 (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.005) 0.005 (0.003) -0.002 (0.006) 0.002 (0.003) 
 
Middle 0.001 (0.002) 0.005** (0.003) -0.010** (0.005) 0.001 (0.004) -0.001 (0.006) 0.002 (0.003) 
 
Unknown 0.000 (0.002) 0.003 (0.003) -0.005 (0.005) 0.006 (0.004) 0.001 (0.006) 0.004 (0.003) 
School Results  4th Quartile 0.004*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.002) -0.031*** (0.002) -0.021*** (0.001) 0.035*** (0.003) -0.001 (0.002) 
 
3rd Quartile  -0.007*** (0.001) -0.013*** (0.001) 0.021*** (0.002) 0.030*** (0.002) -0.053*** (0.002) -0.013*** (0.001) 
 
Top Quartile  -0.012*** (0.001) -0.017*** (0.001) 0.011*** (0.003) 0.051*** (0.002) -0.113*** (0.003) -0.027*** (0.001) 
Economic Effects3 Unemp. Rate -0.001** (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
 
Inactivity Rate 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
 
Youth Unemp. Rate 0.001 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) -0.003 (0.005) 0.000 (0.003) -0.004 (0.005) -0.002 (0.003) 
Emp. Growth  by 
Ind3 
Agric., Hunting, For.  -0.001 (0.003) -0.005 (0.003) 0.006 (0.007) 0.005 (0.006) -0.020* (0.011) -0.006 (0.004) 
Mining & Quarrying -0.001* (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.003) 0.000 (0.001) 
 
Manufacturing -0.025** (0.010) -0.002 (0.015) 0.012 (0.033) -0.020 (0.021) 0.049 (0.034) -0.044** (0.017) 
 
Elect., Gas, Water -0.001* (0.001) 0.002* (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) -0.003 (0.002) 0.003** (0.001) 
 
Construction -0.004 (0.005) 0.011 (0.008) -0.016 (0.016) -0.006 (0.010) -0.006 (0.017) 0.010 (0.009) 
 
Hotels, Restaurants -0.001 (0.005) 0.030*** (0.009) -0.020 (0.018) -0.001 (0.012) -0.028 (0.019) 0.019* (0.010) 
 
Transport, Comms. -0.003 (0.006) -0.003 (0.009) -0.010 (0.018) 0.021* (0.013) -0.010 (0.019) 0.007 (0.010) 
 
Financial Intermed. 0.006 (0.005) -0.013* (0.007) -0.023 (0.016) -0.001 (0.011) 0.007 (0.018) 0.001 (0.009) 
 
Other Business Act. -0.001 (0.006) -0.002 (0.009) 0.022 (0.017) 0.004 (0.012) 0.017 (0.019) -0.004 (0.010) 
 
Business Activities 0.002 (0.004) -0.010 (0.007) 0.009 (0.014) 0.011 (0.010) -0.018 (0.016) -0.004 (0.008) 
 
Public Admin., Def. 0.004 (0.005) 0.009 (0.011) -0.008 (0.017) 0.008 (0.012) 0.052** (0.020) -0.013 (0.010) 
 
Education 0.007 (0.007) -0.007 (0.011) -0.004 (0.024) 0.026 (0.016) -0.004 (0.024) 0.003 (0.012) 
 
Health, Social Work 0.003 (0.006) -0.006 (0.011) -0.015 (0.018) -0.044*** (0.013) 0.007 (0.020) -0.002 (0.011) 
Wages Growth by 
Ind3 
Agric., Hunting, For.  0.004 (0.018) 0.047 (0.032) -0.088 (0.059) -0.160*** (0.046) -0.117* (0.063) -0.031 (0.035) 
Mining & Quarrying -0.014 (0.009) 0.008 (0.015) -0.034 (0.028) 0.006 (0.021) -0.020 (0.033) -0.023 (0.015) 
 Manufacturing 0.030 (0.073) 0.155 (0.123) -0.796*** (0.238) -0.649*** (0.170) 1.179*** (0.265) -0.671*** (0.130) 
 Elect., Gas, Water 0.027** (0.013) -0.017 (0.022) 0.002 (0.041) 0.065** (0.030) 0.074 (0.047) 0.002 (0.023) 
 Construction 0.030 (0.037) 0.067 (0.064) -0.101 (0.127) -0.159* (0.084) -0.027 (0.128) 0.041 (0.067) 
 Hotels, Restaurants -0.006 (0.020) 0.027 (0.034) -0.203*** (0.065) -0.101** (0.047) 0.071 (0.071) -0.060* (0.036) 
 Transport, Comms. 0.001 (0.054) 0.311*** (0.112) 0.086 (0.182) -0.243* (0.127) -0.190 (0.205) 0.234** (0.107) 
 Financial Intermed. -0.006 (0.034) -0.135** (0.058) -0.043 (0.102) 0.111 (0.084) 0.028 (0.123) -0.035 (0.061) 
 Other Business Act. -0.029 (0.025) -0.029 (0.043) -0.166** (0.078) -0.250*** (0.060) -0.119 (0.093) -0.154*** (0.046) 
 Business Activities -0.090 (0.066) 0.116 (0.122) -0.321 (0.208) -0.361** (0.153) -0.270 (0.260) -0.055 (0.116) 
 Public Admin., Def. 0.018 (0.062) -0.175 (0.117) 0.202 (0.212) 0.206 (0.155) -0.303 (0.240) 0.218* (0.120) 
 Education 0.057 (0.048) -0.090 (0.101) -0.200 (0.163) 0.242* (0.125) -0.034 (0.203) 0.070 (0.094) 
 Health, Social Work 0.002 (0.017) -0.023 (0.037) -0.108* (0.061) 0.084* (0.044) 0.132* (0.070) -0.084** (0.035) 
Notes: (1) Dep. Var. takes a value 1(0) if the subject is (not) taken. (2) Standard errors (in brackets) clustered by Postcode District. (3) Economic variables vary by Local Authority. All other variables as defined above.  (4) *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include 132,254 observations, as well as fixed effects for School (3,070), Domicile Postcode District (2,611), Age (5) and Ethnicity (5). 
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2D Appendix: Table D.1 (Cont): Males1, 2, 4 
 
Lang., Ling. & Classics European Languages Other Languages History Art & Music Education 
Disability -0.009*** (0.002) -0.005*** (0.001) -0.001* (0.001) -0.002 (0.003) 0.023*** (0.003) 0.000 (0.001) 
Parental Occ.  Top 0.003 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.004) -0.001 (0.004) -0.005*** (0.002) 
 
Middle 0.002 (0.003) -0.002 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) -0.006 (0.004) 0.000 (0.004) -0.003 (0.002) 
 
Unknown 0.001 (0.003) -0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) -0.004 (0.004) 0.012** (0.004) -0.005*** (0.002) 
School Results  4th Quartile -0.011*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) -0.001** (0.000) -0.019*** (0.002) 0.013*** (0.003) 0.005*** (0.001) 
 
3rd Quartile  0.014*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.000) 0.022*** (0.002) -0.019*** (0.002) -0.009*** (0.001) 
 
Top Quartile  0.020*** (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.013*** (0.002) -0.035*** (0.002) -0.013*** (0.001) 
Economic Effects3 Unemp. Rate 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
 
Inactivity Rate 0.001** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
 
Youth Unemp. Rate -0.003 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.009** (0.003) -0.008** (0.004) -0.003** (0.002) 
Emp. Growth  by 
Ind3 
Agric., Hunting, For.  0.003 (0.004) 0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.008 (0.007) -0.006 (0.007) 0.004 (0.003) 
Mining & Quarrying -0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) -0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.000) 
 
Manufacturing -0.039** (0.018) 0.011 (0.009) -0.009 (0.006) -0.037 (0.026) 0.042 (0.027) -0.002 (0.011) 
 
Elect., Gas, Water -0.002 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) -0.003* (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 
 
Construction 0.008 (0.009) 0.000 (0.005) -0.003 (0.003) 0.020 (0.012) -0.012 (0.013) -0.002 (0.005) 
 
Hotels, Restaurants -0.006 (0.009) 0.003 (0.005) -0.001 (0.004) 0.005 (0.015) 0.009 (0.014) -0.007 (0.006) 
 
Transport, Comms. -0.002 (0.010) 0.006 (0.005) 0.004 (0.004) -0.005 (0.014) 0.006 (0.015) -0.002 (0.005) 
 
Financial Intermed. 0.004 (0.009) -0.003 (0.004) -0.005 (0.003) 0.007 (0.014) 0.011 (0.012) -0.006 (0.005) 
 
Other Business Act. 0.011 (0.010) -0.001 (0.005) -0.002 (0.004) 0.014 (0.016) -0.033** (0.015) -0.008 (0.006) 
 
Business Activities 0.006 (0.008) -0.006 (0.004) -0.002 (0.003) -0.006 (0.011) 0.003 (0.011) -0.001 (0.004) 
 
Public Admin., Def. -0.004 (0.009) 0.001 (0.004) 0.003 (0.005) -0.020 (0.014) 0.010 (0.012) 0.011 (0.008) 
 
Education -0.006 (0.013) 0.002 (0.006) 0.004 (0.004) 0.010 (0.019) 0.029* (0.018) 0.007 (0.006) 
 
Health, Social Work -0.021* (0.011) 0.004 (0.006) -0.002 (0.004) -0.029* (0.016) 0.012 (0.015) 0.008 (0.006) 
Wages Growth by 
Ind.3 
Agric., Hunting, For.  -0.088** (0.035) 0.101*** (0.016) 0.015 (0.010) -0.097** (0.049) 0.005 (0.048) 0.007 (0.019) 
Mining & Quarrying -0.008 (0.016) -0.020*** (0.008) 0.003 (0.005) 0.010 (0.023) -0.053** (0.023) -0.018 (0.011) 
 Manufacturing -0.484*** (0.134) 0.636*** (0.072) 0.167*** (0.049) -1.158*** (0.193) -0.988*** (0.182) -0.066 (0.072) 
 Elect., Gas, Water 0.024 (0.024) 0.013 (0.012) -0.011 (0.008) -0.002 (0.034) -0.029 (0.033) 0.006 (0.013) 
 Construction 0.126* (0.068) 0.000 (0.036) 0.018 (0.024) -0.402*** (0.099) -0.097 (0.097) 0.055 (0.040) 
 Hotels, Restaurants 0.046 (0.037) -0.013 (0.017) 0.014 (0.011) -0.167*** (0.051) -0.199*** (0.052) -0.033 (0.022) 
 Transport, Comms. 0.004 (0.101) -0.199*** (0.049) -0.058* (0.032) 0.191 (0.151) 0.141 (0.142) 0.106 (0.069) 
 Financial Intermed. 0.012 (0.060) -0.098*** (0.026) -0.013 (0.018) 0.155* (0.088) -0.165* (0.086) -0.077** (0.035) 
 Other Business Act. -0.171*** (0.046) 0.205*** (0.022) 0.009 (0.013) -0.278*** (0.067) -0.063 (0.066) -0.021 (0.027) 
 Business Activities -0.195 (0.123) -0.075 (0.060) 0.110*** (0.041) 0.084 (0.171) -0.200 (0.161) 0.010 (0.075) 
 Public Admin., Def. -0.355*** (0.122) 0.059 (0.060) 0.036 (0.042) 0.441** (0.177) 0.631*** (0.169) 0.285*** (0.076) 
 Education -0.091 (0.096) 0.214*** (0.047) -0.012 (0.029) -0.153 (0.136) 0.336*** (0.129) 0.109 (0.067) 
 Health, Social Work 0.034 (0.033) 0.041*** (0.015) 0.018* (0.011) -0.056 (0.049) -0.021 (0.045) 0.012 (0.024) 
Notes: (1) Dep. Var. takes a value 1(0) if the subject is (not) taken. (2) Standard errors (in brackets) clustered by Postcode District. (3) Economic variables vary by Local Authority. All other variables as defined above.  (4) *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include 132,254 observations, as well as fixed effects for School (3,070), Domicile Postcode District (2,611), Age (5) and Ethnicity (5). 
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2D Appendix: Table D.2: Females1, 2, 4 
 
Medicine & Dent. Medicine Related Biological Science Veterinary Science Physical Science Mathematics Engineering 
Disability -0.001 (0.108) 0.007** (0.275) -0.001 (0.374) 0.000 (0.106) 0.010*** (0.233) -0.001 (0.165) 0.003*** (0.106) 
Parental Occ.  Top 0.002** (0.118) 0.008** (0.365) -0.009* (0.494) 0.000 (0.120) 0.001 (0.277) -0.004 (0.260) -0.001 (0.121) 
 
Middle -0.001 (0.123) 0.009** (0.383) -0.003 (0.512) 0.003** (0.128) 0.005 (0.294) -0.003 (0.273) 0.000 (0.125) 
 
Unknown 0.004*** (0.142) -0.002 (0.396) -0.014*** (0.534) -0.001 (0.131) 0.000 (0.312) -0.003 (0.293) 0.000 (0.138) 
School Results  4th Quartile -0.001** (0.036) -0.020*** (0.219) -0.023*** (0.286) 0.005*** (0.092) -0.003* (0.160) 0.007*** (0.148) 0.001** (0.070) 
 
3rd Quartile  0.014*** (0.060) 0.001 (0.177) 0.007*** (0.226) -0.004*** (0.064) 0.005*** (0.138) 0.005*** (0.101) 0.002*** (0.055) 
 
Top Quartile  0.052*** (0.156) -0.016*** (0.224) -0.023*** (0.292) -0.004*** (0.084) 0.017*** (0.189) 0.039*** (0.176) 0.006*** (0.087) 
Economic Effects3 Unemp. Rate 0.000 (0.045) 0.000 (0.092) 0.000 (0.129) 0.000 (0.032) 0.001 (0.072) 0.000 (0.058) 0.000 (0.029) 
 
Inactivity Rate 0.000 (0.017) 0.000 (0.037) 0.001 (0.048) 0.000 (0.015) 0.000 (0.029) 0.000 (0.023) 0.000 (0.012) 
 
Youth Unemp. Rate 0.004** (0.159) 0.005 (0.324) -0.010** (0.476) 0.004*** (0.135) 0.004 (0.266) 0.000 (0.210) 0.001 (0.103) 
Emp. Growth  by 
Ind3 
Agric., Hunting, For.  -0.002 (0.002) 0.008 (0.006) 0.002 (0.009) -0.003 (0.002) -0.006 (0.005) 0.002 (0.004) 0.000 (0.002) 
Mining & Quarrying 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) 0.003 (0.003) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
 
Manufacturing -0.007 (0.011) -0.032 (0.024) 0.054* (0.032) 0.008 (0.009) -0.033* (0.019) -0.015 (0.015) 0.001 (0.009) 
 
Elect., Gas, Water 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001) 
 
Construction -0.006 (0.005) 0.016 (0.012) 0.017 (0.016) -0.003 (0.005) 0.001 (0.009) -0.001 (0.007) 0.001 (0.004) 
 
Hotels, Restaurants 0.004 (0.006) -0.002 (0.013) -0.017 (0.017) -0.002 (0.005) 0.004 (0.010) 0.022*** (0.008) -0.003 (0.004) 
 
Transport, Comms. 0.003 (0.006) -0.001 (0.014) -0.014 (0.019) 0.003 (0.005) -0.001 (0.011) 0.018** (0.008) -0.002 (0.004) 
 
Financial Intermed. -0.001 (0.006) 0.002 (0.011) -0.012 (0.017) -0.012*** (0.005) -0.003 (0.010) 0.002 (0.007) 0.003 (0.003) 
 
Other Business Act. 0.005 (0.006) -0.014 (0.013) -0.028 (0.018) 0.001 (0.005) -0.006 (0.012) 0.007 (0.008) -0.003 (0.004) 
 
Business Activities -0.005 (0.005) 0.016 (0.011) 0.001 (0.014) -0.001 (0.004) -0.003 (0.008) -0.010 (0.006) 0.002 (0.004) 
 
Public Admin., Def. 0.006 (0.006) 0.006 (0.013) -0.007 (0.019) 0.002 (0.006) -0.002 (0.011) -0.006 (0.008) -0.007* (0.004) 
 
Education -0.002 (0.008) 0.011 (0.017) 0.009 (0.023) 0.000 (0.008) -0.021 (0.013) 0.005 (0.011) -0.009 (0.006) 
 
Health, Social Work 0.009 (0.007) 0.048*** (0.014) -0.003 (0.019) 0.002 (0.006) -0.016 (0.012) -0.010 (0.009) 0.000 (0.005) 
Wages Growth by 
Ind. 3 
Agric., Hunting, For.  -0.122*** (0.011) -0.060*** (0.023) 0.062** (0.030) -0.023*** (0.008) -0.036** (0.018) 0.006 (0.015) -0.027*** (0.008) 
Mining & Quarrying -0.057*** (0.006) 0.038** (0.015) -0.019 (0.020) -0.013** (0.006) 0.017 (0.011) 0.025** (0.009) 0.003 (0.005) 
 Manufacturing -0.708*** (0.045) -0.265** (0.107) 0.439*** (0.140) -0.106*** (0.039) -0.202** (0.082) -0.240*** (0.068) -0.120*** (0.034) 
 Elect., Gas, Water 0.119*** (0.012) 0.014 (0.029) -0.031 (0.039) 0.018 (0.012) 0.020 (0.023) 0.001 (0.018) 0.005 (0.010) 
 Construction 0.214*** (0.018) 0.066* (0.036) -0.114** (0.051) 0.015 (0.016) 0.112*** (0.030) 0.031 (0.023) 0.040*** (0.013) 
 Hotels, Restaurants -0.361*** (0.029) -0.244*** (0.067) 0.215** (0.084) -0.088*** (0.022) -0.160*** (0.049) -0.037 (0.039) -0.146*** (0.022) 
 Transport, Comms. 0.192*** (0.035) 0.089 (0.077) -0.067 (0.093) 0.022 (0.028) 0.057 (0.057) 0.022 (0.046) 0.066** (0.027) 
 Financial Intermed. 0.242*** (0.036) 0.098 (0.079) -0.224** (0.106) 0.033 (0.030) 0.063 (0.062) 0.225*** (0.050) 0.094*** (0.027) 
 Other Business Act. 0.231*** (0.027) 0.004 (0.071) -0.128 (0.087) 0.059* (0.031) 0.025 (0.053) 0.204*** (0.042) 0.030 (0.022) 
 Business Activities 0.105*** (0.026) -0.032 (0.067) 0.084 (0.089) 0.030 (0.024) -0.165*** (0.052) 0.005 (0.041) -0.001 (0.020) 
 Public Admin., Def. -1.194*** (0.083) -0.354** (0.180) 0.820*** (0.257) -0.246*** (0.069) -0.510*** (0.155) -0.249** (0.119) -0.147** (0.062) 
 Education 0.208*** (0.059) 0.014 (0.163) 0.006 (0.223) -0.027 (0.068) -0.065 (0.129) -0.019 (0.106) -0.092* (0.055) 
 Health, Social Work -0.504*** (0.031) -0.080 (0.063) 0.327*** (0.087) -0.085*** (0.024) -0.157*** (0.052) -0.174*** (0.041) -0.092*** (0.022) 
Notes: (1) Dep. Var. takes a value 1(0) if the subject is (not) taken. (2) Standard errors (in brackets) clustered by Postcode District. (3) Economic variables vary by Local Authority. All other variables as defined above.  (4) *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include 167,291 observations, as well as fixed effects for School (3,261), Domicile Postcode District (2,646), Age (5) and Ethnicity (5). 
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2D Appendix: Table D.2 (Cont): Females1, 2, 4 
 
Mineral Technology Architecture Social Studies Law Business Studies Communications 
Disability 0.002** (0.074) 0.004*** (0.116) -0.002 (0.312) -0.015*** (0.230) -0.025*** (0.278) -0.006*** (0.206) 
Parental Occ.  Top 0.000 (0.090) 0.001 (0.120) 0.000 (0.400) -0.001 (0.369) -0.018*** (0.439) 0.008*** (0.261) 
 
Middle -0.001 (0.094) 0.001 (0.125) -0.005 (0.421) -0.002 (0.384) -0.008* (0.465) 0.006** (0.273) 
 
Unknown -0.001 (0.101) 0.001 (0.133) -0.004 (0.451) 0.001 (0.400) -0.008 (0.495) 0.011*** (0.292) 
School Results  4th Quartile 0.001 (0.061) -0.001** (0.072) 0.012*** (0.260) -0.027*** (0.189) 0.053*** (0.307) -0.005** (0.190) 
 
3rd Quartile  -0.002*** (0.039) 0.000 (0.061) -0.012*** (0.192) 0.037*** (0.167) -0.037*** (0.184) -0.019*** (0.130) 
 
Top Quartile  -0.004*** (0.044) 0.002** (0.086) -0.026*** (0.241) 0.071*** (0.250) -0.066*** (0.220) -0.036*** (0.143) 
Economic Effects3 Unemp. Rate 0.000 (0.021) 0.000 (0.034) -0.001 (0.102) 0.001 (0.087) 0.000 (0.108) -0.001* (0.072) 
 
Inactivity Rate 0.000 (0.008) 0.000 (0.014) 0.000 (0.041) 0.000 (0.035) 0.000 (0.041) 0.000 (0.029) 
 
Youth Unemp. Rate -0.001 (0.080) -0.001 (0.125) 0.000 (0.366) -0.004 (0.329) 0.005 (0.389) -0.002 (0.236) 
Emp. Growth  by 
Ind3 
Agric., Hunting, For.  -0.001 (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) 0.013** (0.006) 0.003 (0.008) -0.012* (0.007) 0.000 (0.005) 
Mining & Quarrying -0.001* (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) -0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 
 
Manufacturing 0.004 (0.005) 0.005 (0.009) 0.036 (0.027) 0.027 (0.023) 0.040 (0.026) -0.011 (0.018) 
 
Elect., Gas, Water 0.000 (0.000) -0.001 (0.001) -0.003 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 0.002 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) 
 
Construction 0.002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.004) -0.016 (0.012) -0.007 (0.011) 0.006 (0.013) 0.007 (0.009) 
 
Hotels, Restaurants 0.000 (0.003) -0.001 (0.005) 0.019 (0.015) -0.015 (0.012) -0.016 (0.014) 0.010 (0.010) 
 
Transport, Comms. 0.000 (0.003) 0.005 (0.005) -0.013 (0.015) 0.009 (0.013) 0.014 (0.014) -0.003 (0.010) 
 
Financial Intermed. -0.002 (0.003) 0.003 (0.004) -0.009 (0.012) 0.011 (0.012) -0.002 (0.013) -0.003 (0.009) 
 
Other Business Act. -0.003 (0.003) -0.007 (0.005) 0.011 (0.015) 0.009 (0.012) 0.006 (0.015) -0.004 (0.011) 
 
Business Activities -0.002 (0.002) -0.004 (0.004) 0.016 (0.012) -0.007 (0.011) 0.009 (0.012) -0.012 (0.008) 
 
Public Admin., Def. 0.000 (0.002) 0.004 (0.005) -0.005 (0.014) -0.028** (0.014) -0.002 (0.018) 0.004 (0.011) 
 
Education -0.005 (0.004) 0.008 (0.006) -0.018 (0.019) -0.008 (0.016) 0.015 (0.019) -0.005 (0.012) 
 
Health, Social Work -0.004 (0.004) 0.002 (0.006) -0.042** (0.017) -0.017 (0.014) 0.021 (0.016) -0.015 (0.011) 
Wages Growth by 
Ind. 3 
Agric., Hunting, For.  0.011** (0.005) 0.009 (0.008) 0.001 (0.024) 0.062*** (0.022) -0.048* (0.025) 0.012 (0.015) 
Mining & Quarrying 0.006* (0.003) 0.000 (0.005) -0.021 (0.017) 0.012 (0.013) 0.005 (0.016) -0.001 (0.011) 
 Manufacturing 0.030 (0.021) 0.031 (0.037) 0.202* (0.112) 0.402*** (0.101) -0.307*** (0.111) 0.171** (0.076) 
 Elect., Gas, Water -0.011 (0.007) -0.017* (0.010) -0.030 (0.032) -0.015 (0.028) -0.034 (0.031) 0.018 (0.020) 
 Construction -0.012 (0.009) -0.016 (0.014) -0.072* (0.041) -0.081** (0.035) 0.043 (0.041) -0.020 (0.026) 
 Hotels, Restaurants 0.001 (0.012) 0.009 (0.023) 0.140* (0.071) 0.161*** (0.061) -0.395*** (0.073) 0.079* (0.045) 
 Transport, Comms. -0.006 (0.013) -0.007 (0.025) -0.008 (0.080) -0.100 (0.069) 0.035 (0.080) 0.016 (0.050) 
 Financial Intermed. -0.015 (0.017) -0.036 (0.028) 0.000 (0.087) -0.142* (0.074) 0.116 (0.083) -0.100* (0.060) 
 Other Business Act. -0.006 (0.014) -0.027 (0.025) -0.172** (0.070) -0.226*** (0.067) 0.102 (0.073) -0.038 (0.046) 
 Business Activities 0.003 (0.017) 0.037 (0.025) 0.162** (0.076) -0.001 (0.065) -0.105 (0.071) 0.084* (0.051) 
 Public Admin., Def. -0.005 (0.037) 0.030 (0.072) 0.340 (0.208) 0.599*** (0.181) 0.100 (0.204) 0.132 (0.143) 
 Education -0.076** (0.036) 0.064 (0.061) -0.170 (0.180) 0.103 (0.166) -0.607*** (0.183) 0.169 (0.121) 
 Health, Social Work 0.032** (0.014) 0.019 (0.023) 0.219*** (0.070) 0.312*** (0.063) -0.166** (0.071) 0.076 (0.046) 
Notes: (1) Dep. Var. takes a value 1(0) if the subject is (not) taken. (2) Standard errors (in brackets) clustered by Postcode District. (3) Economic variables vary by Local Authority. All other variables as defined above.  (4) *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include 167,291 observations, as well as fixed effects for School (3,261), Domicile Postcode District (2,646), Age (5) and Ethnicity (5). 
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2D Appendix: Table D.2 (Cont): Females1, 2, 4 
 
Lang., Ling. & Classics European Languages Other Languages History Art & Music Education 
Disability -0.015*** (0.257) -0.008*** (0.128) -0.002*** (0.069) 0.010*** (0.279) 0.047*** (0.355) -0.007*** (0.198) 
Parental Occ.  Top 0.002 (0.338) -0.002 (0.166) 0.001* (0.077) 0.007** (0.281) 0.013*** (0.346) -0.009*** (0.319) 
 
Middle -0.002 (0.354) -0.003** (0.168) 0.000 (0.081) 0.001 (0.295) 0.007** (0.364) -0.002 (0.334) 
 
Unknown -0.005 (0.371) 0.002 (0.185) 0.001 (0.088) -0.003 (0.305) 0.031*** (0.413) -0.012*** (0.343) 
School Results  4th Quartile -0.017*** (0.179) -0.005*** (0.078) -0.001*** (0.051) -0.020*** (0.152) 0.017*** (0.269) 0.027*** (0.224) 
 
3rd Quartile  0.028*** (0.168) 0.010*** (0.088) 0.001** (0.048) 0.020*** (0.157) -0.017*** (0.178) -0.039*** (0.133) 
 
Top Quartile  0.045*** (0.240) 0.010*** (0.128) 0.000 (0.065) 0.025*** (0.219) -0.036*** (0.228) -0.057*** (0.149) 
Economic Effects3 Unemp. Rate 0.002* (0.091) 0.000 (0.049) -0.001*** (0.025) 0.001 (0.081) 0.000 (0.097) 0.000 (0.072) 
 
Inactivity Rate 0.000 (0.038) -0.001*** (0.020) 0.000*** (0.010) 0.000 (0.034) 0.000 (0.040) 0.000 (0.029) 
 
Youth Unemp. Rate -0.002 (0.332) 0.008*** (0.168) 0.001* (0.082) -0.004 (0.291) -0.008** (0.354) 0.000 (0.258) 
Emp. Growth  by 
Ind3 
Agric., Hunting, For.  -0.013** (0.005) 0.000 (0.003) 0.002 (0.001) 0.000 (0.005) -0.005 (0.010) 0.013** (0.006) 
Mining & Quarrying -0.003 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 
 
Manufacturing -0.036 (0.023) 0.014 (0.013) 0.012** (0.006) -0.019 (0.024) -0.023 (0.026) -0.025 (0.019) 
 
Elect., Gas, Water 0.001 (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) -0.001* (0.000) -0.003** (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) 
 
Construction -0.006 (0.011) 0.006 (0.006) 0.003 (0.003) 0.004 (0.011) -0.008 (0.012) -0.017* (0.009) 
 
Hotels, Restaurants 0.010 (0.013) 0.008 (0.007) -0.005 (0.004) -0.009 (0.012) 0.005 (0.015) -0.012 (0.010) 
 
Transport, Comms. -0.009 (0.012) 0.010 (0.007) -0.001 (0.003) -0.010 (0.012) 0.005 (0.014) -0.014 (0.010) 
 
Financial Intermed. 0.004 (0.011) 0.009 (0.006) 0.000 (0.003) 0.009 (0.010) 0.008 (0.013) -0.006 (0.009) 
 
Other Business Act. 0.023* (0.014) -0.003 (0.008) 0.001 (0.004) 0.005 (0.013) -0.005 (0.015) 0.003 (0.011) 
 
Business Activities 0.004 (0.010) -0.005 (0.006) -0.001 (0.003) -0.004 (0.010) 0.009 (0.012) -0.004 (0.008) 
 
Public Admin., Def. 0.003 (0.013) 0.009 (0.007) -0.004 (0.003) 0.014 (0.012) 0.013 (0.014) -0.003 (0.012) 
 
Education 0.010 (0.016) -0.021** (0.009) 0.006 (0.005) 0.023 (0.016) 0.014 (0.018) -0.015 (0.013) 
 
Health, Social Work -0.005 (0.013) 0.013* (0.007) 0.003 (0.004) -0.004 (0.014) 0.022 (0.015) -0.004 (0.011) 
Wages Growth by 
Ind. 3 
Agric., Hunting, For.  0.037* (0.020) -0.051*** (0.011) -0.014** (0.006) 0.030 (0.020) 0.103*** (0.022) 0.047*** (0.018) 
Mining & Quarrying -0.037*** (0.013) 0.030*** (0.008) 0.008** (0.004) -0.022* (0.013) 0.003 (0.016) 0.025** (0.012) 
 Manufacturing 0.058 (0.099) -0.274*** (0.055) -0.052* (0.029) 0.228** (0.096) 0.511*** (0.114) 0.201*** (0.076) 
 Elect., Gas, Water -0.044 (0.027) 0.015 (0.014) 0.011 (0.007) -0.029 (0.026) 0.020 (0.029) -0.030 (0.023) 
 Construction -0.036 (0.034) 0.055*** (0.018) 0.013 (0.010) -0.070** (0.033) -0.147*** (0.039) -0.024 (0.030) 
 Hotels, Restaurants 0.236*** (0.059) -0.428*** (0.032) -0.077*** (0.016) 0.294*** (0.059) 0.509*** (0.066) 0.292*** (0.054) 
 Transport, Comms. -0.063 (0.064) -0.047 (0.042) 0.005 (0.020) -0.038 (0.066) -0.171** (0.078) 0.003 (0.063) 
 Financial Intermed. -0.121 (0.078) 0.234*** (0.043) 0.052** (0.022) -0.052 (0.073) -0.355*** (0.083) -0.112* (0.060) 
 Other Business Act. -0.151** (0.061) 0.285*** (0.032) 0.045*** (0.017) -0.116* (0.060) -0.045 (0.068) -0.078 (0.054) 
 Business Activities 0.069 (0.064) -0.175*** (0.029) -0.052*** (0.016) 0.036 (0.062) 0.106 (0.069) -0.189*** (0.047) 
 Public Admin., Def. 0.039 (0.181) -0.201** (0.091) 0.025 (0.052) 0.314* (0.179) 0.559*** (0.202) -0.054 (0.140) 
 Education -0.026 (0.162) -0.129* (0.078) -0.065 (0.047) 0.280* (0.159) 0.465*** (0.169) -0.032 (0.117) 
 Health, Social Work 0.109* (0.060) -0.240*** (0.033) -0.058*** (0.019) 0.164*** (0.062) 0.278*** (0.067) 0.021 (0.048) 
Notes: (1) Dep. Var. takes a value 1(0) if the subject is (not) taken. (2) Standard errors (in brackets) clustered by Postcode District. (3) Economic variables vary by Local Authority. All other variables as defined above.  (4) *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include 167,291 observations, as well as fixed effects for School (3,261), Domicile Postcode District (2,646), Age (5) and Ethnicity (5). 
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3. Access all areas? The impact of fees and background on student demand for 
postgraduate higher education in the UK 
 
Postgraduate education is a large and growing part of the higher education system in the 
UK. In 2000/01 there were 168,235 full-time postgraduates at universities in Great 
Britain. By 2010/11 the number of full-time students had grown to 304,320, taking the 
total number of postgraduates in higher education to more than 575,000 (HESA 2010). 
Around 10% of graduating first-degree students progressed directly into study for a 
higher qualification between 2004/05 and 2008/09.
16
 
 Recent reforms have focussed academic and policy-maker attention on first-
degree students (Johnstone 2004, Chowdry et al. 2010, Barr 2010a, 2010b, Dearden et 
al. 2011). Despite the large size of the postgraduate sector and the relevance of issues 
such as access and the impact of tuition fees, few papers have engaged with these 
questions beyond undergraduate level, with notable exceptions (Machin and Murphy 
2010). Highlighting this research deficit, the Browne review of higher education 
funding concludes that trends in postgraduate study should ‘be monitored carefully, 
including after the introduction of changes to funding and student finance’ (Browne 
2010, pp.55). Although the primary focus of the Review was the financing of 
undergraduate teaching, Browne (2010) also considered the funding arrangements for 
taught postgraduate courses, concluding: ‘we have seen no evidence that the absence of 
student support in the taught postgraduate market has had a detrimental impact on 
access to postgraduate higher education’ (Browne 2010, pp.55). In an earlier review of 
postgraduate training in the UK, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) 
(2010) calls for research to examine whether finance presents a barrier for potential 
postgraduate students, arguing that at present ‘there is little in the way of robust 
                                                          
16
 Based on Destinations of Leavers from Higher Education survey from the Higher 
Education Statistics Agency and author’s own calculations. See Section 3.5. 
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evidence on whether the cost of postgraduate study and the lack of student support 
prevent those who would otherwise have pursued postgraduate education from doing 
so’ (BIS 2010, pp.48). 
This paper seeks to address this research deficit through an examination of 
participation in postgraduate higher education. Using a large micro-level dataset it 
explores why some undergraduates choose to remain in higher education after 
completing their first degree and why others do not, and makes several contributions to 
the literature. Firstly, this paper provides a summary of previously neglected trends in 
postgraduate participation in the UK. Secondly, it introduces and utilises a substantial 
and hitherto unavailable dataset of postgraduate tuition fees by institution and subject, 
generated through a large number of requests made under the Freedom of Information 
Act. Thirdly, it uses a micro-level model and seeks to control for several potential forms 
of endogeneity to assess the extent to which tuition fees affect the demand for 
postgraduate education in the UK.  
The paper makes a number of findings. Firstly, postgraduate fees increased 
faster than inflation between 2003/04 and 2008/09. Secondly, there are significant 
differences in tuition fees within and between institutions. Thirdly, the results suggest 
that higher fees reduce student demand for postgraduate places. In my preferred 
specification, a 10% increase in tuition fees is associated with a reduction in the 
probability of progressing to a postgraduate degree of between 1.7% and 4.5%. Finally, 
the results also suggest that there are significant differences in progression probabilities 
between students from different socio-economic groups, even after controlling for 
observable differences in academic attainment. The results raise questions about the 
relative lack of public funding to support research students above undergraduate level.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.1 provides a brief 
examination of higher education funding in the UK. Section 3.2 surveys existing 
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academic work. Section 3.3 examines trends in postgraduate participation, while 
Section 3.4 introduces the empirical model. Section 3.5 summarises the data, Section 
3.6 documents the results and Section 3.7 describes my robustness checks. Section 3.8 
offers some discussion, conclusions and areas for future research. 
 
3.1 Higher education funding policy  
 
The funding of teaching in UK higher education has been the subject of repeated policy 
revisions in recent years (Chowdry et al. 2010, Crawford and Dearden 2010, Dearden et 
al. 2011, Barr 2009, 2010a, 2010b, Adnett and Tlupova 2007). Starting in 1998/99, a 
series of reforms have aimed to (1) shift a greater proportion of the cost of 
undergraduate teaching from tax-payers to graduates, (2) to increase competitive 
pressure in the higher education sector to raise standards and efficiency, and (3) to 
ensure that the system remains accessible to all qualified students regardless of ability to 
pay.
17
  
 To these ends, institutions derive income for teaching from both the publicly-
funded Higher Education Funding Councils (HEFCs) and tuition fees paid by graduates. 
The balance between these two sources of income varies between subjects and across 
different qualifications (Table 3.1). At undergraduate level, students pay a common, 
centrally set tuition fee regardless of the subject they study or the institution they 
attend.
18
 The larger proportion of teaching funding comes through formula-based grants  
                                                          
17
 These reforms broadly parallel international changes to higher education finance 
(Marcucci and Johnstone 2007, Johnstone 2004, Chapman 1997). 
18
 The Higher Education Act 2004 introduced a number of changes which are detailed in 
Section 1.3 and elsewhere (Barr 2010a). Undergraduate institutions have had the ability 
to vary fees by subject up to a centrally set cap since 2006/07. In practice the majority 
of institutions priced their courses at this maximum fee. The only institution not to do so 
was Leeds Metropolitan University, which offered courses at a discounted rate between 
2006/07 and 2008/09 (Times Higher Education 2011).  
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Table 3.1: Public & private per-student funding (£) for undergraduate & postgraduate study in the UK: 
2010-111 
 
Undergraduate Postgraduate 
Subject Group2: D C B A D C B A 
         
(A) Standard Resource  3,951 5,136 6,717 15,804 3,951 5,136 6,717 15,804 
         
(B) Expected Fee  
Income3 
1,310 
(33.2%) 
1,310 
(22.5%) 
1,310 
(19.5%) 
1,310 
(8.3%) 
3,951 
(100%) 
3,951 
(76.9%) 
3,951 
(58.8%) 
3,951 
(25.0%) 
(C) HEFCE grant  
2,641 
(66.8%) 
3,826 
(74.5%) 
5,407 
(80.5%) 
14,494 
(91.7%) 
0 
(0%) 
1,185 
(23.1%) 
2,766 
(41.2%) 
11,853 
(75.0%) 
Note(s): (1) Based on HEFCE (2010). (2) Subject groups are defined by HEFCE. Group A includes clinical 
stages of medicine and dentistry courses and veterinary science. Group B includes laboratory based subjects, 
including pre-clinical stages of medicine & dentistry, engineering and technology. Group C includes subjects 
with a studio, laboratory or fieldwork element. Group D includes all other subjects. (3) Expected Fee 
Income reflects HEFCE assumptions, set by statutory instrument. These have continued to reflect tuition 
fees in the pre-Higher Education Act 2004 era as a result of a consultation carried out by HEFCE in 2005. 
See HEFCE (2006) for more details. 
 
 
 
from the HEFCs. These aim to equalise the amount of funding per equivalent full-time 
student within each subject area (HEFCE 2010). As shown in Table 3.1, the HEFCs 
make up the difference between the estimated costs of teaching (A) and the expected 
average contribution of the student (B), given in row (C). Confronted with different 
costs of educating students in different subjects and a single-rate tuition fee, the HEFCs 
offer a smaller public subsidy for students of ‘cheaper’ degrees (such as Arts and 
Humanities) than to students of more expensive degrees (such as Clinical Medicine and 
Dentistry degrees). As the ‘standard resource’ of even the cheaper degrees exceeds the 
expected fee income from each student, every undergraduate receives a subsidy. 
 At the postgraduate level, public funding is more limited and the balance 
between HEFC funding and tuition fees is shifted towards the student. Once again, the 
HEFCs aim to equalise teaching funds on a per equivalent full-time student basis, and 
make up the difference between the cost of teaching and the expected student 
contribution. As can be seen in Table 3.1, the public subsidy for postgraduate students is 
substantial – particularly for students in the more expensive, band A subjects – but it is 
smaller than the undergraduate subsidy across the range of subjects and zero for the 
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‘base’ subjects. Based on Table 3.1, postgraduate students in all but the most expensive 
subject areas bear the greater share of their costs of teaching. 
 The second difference between undergraduate and postgraduate funding 
concerns how fees are set. While undergraduate fees have effectively been centrally set, 
taught postgraduate fees are largely unregulated, may vary across subjects and are set 
independently by the institutions themselves. As a consequence there is greater intra- 
and inter-institution variation in fee levels which is not captured by the HEFCs 
workings as set out in Table 3.1. Rather than basing ‘expected’ postgraduate fee income 
on survey data, the HEFCs set the student contribution equal to the standard resource 
for type ‘D’ degrees. Section 3.6 sets out my findings with regard to tuition fees, but it 
is clear that postgraduate fees differ from the type ‘D’ standard resource in the majority 
of cases.  
 A further difference between undergraduate and postgraduate financing in the 
UK is the extent of public funding to help students pay tuition fees. While 
undergraduate students may use state-financed income-contingent loans to pay their 
fees, the range of funding sources available to postgraduates is more limited. The 
primary providers of financial support for postgraduate study are the publicly funded 
Research Councils. These specialise along academic lines and offer a limited number of 
scholarships for postgraduate study, allowing students domiciled in the UK who intend 
to study for a Masters and continue to a PhD, to compete for public support to cover 
both living and tuition costs. Professional and Career Development Loans (PCDLs) are 
also available to cover postgraduate study, but the number of students taking these up is 
very small.
19
 Some institutions also offer financial assistance or early payment 
discounts, while others offer their Bachelors students preferential rates if they progress 
                                                          
19
 BIS (2010) presents data suggesting that just 1,750 individuals, or 0.5% of the UK-
domiciled postgraduate population, used PCDLs to fund their postgraduate study in 
2008/09. 
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to postgraduate study at their undergraduate institution. BIS (2010) suggests that around 
30% of postgraduate researchers and around 60% of taught postgraduate students 
receive no funding from either public or private providers. 
 
3.2 Literature review  
 
A rigorous analysis of the determinants of participation must confront a series of 
empirical challenges. Selection into universities and courses based on unobservable 
characteristics (Black and Smith 2004, Ehrenberg 2004, Hoxby 1997, Arcidiacono 
2004, Chevalier and Conlon 2003, Long 2004) and a shortage of suitable instruments 
make dependable analytical work difficult. This section surveys a number of papers 
which offer insightful descriptive work or analysis of participation at undergraduate 
level to inform my approach.  
 
3.2.1 Undergraduate participation 
 
Several recent papers examine post-secondary progression rates in the context of family 
income and socio-economic group. Galindo-Rueda, Marcenaro-Gutierrez and Vignoles 
(2004) use data from the Youth Cohort Survey (YCS), the Higher Education Statistics 
Agency (HESA) and the CACI Paycheck dataset to examine how individuals from 
households with different levels of income have varied in their participation likelihood 
over time. Using individual- and postcode-level analyses, their results suggest that 
wealthier postcodes experienced a more rapid increase in the number of students 
choosing to participate in higher education at age 18 between 1996 and 2000. The 
authors highlight the difficulty of separating the effects of economic background and 
educational performance before university, as students from disadvantaged backgrounds 
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have lower average school-level attainment than wealthier students. They conclude that 
in 1996 (before the introduction of undergraduate tuition fees) there was a significant 
class divide in participation which largely reflected pre-existing patterns of educational 
attainment and economic background. By 2000 however, they find that economic class 
has a direct impact on participation probabilities, even after controlling for prior 
academic achievement.  
Chowdry et al. (2010) use a student-level dataset to explore patterns of 
participation among people from different socio-economic backgrounds in the UK. 
They use a micro-level linear probability model with school fixed effects to try to 
control for selection and to explore patterns of participation in higher education. 
Introducing the variables in groups, their initial estimates suggest that male (female) 
students from the poorest socio-economic quintile are 40.7% (44.6%) less likely to 
participate in higher education than students from the top quintile. Introducing student 
and school characteristics alongside academic attainment at 11, 14, 16 and then 18, they 
find that this gap falls to 4.1% for males and 5.3% for females. Chowdry et al. (2010) 
conclude that poorer students are less likely to attend university, but that the majority of 
this gap is attributable to well-documented differences in educational attainment earlier 
in life, rather than specific access constraints at entry to higher education.  
The results of these papers confirm the findings of several others. Gayle, 
Berridge and Davies (2002) also use YCS data, and conclude that parental education, 
socio-economic class and State-school attendance all affect participation probabilities. 
Blanden and Machin (2004) use data from three panel surveys and similarly conclude 
that the recent expansion of higher education in the UK has disproportionately benefited 
students from wealthier backgrounds. Their detailed results suggest that after 
controlling for individual characteristics and prior academic achievement, family 
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income increased in importance as a determinant of participation between 1981 and 
1993.  
However, while the finding of substantial inequality in undergraduate education 
is common, several papers challenge the notion that social class and family income are 
of increasing importance. Using data from the Scottish Higher Education Funding 
Council, Paterson (1997) concludes that while participation rates are highest among 
those from the top social class, differences between socio-economic groups fell between 
the early 1980s and the mid-1990s. Gallacher (2006) also finds that students from the 
wealthiest groups are most likely to continue to higher education, but that students from 
the most deprived families increased their participation slightly at all types of institution 
in Scotland between 2001 and 2003. O’Connell, McCoy and Clancy (2006) use data 
from the Irish Republic and find that while patterns of social inequality in 
undergraduate education remain in Ireland, there has also been a gradual reduction in 
the extent of this gap. 
 
3.2.2 Tuition fees  
 
The introduction of undergraduate tuition fees in the UK created the potential for new 
papers examining student responses. Crawford and Dearden (2010) use data on four 
cohorts of British students to examine whether the introduction of ‘top-up fees’ in 
2006/07 had a significant impact on participation in undergraduate higher education. 
Their formal analysis used a difference-in-difference approach based on limited 
geographical variation in the introduction of top-up fees. Their results suggest that the 
reforms had a small, negative but insignificant impact on participation. However, they 
caution that because of underlying differences in the control and treatment groups their 
results may not be reliable. Soo and Elliot (2010) examine UK data from the University 
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and College Admission Service (UCAS) for evidence that higher tuition fees have 
discouraged international undergraduate applicants to a selection of British universities. 
They find that demand for places is largely driven by university quality and 
environmental factors: tuition fees are of second order importance.  
Dearden et al. (2011) use data on potential university entrants from the Labour 
Force Survey to examine the impact of reforms to tuition fees, grants and loans between 
1992 and 2007. They attempt to control for differences in unobservable characteristics 
by dividing their data into cells of individuals who are observably similar and 
estimating for each cell separately. Their results suggest that a £1,000 increase in 
undergraduate fees is associated with a 3.9% reduction in demand for undergraduate 
places, while a £1,000 increase in maintenance grants is associated with a 2.6% increase 
in demand. Dolton and Lin (2011) use a large time-series dataset to look for structural 
breaks in participation rates in the UK and similarly conclude that student’s 
participation behaviour does respond to financial incentives.   
International evidence on the impact of fees on demand for higher education is 
more plentiful. Flannery and O’Donoghue (2009) focus primarily on the impact of 
expected earnings on the probability of attending university in Ireland, but also include 
average tuition fees in their analysis. They find no evidence that tuition fees either 
reduce demand for undergraduate places or impede access to higher education for 
particular groups. Chapman and Ryan (2005) examine the impact of the Australian 
Higher Education Contribution Scheme on access, while Christofides, Hoy and Yang 
(2010) examine higher education participation in Canada. Chapman and Ryan (2005) 
find no impact of tuition fees on student demand and argue that there is no evidence to 
suggest that fees have deterred individuals from poor backgrounds from attending 
university in Australia. Christofides, Hoy and Yang (2010) find that tuition fees do have 
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a small, negative impact on student demand and that they affect females slightly more 
than males.  
 In contrast to these results, a large literature in the United States has reported 
strong evidence that students respond to price signals from higher education institutions, 
both in terms of the level of tuition fees and the amount of financial assistance available 
(Leslie and Brinkman 1987, Heller 1997). Carneiro and Heckman (2002) offer evidence 
on the nature and extent of credit constraints affecting higher education participation in 
the United States. They argue that two forms of credit constraint are relevant: (1) the 
short-term credit constraint which prevents some students meeting the financial cost of 
university, and (2) the long-term credit constraint which prevents students from buying 
greater ability through higher family income. They estimate that the second of these 
constraints is far more important in the US case, mirroring findings in the UK 
(Crawford and Dearden 2010).   
Recent work has also sought to exploit quasi-experimental methods around 
policy shifts to identify the impact of tuition fees and financial aid on university 
enrolment. Dynarski (2003, 2005) and Kane (2003, 2004) offer four such analyses. 
Dynarksi (2003) conducts a difference-in-difference analysis around the withdrawal of a 
source of financial aid for university study in 1981. After controlling for individual, 
parental and family characteristics as well as prior academic attainment, she finds a 
significant reduction in participation probabilities among eligible students following the 
withdrawal of the benefit scheme. Dynarksi (2005) similarly concludes that the 
introduction of financial aid schemes in Arkansas and Georgia in 1991 and 1993 had an 
impact on participation, increasing university enrolment rates by around 3%. 
Kane (2003) uses a similar, quasi-experimental approach to estimate the impact 
of the introduction of the Cal Grant program in California. Using data on 150,000 
applicants to the scheme between 1998/99 and 1999/2000, he identifies the impact of 
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eligibility for the scheme using variation in the income and Grade Point Average (GPA) 
scores required each year. His results suggest that eligibility for the Cal Grant scheme 
raised the probability of participation by between 3% and 4%. Kane (2004) exploits the 
introduction of a new financial aid package designed to improve the mobility of 
students from Washington D.C. to examine how individuals respond to price changes. 
He finds that students from the District of Colombia were more likely to attend 
university, and more likely to go out of state for their higher education, after the 
introduction of the programme.  
  In the UK, the literature on the impact of financial aid is more limited. Adnett 
(2006) summarises concerns about the decentralised nature of financial support in the 
UK, but Callender (2010) provides the first evidence on the nature of the bursary system 
established in response to recent reforms. Although it remains too early to assess their 
effectiveness, the data suggest that around 60% of established bursaries were designed 
to improve access for individuals from poor backgrounds. A further 25% were merit 
based and targeted individuals who achieved particular grades at school level, or 
excellence in a particular subject. Callender (2010) presents evidence that many of these 
schemes were designed to alter the composition of student bodies, to attract ‘star’ 
students and to raise a university’s academic standing. Callender (2010) also raises 
questions about the equity of the decentralised financial aid system. In particular, she 
demonstrates that some poorer students at the best universities received as much as 
three times as much aid as equivalent students in other institutions.  
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3.2.3 Postgraduate participation 
 
The small size of the literature on postgraduate participation represents a significant 
research deficit. The author is aware of only one paper which examines trends in 
progression to further study in the UK. 
 Machin and Murphy (2010) use individual level data from HESA on students in 
full-time undergraduate and postgraduate study in 2004/05, 2006/07 and 2008/09 to 
examine trends in participation in the UK. They find that the social composition of the 
population of postgraduates in the UK broadly reflects the social composition of the 
undergraduate population – suggesting that the jump from undergraduate to 
postgraduate study presents few additional barriers to students from poorer 
backgrounds. Machin and Murphy (2010) estimate that achieving a ‘good’ degree 
increases the probability of progression to a postgraduate course by 12%, while 
attending an Independent school raises the probability of progression by a further 
1.2%.
20
 
 Machin and Murphy (2010) also highlight the increasingly ‘gateway’ nature of 
postgraduate qualifications for careers in Law, Journalism and Economics. However, 
they lack data on postgraduate fees and therefore cannot provide an assessment of how 
these have shaped student demand in recent years. The extent to which they have 
controlled for selection based on unobservable characteristics is also unclear, but the 
paper provides a useful yardstick against which to judge the results of my analysis. 
 
 
 
                                                          
20
 Machin and Murphy (2010) define a ‘good degree’ as either First or Upper Second 
class honours. 
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3.3 Trends in postgraduate participation 
 
  A range of different measures have been used to estimate participation in post-
compulsory education. As students may take breaks from their studies before returning 
to pursue higher qualifications, aggregate birth-cohort measures of participation derived 
from longitudinal data or multiple cross-section surveys have advantages (Card and 
Lemeiux 2000), but the definition used in this paper is dictated by the dataset. 
Participation is here defined as the proportion of students domiciled in the UK who are 
enrolled in a full-time course of higher education six- to nine-months after graduating 
with a first undergraduate degree. My results consequently capture ‘direct entry’ 
graduates and cannot take into account students who choose to pause between their 
undergraduate and postgraduate degrees. This is discussed further in Section 3.8 and is a 
potential limitation of this paper, but is similar to other work in the field (Kane 2004).  
 Figures 3.1 to 3.3 show descriptive statistics for my measure of participation 
based on the Destination of Leavers from Higher Education survey (see Section 3.5). 
Figure 3.1 shows the proportion of surveyed students who progress to a postgraduate 
degree. Average participation rates grew slowly until the final year of data, rising from 
9.6% in 2004/05 to 12.8% in 2008/09. The male enrolment rate exceeded the female 
enrolment rate in every year, although participation rates for both genders increased 
sharply in 2008/09. Figure 3.1 also demonstrates that the surveyed student population 
progressing to postgraduate study is heavily weighted in favour of students from higher 
occupational groups. Students from Managerial and Professional backgrounds account 
for 60% or more of those continuing each year between 2004/05 and 2008/09. The two 
lowest socio-economic groups– Routine occupations and Never Worked and Long-term 
Unemployed – need to be aggregated to form a group large enough for reliable 
inference, and account for no more than 4% of progressing students during this period.   
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  Figure 3.2 suggests that there are unconditional differences in enrolment rates 
across socio-economic groups. Students from amongst the wealthiest families enjoy a 4-
6% probability premium in their likelihood of remaining in higher education after 
graduating relative to students from the poorest backgrounds. However, these 
differences cannot account for the large inequalities demonstrated in Figure 3.1, which 
implies that barriers to progression for poorer students earlier in education must play an 
important role (Galindo-Rueda, Marcenaro-Gutierrez and Vignoles, 2004). If  
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postgraduate participation rates for the lowest socio-economic groups were equal to that 
of the highest, the number of students from the poorest backgrounds would still be less 
than one-fifth of the number of progressing students from wealthy families.   
Academic criteria appear to be more important. Figure 3.3 shows progression 
rates among all undergraduates by the class of their degree between 2004/05 and 
2008/09. Around one-in-five First-class degree students choose to continue to a 
postgraduate degree, and 10-13% of Upper-Second class degree holders continue, 
compared to just 3-4% of Third-class students.  
 
3.4 Empirical model  
 
The empirical model is built around the reduced form human capital investment model 
set out in Rice (1999) and developed in Card and Lemieux (2000). The demand of an 
individual (n) for a postgraduate place to read a particular subject (s) at a particular 
institution (i), in year t, is given by: 
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                            (1) 
 
Where    are characteristics of individual n,        is the present discounted value of the 
expected benefits of a further course of study and        captures the present value of the 
expected costs of a course of further study including tuition fees. As         
  is 
unobserved, a variable,  , is defined which takes a value one where the student chooses 
to participate (and therefore the net present value of a further qualification is assumed to 
be positive) and zero otherwise.  
 
           
                  
   
                  
   
  (2) 
 
 This specification presents several empirical challenges. Firstly, measures of the 
discounted future benefits and costs of a higher degree are likely to be (a) measured 
with significant error and (b) subject to uncertainty, both from the perspective of the 
researcher and the potential student. Secondly, unobserved characteristics are likely to 
influence students’ choices about whether to pursue a particular postgraduate degree. 
Individual level characteristics, such as a taste for research, or institution level 
characteristics, such as the extent of research training during their undergraduate degree, 
are both unobserved and may play significant roles.  
 Finally, the postgraduate fees component of        poses two problems. Firstly, 
the choice to progress is usually binary: students either select into further study or opt 
out – which prevents analysis of how marginal changes in price bring about marginal 
changes in quantity. The binary nature of the decision is complicated because 
information about prices is incomplete. Postgraduate fees are only paid by graduates 
who choose to progress. For these students, it is possible to estimate how much they are 
likely to have paid for their course. However, no information is available about what fee 
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non-progressing students considered paying (and then rejected). As a result, 
undergraduates divide into two groups: those who progressed (and paid postgraduate 
fees) and those who did not (for whom no price information is available).  
 A further problem arises for those who do progress as the fee levels themselves 
are likely to be endogenous in the level of demand. Prestigious research institutions will 
have higher applicant to place ratios, giving them a degree of market power which 
allows them to charge a higher price for their courses. Failing to account for the 
simultaneity of prices and quantity would attribute selection into universities based on 
unobserved characteristics to higher fee levels and suggest a spurious, positive 
relationship between fees and student demand.  
 To help to mitigate these problems, the basic specification in (1) and (2) is 
modified and developed. An instrumental variables approach is implemented. My main 
equation is a linear probability model of the form:  
 
                                                   (3) 
 
On the left-hand-side is the probability that a student enrolled in an undergraduate 
program defined by a particular subject-institution combination,
21
 si, domiciled in a 
labour market area, g, at time t, chooses to progress to a higher degree. On the right-
hand-side are the student’s characteristics,   , and opportunity cost of a further course 
of study, excluding the costs of tuition fees,       . Tuition costs are included in       , 
alongside fixed effects for each undergraduate subject-institution combination,    , each 
graduating cohort,   , and each labour market area of pre-university domicile,   .  
Incorporating the arrays of fixed effects in (3) has several important 
consequences. Firstly, the fixed effects for each subject-institution combination control 
                                                          
21
 See Appendix 3A for a detailed breakdown of the subject classification used in this 
paper. 
120 
 
for the common, time invariant unobserved characteristics of both undergraduate 
students and the department at which they are studying. This helps to reduce the impact 
of confounding effects in the analysis which follows, but requires two additional 
assumptions: (a) that students reveal information about their unobserved characteristics, 
including their preference for research and innate ability, when they select into their 
undergraduate courses, and (b) that the unobserved characteristics of the courses and the 
students on them are time-invariant. Secondly, as set out in the previous paper, the 
arrays of fixed effects for domicile and cohort help to control for selection into areas of 
residence and cohort specific effects.   
 
3.4.1 Predicting fees for participating and non-participating students 
 
 To avoid the problems associated with imperfect price information detailed 
above, the tuition fee variable,       , is designed to capture the price that each student 
might reasonably expect to pay for a course of higher study. This approach allows me to 
assign an ‘expected fee’ to each student regardless of whether they choose to progress to 
postgraduate study and is consistent with an intention to treat approach. The assumed 
underlying process is one in which a student’s progression behaviour is conditioned by 
the perceived costs and benefits of a course of further study. A negative, significant 
coefficient on        is therefore interpreted as evidence that higher expected tuition fees 
discourage students from remaining in higher education. Conversely, a positive, 
significant coefficient on        is interpreted as evidence that higher tuition fees 
encourage students to progress to further study.  
A wide range of plausible mechanisms may be used to estimate student’s 
expectations about the costs of a higher degree. Details of the micro-level data are 
provided in the following section, but Table 3.2 analyses the destinations of the subset 
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of students for whom information is available on both their undergraduate and 
postgraduate universities. Columns (1)-(4) demonstrate that a majority of male (57.3%) 
and a large minority of female students (46.8%) choose to stay at their undergraduate 
institution for postgraduate study.  
To examine student destinations in more detail, I calculated the share of 
undergraduates from each university, i, progressing to each other university, j, for 
postgraduate study. The final column of Table 3.2 suggests that the undergraduate 
institution, i, retains the largest fraction of progressing students in the vast majority of 
cases. As a result I expect the cost of postgraduate courses at the student’s 
undergraduate institution to play an important role in determining fee expectations. 
Unfortunately the micro-level data does not contain information about the 
subject the student chooses to study at postgraduate level, which prevents me from 
assigning fees with precision. This is a limitation of the paper which is returned to in 
Section 3.8. With this information, there are several possible methods of calculating 
expected postgraduate fees: 
 
DEFINITION [1]: Use the average cost of a postgraduate degree in the student’s 
undergraduate subject at their undergraduate institution. Adopting the subscripts s, i and 
t to denote subjects, institutions and time, and specifying P as the price of a higher 
degree course: Def. 1:                     
DEFINITION [2]: Use the average cost of a postgraduate degree at the student’s 
undergraduate institution. This approach allows students to switch subjects between 
Bachelors and Masters levels. Def. 2:                 
DEFINITION [3]: Students may change institutions between undergraduate and 
postgraduate levels (Table 3.2). To allow for this, I assign to each progressing student 
the cost of a higher degree in their undergraduate subject at their observed postgraduate  
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institution, j. I analyse this fee as a function of the student’s individual characteristics 
and the cost of a course in their undergraduate subject at their undergraduate 
institution:                     . Using the coefficients from this regression, I predict the 
price each undergraduate (both those students who continue and those who do not) 
would need to pay for a postgraduate degree in their undergraduate subject. This 
approach allows students to change institutions. 
DEFINITION [4]: The final possible definition allows students to change subjects and 
institutions between undergraduate and postgraduate levels. I begin by assigning to each 
progressing student the average cost of a higher degree at their observed postgraduate 
institution, j. This fee is then analysed as a function of the student’s characteristics and 
the average cost of a postgraduate course at their undergraduate institution:      
           . Using the coefficients from this regression I predict the price each 
undergraduate (both those students who continue and those who do not) would need to 
pay for a postgraduate degree. 
To ensure the robustness of my results, I adopt all four definitions. 
 
 
Table 3.2: Stayers and movers: Undergraduate to postgraduate study1,2 
 
Male – (%) Female – (%) % Institutions retaining 
largest share of their 
undergraduates3 
 
Stay Move Stay Move 
2004/05 55.8 44.2 45.0 55.0 84.9 
2005/06 56.4 43.6 45.9 54.1 89.3 
2006/07 58.2 41.8 47.3 52.7 90.7 
2007/08 57.3 42.7 47.4 52.6 91.8 
2008/09 58.4 41.6 48.1 51.9 92.4 
Total 57.3 42.7 46.8 53.2 89.8 
Note(s): (1) Based on Destination of Leavers from Higher Education (DLHE) survey provided by HESA. 
See Section 3.5 for details. (2) Total sample size: 93,025. (3) Proportion of undergraduate institutions in 
which the largest fraction of undergraduates remain at the institution for postgraduate study. 
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3.4.2 Instrumenting for expected postgraduate fees 
 
 Having established an ‘expected fee’ for each student, regardless of whether 
they progress or not, I instrument for the expected fee in a first stage. To help to 
mitigate the likely endogeneity of fee levels, a strategy is designed to capture variation 
in fees which is not attributable to changes in home student demand. To this end (4) is 
estimated in addition to (3): 
 
                                         
                                      
(4) 
 
Equation (4) models expected postgraduate tuition fees as a function of the other 
explanatory variables in (3) and two instrumental variables. First, following a shift-
share approach (see Bartik 1991), the proportion of students on each subject-institution 
combination who are from overseas in the two years preceding my analysis (        ) is 
interacted with the trade-weighted movement in the Sterling exchange rate (   ). 
Higher purchasing power for Sterling raises the cost of migrating to the UK for study 
and reduces the demand for places from overseas. This in turn reduces pressure on the 
number of places available for students from the UK, reducing home fee levels. 
Consequently I expect    to be negative. 
The second instrument is the level of the total HEFC teaching grant received by 
each institution divided by the number of full-time academic staff,       . This variable is 
used in log form, and is interacted in a shift-share manner with the proportion of all 
academic staff in each department in the two years prior to my regression analysis 
(        . This generates a proxy variable for the level of academic salaries in each 
subject area at each university. All else equal, departments with growing staff costs will 
need to charge higher fee levels to break even. As a result I expect the estimate of    to 
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be positive. For the system of equations to be identified, I need    and    to be both 
individually and jointly significant at conventional levels. 
 
3.5 Data  
 
The student level data used in this paper are drawn from the Destination of Leavers 
from Higher Education (DLHE) dataset provided by HESA which has been analysed 
extensively elsewhere (Faggian and McCann 2006, 2009, Faggian, McCann and 
Sheppard, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, Naylor and Smith 2004, Smith and Naylor 2005, Wales 
2010). The DLHE is a large survey of graduates from universities in the UK six to nine 
months after they complete their degrees. It includes a wealth of information about what 
qualification the student studied for and their degree classification, as well as a range of 
individual characteristics and the student’s pre-university postcode district of domicile. 
The DLHE also provides the variable of interest, as it records what the student is doing 
at the time of survey. Participation is defined as those who report that they are in ‘full-
time study’ for a ‘higher degree’, six to nine months after completing their first 
undergraduate degree.  
Starting with all full-time, undergraduate students taking subjects other than 
Medicine & Dentistry, domiciled in Great Britain who take between three and five years 
to complete their degree, graduating between 2004/05 and 2008/09, who respond to the 
DLHE yields a sample of 786,750 students. After eliminating non-typical students who 
commenced their degree aged 22 or above and all those for whom there is no 
information about school level performance, the remaining sample size is 563,740. 
Some further attrition occurs as the data on fees, university staff records and HEFC 
funding is incomplete, leaving a sample of students which slightly over-represents 
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younger students from well-off backgrounds, although these differences are relatively 
slight.
22
 Summary statistics on included students are shown in Table 3.3.  
 
3.5.1 Fees data 
 
The tuition fee dataset used in this paper represents a significant contribution to the 
literature. Unlike undergraduate tuition fees which have effectively been centrally set 
and regulated, postgraduate fees are largely unregulated and are set by individual 
institutions. Few attempts have been made to monitor how tuition costs at the 
postgraduate level have changed over time. One notable exception, the ‘Public Goods’ 
website (Reddin, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009), contains data on ‘standard’ 
Masters course fees by institution, but contains no systematic information about 
different fees for different subjects at the same university.  
 To develop a dataset of postgraduate fees by subject and university, I contacted 
159 of the 173 postgraduate degree-granting institutions in the UK and requested 
information about the level of postgraduate fees for each Masters course, both taught 
and research, offered between 2003/04 and 2009/10. Using the surveyed Masters 
students in the DLHE, I first constructed a matrix detailing all of the Masters courses 
taken at the two-digit Joint Academic Classification of Subjects (JACS) level 
(Appendix 3A). This yielded a set of 7,917 courses, distinguished by the type of 
qualification (taught or research), the institution attended and the subject(s) studied. The 
detail of the JACS classification allows distinctions to be drawn between courses 
composed of different elements and different quantities of the 165 academic fields 
included in the taxonomy.  
                                                          
22
 The non-response rate to the DLHE survey varies between 23.8% and 27.4% in the 
period under consideration. These fluctuations are assumed to be random as they do not 
appear to differ systematically across sub-populations. 
126 
 
Table 3.3: Summary statistics of student characteristics 
  Males Females 
  Frequency % Frequency % 
      
Total  289,800 44.0 368,830 56.0 
      
Ethnicity      
 White 242,920 83.8 311,850 84.6 
 Black 5,470 1.9 9,450 2.6 
 Asian 27,870 9.6 31,900 8.6 
 Other 7,790 2.7 10,300 2.8 
 Unknown 5,750 2.0 5,330 1.4 
Year      
 2004/05 55,260 19.1 69,670 18.9 
 2005/06 56,200 19.4 71,460 19.4 
 2006/07 57,250 19.8 72,930 19.8 
 2007/08 58,880 20.3 75,920 20.6 
 2008/09 62,210 21.5 78,840 21.4 
School      
 State 218,920 75.5 289,800 78.6 
 Private 40390 13.9 40300 10.9 
 Unknown 30490 10.5 38730 10.5 
Undergraduate degree class    
 First 41,550 14.3 46,150 12.5 
 Upper Second 139,250 48.0 206,020 55.9 
 Lower Second 86,140 29.7 97,030 26.3 
 Third 16,120 5.6 11,380 3.1 
 Unclassified 6,750 2.3 8,240 2.2 
Progression Rates     
 Further Study 36,070 12.4 34,230 9.3 
 Other 253,730 87.6 334,600 90.7 
Socio-economic group     
 
Higher Manag. & 
Prof. 
59,680 20.6 71,830 19.5 
 Lower Manag. & Prof. 69,620 24.0 91,850 24.9 
 Intermediate  30,260 10.4 40,140 10.9 
 Small Employers  14,880 5.1 20,720 5.6 
 Lower Super. & Tech. 10,500 3.6 14,410 3.9 
 Semi-routine  20,930 7.2 29,480 8.0 
 Routine, Unemployed 9,440 3.3 13,530 3.7 
 Unknown 74,490 25.7 86,870 23.6 
Note(s): (1) Figures are for all academic years combined, percentages based on proportion of gender group. 
(2) Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding. (3) Progression rates based on direct entry graduates, 
see Sections 3.5 and 3.8.  
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 Using this matrix as the starting point, I manually linked each course included in 
the DLHE to the tuition fee information provided by institutions and specifically to the 
home/EU full-time price.
23
 In the majority of cases a single definitive fee could be 
identified. In cases of small ambiguity an average of the possible courses was taken. In 
the minority where there was no identifiable fee, none was recorded. As not all 
institutions were able to provide a full time series for their courses, the final dataset 
includes price information for 47,380 course-institution-year combinations, of a total of 
55,419, or 85.5%. Among the missing data are a small number of institutions who were 
excluded as their postgraduate degrees took a modular form for which it was impossible 
to establish a ‘standard’ subject fee. A small number of institutions also excluded 
themselves on the grounds of lost records or on the basis of the cost of gathering 
information.
24
 Finally, to reduce the potential for bias introduced through human error, 
the dataset was aggregated to the JACS 1 level of detail (See Appendix 3A for details of 
the subject breakdown).  
The result of this data gathering process is the first dataset of postgraduate 
tuition fees by subject and institution in the UK. Average tuition fees at current prices 
(Table 3.4) increased 31.8% between 2003/04 and 2009/10, from £3,232 to just over 
£4,261. This rate of increase is significantly higher than the general price level, which 
was just 18.4% higher in 2010 than in 2003 (ONS 2012).
25
 However, this average 
masks significant differences in across subjects. Business Studies courses (comprising 
Business Studies, Management, Marketing, Finance, Accounting and Human Resource 
Management) were the most expensive over the period, ranging from £4,920 in 2003/04  
                                                          
23
 For clarity of exposition, I shall refer to ‘Home/EU full-time tuition fees’ simply as 
‘tuition fees’ from this point forward.  
24
 These were Aston University, Thames Valley University, UHI Millennium Institute, 
St Mary’s University College, Twickenham. 
25
 This figure is based on the Consumer Prices Index provided by the Office for 
National Statistics and the author’s own calculations.  
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Table 3.4: UK tuition fees 2003/04-2009/10 
  £ current £ current by institutional group 
 
UG1 
Public 
Goods2 
FOI 
Dataset3 
Russell 
Group5 
1994 
Group6 
Million+7 
University 
Alliance8 
2003/04 1125 3048 3232 3339 3200 3079 3151 
2004/05 1150 3031 3439 3684 3326 3233 3320 
2005/06 1175 3441 3620 3919 3566 3397 3471 
2006/07 30004 3730 3801 4104 3666 3595 3666 
2007/08 3070 3970 3970 4266 3772 3819 3833 
2008/09 3145 3989 4121 4487 3909 3882 3948 
2009/10 3225 4191 4261 4595 4107 4145 4095 
Note(s): (1) Regulated undergraduate annual fee levels for students starting in that academic year. (2) 
‘Standard’ postgraduate fee as reported by Reddin (2004-2009). (3) Average postgraduate fee based on 
freedom of information requests carried out for this paper. (4) Undergraduate fees increased due to a 
policy shift between 2005/06 and 2006/07. (5) Russell Group of research institutions is a group twenty 
research institutions in the United Kingdom. (6) 1994 Group is a group of nineteen ‘smaller research-
intensive’ institutions. (7) Million+ is a group of 27 universities including many former polytechnics. (8) 
University Alliance is a group of 23 universities which focus on business courses. 
to a little over £6,810 in 2009/10. Least expensive were Education courses, which 
varied from an average of £2,780 in 2003/04 to £3,720 in 2009/10. Among the fastest 
climbing courses (Figure 3.4) were Law degrees (rising 42% during the period) and 
Business Studies (38%), while the lowest relative increases came in European 
Languages (24%) and Engineering (26%). The Russell Group of research institutions 
has charged the highest average fees throughout the period, rising from £3,339 in 
2003/04 to £4,595 by 2009/10.  
The extent of variation in tuition fees has also risen significantly in recent years. 
Although universities have had the capability to vary fees by subject for several years, 
there has only been a gradual move away from charging the ‘standard HEFC’ assumed 
fee (Tables 3.1 and 3.5). In 2003/04, 74.3% of the courses for which data was gathered 
charged the HEFC fee, a proportion which falls gradually to 31.1% in 2009/10. The 
deregulated nature of postgraduate tuition fees allows me to side-step the empirical 
difficulties that a single, universal policy shift presents for estimating changes in student 
demand (Crawford and Dearden, 2010). 
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 Finally, to estimate expected fees using definitions [3] and [4] above, two 
preliminary regressions were run as detailed in Section 3.4. Definition [3] involves 
regressing the average cost of a higher degree in the student’s undergraduate subject at 
their observed postgraduate institution, against individual characteristics and the 
average cost of a course in their undergraduate subject at their undergraduate institution. 
100 
105 
110 
115 
120 
125 
130 
135 
140 
145 
2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 
Figure 3.4: Postgraduate tuition fees by academic field 
Law 
Business Studies 
Education 
Mathematics 
Physical Science 
History 
Lang, Ling & Classics 
Engineering 
European Lang. 
Note(s): Based on FOI data requested for this paper and author's own calculations 
2003/04=100 
Table 3.5: Variation in postgraduate tuition fees: 2003/04-2008/09 
 
% Courses within +/-
£10 of HEFC Fee 
Standard Deviation Observations 
2003/04 74.3 1608 6265 
2004/05 63.9 1833 6376 
2005/06 55.2 1972 6503 
2006/07 48.6 2051 6699 
2007/08 44.0 2172 6756 
2008/09 33.5 2266 7225 
2009/10 31.1 2303 7556 
Note(s): Based on data gathered by FOI requests and author’s own calculations. Each observation is an 
observed course of study.  
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Definition [4] involves a similar regression of the average cost of a higher degree at the 
student’s observed postgraduate institution, against individual characteristics and the 
average cost of a higher degree at their undergraduate institution. Both regressions 
include only those students who are observed progressing to postgraduate education and 
who report both their undergraduate and postgraduate institutions.  
The results of these analyses are shown in Table 3.6. In both regressions, the 
student’s undergraduate institution fees have a large, positive and significant impact on 
expected postgraduate fees. Higher than average fees are recorded for students with 
stronger academic results, students who attended private secondary schools and students 
who are from higher socio-economic groups. Undergraduates from ethnic minorities 
also appear to pay more on average than white students. These coefficients are used to 
predict expected postgraduate fees for all students, regardless of whether they choose to 
progress or not. Controls for all student and local economic characteristics included in 
Table 3.6 are also included in the subsequent participation regressions.  
 
3.5.2 Local economic data 
 
The empirical specification set out in (3) also demands measures of the opportunity cost 
of a higher degree relative to an undergraduate degree. Following other work in the field 
(Rice 1999, 2000) measures of unemployment and hourly wages are included in my 
regressions to capture (1) the likelihood of a student finding of employment if they 
choose not to progress and, (2) forgone earnings during further study. These data are 
drawn from the quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS) records held by the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS). Using the micro-level record, measures of unemployment 
and average hourly earnings were calculated for each of the 297 travel-to-work areas in  
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Table 3.6: Estimated postgraduate tuition fees: Fees definitions [3] and [4]1, 3 
 
Definition [3] Definition [4] 
 
β s.e β s.e 
Av. PG Fee in UG Subj. at PG Inst. 2 0.593*** (0.022)   
Av. PG Fee at PG Inst. 2 
  
0.572*** (0.004) 
Female -0.004** (0.002) -0.005*** (0.002) 
Ethnicity Black 0.021*** (0.007) 0.014** (0.006) 
 
Asian 0.034*** (0.004) 0.031*** (0.004) 
 
Other 0.014*** (0.005) 0.014*** (0.005) 
 
Unknown 0.004 (0.007) -0.002 (0.007) 
School Type Private 0.019*** (0.003) 0.031*** (0.003) 
 
Unknown 0.002 (0.004) 0.004 (0.003) 
UG Degree Class 1 0.036*** (0.003) 0.042*** (0.003) 
 
2-1 0.021*** (0.003) 0.019*** (0.002) 
 
Third -0.017* (0.009) -0.006 (0.006) 
 
Unknown 0.003 (0.009) 0.004 (0.01) 
Socio-economic group Lower Manag. & Prof. -0.004* (0.002) -0.003 (0.002) 
Intermediate  -0.009*** (0.002) -0.009*** (0.002) 
 
Small Employers  -0.006* (0.003) -0.007* (0.003) 
 
Lower Super. & Tech. -0.004 (0.004) -0.003 (0.004) 
 
Semi-routine  -0.011*** (0.003) -0.006** (0.003) 
 
Routine, Unemployed -0.013*** (0.004) -0.012*** (0.004) 
 
Unknown -0.003 (0.003) -0.002 (0.003) 
School Results 2nd Quartile -0.004 (0.003) -0.002 (0.002) 
 
3rd Quartile -0.001 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 
 
4th Quartile 0.002 (0.004) 0.003 (0.003) 
UG Degree Duration 0.001 (0.003) 0.003 (0.002) 
Dom. Econ. Unemployment2 -0.021 (0.039) -0.004 (0.036) 
 
Hourly Earnings2 -0.002 (0.012) -0.014 (0.011) 
Year 2005 -0.012*** (0.003) -0.014*** (0.003) 
Year 2007 0.019*** (0.003) 0.022*** (0.003) 
Year 2008 0.037*** (0.003) 0.043*** (0.003) 
Year 2009 0.049*** (0.004) 0.056*** (0.004) 
Controls Age YES YES 
 Domicile TTWA FE YES YES 
Subject*Institution FE YES YES 
Observations 51,270 52,440 
F-stat 34.61*** 51.70*** 
Note(s): (1) Dep. Var. is the average cost of a postgraduate course in the student’s undergraduate subject at 
their observed postgraduate institution (Definition Three) and the average cost of a postgraduate course at 
the student’s observed postgraduate institution (Definition Four). Std. Errors Clustered at the subject-
institution level. (2) These variables are continuous. (3) *, ** and ** reflect significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
the UK based on the 1998 definitions.
26
 These definitions (see Panel A of Figure A1 in 
Appendix 3A) were aggregated to 219 entities to avoid non-disclosive sample sizes (see 
Panel B). Local unemployment is broadly defined as the proportion of the population 
aged 16 to retirement who are not working or in full-time training/study. Local wages 
                                                          
26
 The boundaries of the 1998 travel to work areas were based on an analysis of 
commuting flows from the 1991 census and are deemed to more closely represent ‘local 
economies’ than administrative geographies such as local authorities or counties. See 
Appendix 3A. 
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are defined as the natural logarithm of average reported gross hourly earnings in each 
geographical area.  
 
3.6 Results 
 
To examine the impact of expected postgraduate tuition fees on student demand, two 
analyses were carried out. The first set of results is derived from a series of ordinary 
least squares regressions (OLS) of the likelihood of progression, conditional on a range 
of student characteristics and expected tuition fees. The second set of results includes 
the same variables, but instruments for expected postgraduate fees using changes in the 
trade-weighted exchange rate of Sterling and the level of HEFC funding per full-time 
academic employee. The main results are summarized in Tables 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9. The 
full results using fee definition [1]-[4] are available in Appendices [B]-[E].  
 
3.6.1 Expected tuition fees 
 
Table 3.7 summarises the findings with respect to expected postgraduate tuition fees. 
The dependent variable is a binary variable which takes a value one if the student is in 
full-time study for a higher degree, six to nine months after graduating with their first 
undergraduate degree, and zero otherwise. Explanatory variables were introduced 
gradually to allow comparison of the estimated coefficients in both the OLS 
(Specifications 1-6) and IV (7-12) estimations. Each specification is run for each 
definition of expected postgraduate fees. The coefficients reported in Table 3.7 
therefore reflect the results of 48 separate regressions.  
Details of how expected postgraduate tuition fees are calculated are included in 
Section 3.4. The first definition assigns each student the cost of taking a higher degree 
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in the student’s undergraduate subject at their undergraduate institution. The second 
assigns the average cost of taking a postgraduate degree at their undergraduate 
institution (allowing students to switch subjects). The third and fourth definitions 
estimate expected fees using the results of supplementary analysis. This work, reported 
in Section 3.5, analyses the price paid by continuing students on each undergraduate 
course as a function of their individual and academic characteristics as well as the 
average cost of courses at their undergraduate institution.  
Across the range of specifications, the coefficients estimated by OLS tend to be 
smaller than those produced by the IV procedure. Using simple averaging, Fee 
Definitions [1] and [2] produce a small, negative but insignificant coefficients on 
expected fees. Using the results of the preliminary regressions in Fee Definitions [3] 
and [4] yields more interesting results. These measures initially suggest that students 
who expect to pay higher tuition costs are more likely to progress to further study. In 
specification (1), a 1% point increase in expectations of postgraduate tuition fees raises 
the likelihood of progressing to higher study by between 0.30% (Definition [3]) and 
0.51% (Definition [4]). This counter-intuitive finding is reversed once controls for 
academic performance and parental background are introduced in specifications (3), (4) 
and (5). In these regressions, expected postgraduate fees have a small, negative but 
statistically significant impact on participation probabilities. 
Specifications (7-12) instrument for postgraduate tuition fees to partially account 
for their endogeneity and suggest a larger and more important role for expected tuition 
costs. After controlling for year effects (four effects) and institution-by-subject fixed 
effects (1,381) in specification (7), the results suggest that a 1% increase in expected 
tuition fees is associated with a reduction of between 0.14% and 0.48% in the 
probability of participation. Fee Definitions [1]-[3] are significant at the 1% level and  
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Table 3.7: Expected postgraduate tuition fees & participation probabilities1,8 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
ln(Exp. Fees Def. One)2 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
-0.140*** 
(0.034) 
-0.130*** 
(0.034) 
-0.167** 
(0.070) 
-0.172** 
(0.072) 
-0.167** 
(0.071) 
-0.171** 
(0.073) 
ln(Exp. Fees Def. Two)2 
-0.009  
(0.010) 
-0.008  
(0.010) 
-0.006  
(0.012) 
-0.007  
(0.011) 
-0.008  
(0.012) 
-0.007  
(0.012) 
-0.271***  
(0.083) 
-0.251***  
(0.076) 
-0.280**  
(0.112) 
-0.287**  
(0.114) 
-0.283**  
(0.113) 
-0.288**  
(0.115) 
ln(Exp. Fees Def. Three)2 
0.304*** 
(0.042) 
0.265***  
(0.039) 
-0.038***  
(0.012) 
-0.020  
(0.012) 
-0.020  
(0.012) 
-0.008  
(0.014) 
-0.273***  
(0.104) 
-0.268**  
(0.113) 
-0.257**  
(0.106) 
-0.255**  
(0.105) 
-0.250**  
(0.106) 
-0.258**  
(0.110) 
ln(Exp. Fees Def. Four)2 
0.506*** 
(0.042) 
0.460***  
(0.041) 
-0.095***  
(0.019) 
-0.054***  
(0.019) 
-0.055***  
(0.019) 
-0.016  
(0.023) 
-0.480**  
(0.201) 
-0.466**  
(0.189) 
-0.439**  
(0.179) 
-0.435**  
(0.177) 
-0.433**  
(0.177) 
-0.447**  
(0.182) 
Controls             
 Subject*Inst., Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 Personal Characteristics3  Y Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y Y 
 Sch. Type & Performance4   Y Y Y Y   Y Y Y Y 
 Socio-economic group   Y Y Y Y   Y Y Y Y 
 UG Degree Class   Y Y Y Y   Y Y Y Y 
 Labour Market Effects5    Y Y Y    Y Y Y 
 Domicile TTWA FE6      Y      Y 
Sample7 ALL ALL ALL ALL Selection Selection ALL ALL ALL ALL Selection Selection 
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV IV IV 
Multivariate F-test:             
 Def. One:        54.95*** 54.96*** 29.09*** 28.83*** 28.71*** 28.74*** 
 Def. Two:        65.70*** 65.80*** 79.74*** 81.18*** 83.69*** 83.27*** 
 Def. Three:       32.26*** 34.05*** 34.43*** 34.88*** 34.47*** 34.75*** 
 Def. Four:       73.54*** 78.99*** 83.24*** 85.24*** 77.93*** 83.03*** 
Note(s): (1) Dep. Var. is a binary indicator of whether the student progressed to postgraduate higher education. Estimated coefficients are shown with standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are 
clustered at the Institution-by-subject level. (2) ln(Expected Fees) is defined in four different ways. Each specification is estimated separately for each expected fees definition, see Section 3.4. (3) 
Personal characteristics include dummy variables for age, gender, ethnicity and disability status. (4) School type is defined as State, Private or Unknown. School Performance includes dummies for the 
quartile position of students in the A-level point score distribution in their year of undergraduate commencement. (5) Labour market effects consist of average hourly earnings and the rate of 
unemployment in the student’s domicile travel-to-work-area. (6) 219 domicile travel to work areas are included, see Section 3.4.  (7) Specifications (5)-(6) and (11)-(12) include only students obtaining 
Lower Second Class UG degrees or above. (8) *, ** and ** reflect significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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are only marginally affected by the introduction of individual level characteristics in (8), 
while Fee Definition [4] is significant at the 5% level.  
Specification (9) incorporates controls for the student’s socio-economic group 
and academic characteristics, including their secondary school type, exam performance 
aged 18 and their undergraduate degree class. These variables serve to increase the 
magnitude and standard error of the coefficients on expected tuition fees. Incorporating 
unemployment rates and average earnings in the student’s domicile travel-to-work-area 
in (10) suggests that a 1% increase in expected tuition costs reduces the probability of 
participation by between 0.17% and 0.44%.   
To more accurately focus on the effective demand for postgraduate places, 
specifications (5), (6), (11) and (12) limit their sample to students who obtain at least 
Lower Second Class honours in their undergraduate degree studies. (12) also attempts to 
mitigate against endogenous patterns of residential selection through an array of 
domicile travel-to-work-area fixed effects (219 effects). Neither (11) nor (12) 
significantly alters the results of (10). (12), which reflects the preferred specification, 
suggests that a 1% increase in expected tuition costs is associated with a reduction in the 
probability of progression by between 0.17% and 0.45%.  
The disparity between the OLS and IV results is significant and suggests that the 
IV results partially resolve several empirical problems likely to hamper the least squares 
procedure. Firstly, the OLS results are likely to be attenuated by measurement error, 
both in the recording of fee levels and in the assignment of expected fees to students 
who change subjects or universities. My broader measures of expected fees which make 
use of limited information about undergraduate destinations are superior in this respect 
and offer the most intuitive results. Secondly, the smaller OLS results are consistent 
with a mechanism for setting fees which is sensitive to patterns of demand. Stronger 
demand for a particular institution-subject combination will lead to higher fee levels. 
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Conversely, weaker demand for a postgraduate course will lead to lower fee levels (or 
lower rates of increase). Failing to control for this endogeneity in the OLS regressions 
therefore understates the impact of expected tuition fees on students, as it spuriously 
assigns higher (lower) participation probabilities to higher (lower) fees, which in turn 
were caused by higher (lower) demand. Failing to control for this endogeneity is a 
serious problem in the OLS regressions. 
The IV estimates are dependent upon several identifying assumptions. These are 
that (a) a stronger Sterling Exchange rate deters foreign students from coming to the UK 
for postgraduate study, reducing pressure on the supply of places for home students, and 
(b) that changes to academic salaries raise university costs but leave student demand for 
places unchanged. The results of the first stage regressions are shown in full in the 
Appendix and summarised in Tables 3.7 and 3.8. In Table 3.7, the results of 
multivariate F-tests for the exclusion restrictions are shown (Angrist and Pischke 2009, 
Stock, Wright and Yogo 2002), while Table 3.8 reports the estimated coefficients on the 
instruments from the most detailed specifications. 
These results bear out expectations. The teaching salary instrument is positively 
and significantly correlated with postgraduate tuition fees in each specification and for 
each Fees Definition, which is consistent with higher input costs pushing up the price of 
the final good. The trade weighted Sterling index, by contrast, is negatively and 
significantly correlated with postgraduate tuition fees, suggesting that a stronger Pound 
reduces the attractiveness of the UK as a destination for higher education migration, 
reducing pressure on postgraduate places for home students. Both variables are 
individually significant at conventional levels, and are jointly significant with an F-stat 
comfortably above the Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) recommended level of 10.  
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Table 3.8: First stage IV results for expected postgraduate fees1,6 
Fees Definition: [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Instruments     
 
Teaching grant per academic 
staff FPE, subject weighted2 
0.040***  
(0.009) 
0.039***  
(0.003) 
0.024***  
(0.005) 
0.023***  
(0.002) 
 
Overseas share * Trade 
weighted Sterling3 
-0.033**  
(0.015) 
-0.018**  
(0.008) 
-0.021**  
(0.009) 
-0.012**  
(0.005) 
Controls (see Table 3.7)4 Y Y Y Y 
Specification (12) (12) (12) (12) 
Sample5 Selection Selection Selection Selection 
Diagnostics     
 Observations 463,197 463,197 430,091 432,003 
 F-stat 16.60*** 28.86*** 1786.27*** 5074.29*** 
 Multivariate F-test of Excl. Res. 28.74*** 83.27*** 34.75*** 83.03*** 
Note(s): (1) Dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the average cost of a course of higher study by 
subject and institution, see Section 3.4. Estimated coefficients are shown with standard errors in brackets. 
Standard errors are clustered at the Institution-by-subject level. (2) The HEFC teaching grant awarded to 
each institution divided by the number of full-time equivalent academic staff, which is logged and 
interacted with the proportion of academic staff in each subject in 2003/04. (3) The share of overseas 
students taking each subject at each institution in 2002/03 and 2003/04 is interacted with the trade 
weighted Sterling exchange rate. (4) Controls included are shown in Table 3.7. (5) Specification shown 
(12) includes only students obtaining Lower Second Class UG degree classification or above. (6) *, ** and 
** reflect significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
3.6.2 Socio-economic group 
 
Table 3.9 summarises the findings with respect to socio-economic group,
27
 reporting the 
estimated coefficients on group dummies from specification (12) across each definition 
of expected fees. In each case the base category are students from Higher Managerial & 
Professional occupations and the estimated coefficients reflect the change in 
participation probabilities associated with a student coming from a different socio-  
 
                                                          
27
 Socio-economic group is here defined as the 2001-National Statistics Socio-
Economic Classification (NS-SEC) which is based on the Standard Occupational 
Classification 2000. See Table 3.9 for categories.  
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Table 3.9: Socio-economic group and participation probabilities1,4 
Fees Definition: [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Socio-economic group   
  
 
Lower managerial & 
Professional occupations 
-0.005*** 
 (0.001) 
-0.005***  
(0.001) 
-0.006***  
(0.002) 
-0.007***  
(0.002) 
 
Intermediate occupations 
-0.012***  
(0.002) 
-0.012***  
(0.002) 
-0.015***  
(0.002) 
-0.017***  
(0.002) 
 
Small employers & own account 
workers 
-0.016***  
(0.002) 
-0.016***  
(0.002) 
-0.018***  
(0.002) 
-0.020***  
(0.002) 
 
Lower supervisory & technical 
occupations 
-0.015***  
(0.002) 
-0.015***  
(0.002) 
-0.017***  
(0.002) 
-0.017***  
(0.002) 
 
Semi-routine occupations 
-0.013***  
(0.002) 
-0.013***  
(0.002) 
-0.017***  
(0.002) 
-0.017***  
(0.002) 
 
Routine occupations & Never 
worked and long-term 
unemployed  
-0.018***  
(0.002) 
-0.018***  
(0.002) 
-0.022***  
(0.003) 
-0.024***  
(0.003) 
 
Not classified 
-0.001  
(0.002) 
0.000 
 (0.002) 
-0.002  
(0.002) 
-0.001  
(0.002) 
Controls (see Table 3.7)2 Y Y Y Y 
Specification (12) (12) (12) (12) 
Sample3 Selection Selection Selection Selection 
Estimation Method IV IV IV IV 
Note(s): (1) Dep. Var. is a binary indicator of whether the student progressed to postgraduate higher 
education. Estimated coefficients are shown with standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are clustered 
at the Institution-by-subject level. Excluded category is Higher managerial and Professional occupations. 
(2) Controls included are shown in Table 3.7. (3) Results shown are drawn from regressions using 
specification (12) which includes only students obtaining Lower Second Class UG degree classification or 
above. (4) *, ** and ** reflect significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
economic group. In contrast to the results on expected tuition fees, these coefficients are 
relatively stable across specifications. 
 Compared to students from Higher Managerial & Professional occupations, 
students from lower socio-economic groups appear less likely to progress to 
postgraduate study. The magnitude of this effect varies, from between -0.5% and -0.7% 
for students from Lower Managerial & Professional occupations, to between -1.8% and 
-2.4% for students from the poorest socio-economic groups, Routine occupations and 
Never worked & long term unemployed. Students from Lower supervisory & technical 
occupations and Small employers & own account worker backgrounds are between 
1.5% and 2.0% less likely to progress to postgraduate study. As can be seen in full in 
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the Appendices, these results are consistent across specifications and estimation 
methods.  
 
3.6.3 Other results 
 
In addition to the core results with respect to fees and socio-economic background, the 
findings of this paper shed light on a range of other factors which affect the probability 
of progressing to postgraduate study. As is shown in the Appendix, the results suggest 
that women are between 3.1% and 3.4% less likely to progress to postgraduate study 
than men, while students from non-white backgrounds are significantly more likely to 
remain in higher education. After controlling for common, time-invariant unobservable 
characteristics, Specification (12) suggests that Black and Asian students are 5.8-6.6% 
and 5.2-6.8% more likely respectively to progress to a further degree than equivalent 
white students. Students who report having a disability are also significantly more likely 
to remain in higher education.  
 The effect of academic performance on the probability of a student progressing 
to a higher degree is broadly as expected. Students who obtained First Class or Upper 
Second Class undergraduate degrees are 13.4-16.0% and 4.1-5.3% more likely to 
remain in higher education than students who obtained Lower Second Class degrees. 
School level results also appear to have a residual significant effect, with better 
performing students more likely to remain in higher education. Attendance at a Private 
school prior to university significantly increases the likelihood of progression by 
between 0.9% and 2.4%, confirming the findings of Machin and Murphy (2010).  
 Finally, the effect of local economic conditions on student’s decisions varies 
across specifications. In specifications (5) and (11), before the introduction of fixed 
effects to control for endogenous residential selection, earnings around the student’s 
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domicile are found to have a significant if relatively small impact on progression 
probabilities. In specification (11), a 10% increase in the level of hourly earnings is 
associated with a reduction of between 0.2% and 0.3% in the probability of remaining 
in higher education. A similar increase in youth unemployment is associated with an 
increase in progression probabilities of between 0.2% and 0.5%. 
 Including an array of fixed effects for domicile travel to work area in 
specifications (6) and (12) has the effect of shifting the identification strategy onto 
changes in unemployment and earnings over time. These results vary across Fee 
Definitions. Using definitions [1] and [2], earnings growth has no statistically 
significant impact on progression rates, while growing rates of youth unemployment 
reduce the probability of participation. Using definitions [3] and [4], youth 
unemployment continues to exert downwards pressure on participation probabilities, but 
growing earnings also reduces the likelihood of progression. Both effects are relatively 
slight. Taken together, these coefficients suggest that students from relatively wealthy 
areas are marginally more likely to remain in higher education after completing their 
undergraduate degrees, but that a poorer economic outlook encourages students to look 
for employment rather than pursue further study. 
 
3.7 Heterogeneity and robustness of the effects 
 
To check that these results are not the product of my assumptions, a number of 
robustness checks were carried out. Firstly, as reported in Section 3.4, a number of 
different methods were used to calculate the expected postgraduate tuition fee for each 
student. Adopting different assumptions allowed me to control for students who change 
subject, institution or both between undergraduate and Masters levels. The consistency 
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of the findings across expected fee definitions provides strong evidence that expected 
postgraduate fees do influence student behaviour. 
 Secondly, to examine the robustness of my results to changes in the instrumental 
variables, IV regressions were performed for each fee definition using one instrument at 
a time. Using just the teaching cost instrument, the magnitude and significance of the 
coefficient on expected fees remained similar to that produced using both instruments. 
In each case teaching costs are positively and significantly correlated with expected 
postgraduate fees and in each case the variable produces an F-stat greater than ten. 
Using only the trade-weighted Sterling index in the first stage produced coefficients on 
fees of a similar magnitude, but a slightly lower level of significance. In each case, 
trade-weighted movements in Sterling are significantly and negatively associated with 
expected postgraduate fees and in two of the four definitions, the coefficient on 
expected fees is significant at the 10% level. However, on its own the exchange rate 
instrument is not sufficiently powerful to pass the first-stage multivariate F-test (Stock, 
Wright and Yogo 2002). 
 To examine whether students from different backgrounds differ in their 
responses to expected postgraduate tuition fees a further set of IV regressions were run 
using interaction terms between expected tuition fees and (1) gender, (2) socio-
economic background and (3) ethnic group. In the first case, the two fees terms 
(expected postgraduate fee and expected postgraduate fees interacted with the Female 
dummy variable) were instrumented for using the interacted teaching costs and 
exchange rate variables (teaching costs and exchange rate movements, and these terms 
interacted with the Female dummy variable). The results of this process suggest that 
men and women respond to expected postgraduate fees in broadly the same way, as 
none of the interacted fees terms were significant across the different expected fee 
definitions. 
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 In the second case, a similar identification strategy was adopted, interacting both 
the fees variable and the instruments. As before, none of the expected fee interaction 
terms were significant, suggesting that fees have a similar impact across students from 
different socio-economic groups. The ethnic group interactions suggest that Asian 
students are significantly more affected by expected postgraduate fees than white 
students, although the magnitude and significance of this effect varies. The coefficient 
on expected postgraduate fees interacted with the Asian dummy variable is negative and 
significant at the 5% level using three of the four fees definitions, while the fourth is 
significant at the 10% level. The magnitude of the coefficient on the interacted variable 
ranges between -0.09 and -0.14, although as with the other robustness regressions, the 
interacted instruments perform relatively poorly in the first stage, placing the reliability 
of this result in question.  
 Finally, a set of IV regressions were estimated including more detailed variables 
examining the return to specific types and levels of qualification. In a preliminary stage 
(unreported), micro-level Labour Force Survey data was used to model (a) 
undergraduate earnings, (b) postgraduate earnings and (c) unemployment risk for those 
aged 18-24 as a function of individual, academic and geographical characteristics. The 
coefficients from these regressions were used to impute forgone earnings (if the student 
chose not to progress), likely earnings (if the student chose to take a higher degree) and 
the risk of unemployment (if the student chose not to progress), and capture variation in 
the labour market returns of different qualifications over time. By their construction, 
these variables go some way towards addressing the risk that the unobserved returns to 
particular courses vary significantly over time. In practice, these measures had little 
impact on the significance of the estimated fees coefficient, but did marginally attenuate 
the size of the effect. Using these more detailed measures of the return to different 
levels of qualification produced coefficients of between -0.146 and -0.375 depending on 
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the definition of expected fees adopted. In each case the estimated coefficient is 
statistically significant at conventional levels. 
 
3.8 Discussion and conclusions 
 
This paper examines the impact of tuition fees on student demand for postgraduate 
higher education in the UK and explores patterns of participation among students from 
different economic backgrounds. Using a large, micro-level dataset of students in higher 
education between 2004/05 and 2008/09, it makes several contributions to the literature. 
Firstly, it provides a summary of previously neglected trends in participation above 
undergraduate level. Secondly, it uses a large and hitherto unavailable dataset of 
postgraduate tuition fees by institution and subject. Thirdly, it uses a micro-level, two-
stage model to reduce the impact of multiple forms of endogeneity bias to assess the 
extent to which postgraduate tuition fees impact on the demand for postgraduate higher 
education in the UK. 
 The results suggest that students do respond to price signals in higher education 
and that the marginal impact of postgraduate fees may be quite large. The preferred 
specification, which partially controls for unobserved individual and departmental 
characteristics and which attempts to deal with the endogeneity of postgraduate fees, 
suggests that a 10% increase in expected postgraduate tuition fees is associated with a 
reduction in the probability of progressing to postgraduate study of between 1.7% and 
4.5% depending on the approach adopted. The results also suggest that there are 
significant differences in the progression rates of students from different economic 
backgrounds. Students from the poorest families are between 1.8% and 2.4% less likely 
to progress to a postgraduate degree than students from the wealthiest backgrounds, 
even after controlling for their individual characteristics and prior academic attainment.  
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Two areas present scope for future work. Firstly, the definition of participation 
used here only captures ‘direct entry’ postgraduate students. As a consequence, those 
who study for a higher degree after a spell of other activity are outside the scope of this 
paper. Longitudinal datasets offer scope to improve the robustness of these analyses. 
Further investigation to examine which sub-groups of students choose to defer further 
study may also shed light on access concerns. Secondly, this paper can say nothing 
about the impact of changes to undergraduate tuition fees on access to postgraduate 
higher education, as all the students included in the dataset took their undergraduate 
degrees under the same tuition fee regime. Given the price sensitivity these results 
suggest, further research is urgently needed to examine the effect of student debt on 
willingness to pursue higher degrees in the UK.  
Two implications of these results for policy are especially clear. Firstly, a 
systematic effort is needed to monitor all postgraduate tuition fees in the UK. The 
absence of a database of fees by subject, institution and qualification level has presented 
a significant barrier for research and is an essential pre-requisite for efforts to 
effectively monitor access above undergraduate level, as demanded by the Browne 
Review (Browne 2010). Recent policy reforms to encourage institutions to charge 
different rates for undergraduate courses must also be accompanied with effective 
monitoring. 
Secondly, there is a need to re-examine how public support for postgraduate 
study is allocated. The ‘assumed fee’ used by the Higher Education Funding Councils 
understates the true student contribution in many cases and therefore fails to equalise 
per equivalent student funding. My results suggest that students from poorer 
backgrounds (1) are under-represented in postgraduate study and (2) that the jump from 
undergraduate to postgraduate study presents an additional barrier, through both level 
effects and the deterrent effect of tuition fees. Policy makers should reconsider the 
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funding arrangements for postgraduate study and in particular the extent of public 
support for students from low income backgrounds who aspire to study beyond 
undergraduate level.   
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3A Appendix A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table A.1: Joint Academic Classification of Subjects1 
JACS2 Subject JACS3 Codes 
Degrees related to Medicine  B0-B9 
Biological Science C0-C9 
Veterinary Science D0-D9 
Physical Science F0-F9 
Mathematics G0-G92 
Engineering H0-H9 
Mineral Technology J1-J9 
Architecture K0-K9 
Social Sciences L0-L9 
Law M0-M9 
Business Studies N0-N9 
Communications P0-P9 
Lang, Ling and Classics Q0-Q9 
European Languages R1-R9 
Other Languages T1-T9 
History V0-V9 
Art and Music W0-W9 
Education X0-X9 
Combined degrees Y0 
Note(s): (1) Listings available at www.hesa.ac.uk. 
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Figure A.1: 1998 Travel to work areas: Original 
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Figure A.1: 1998 Travel to work areas: Modified 
 
Note(s): Combined TTWAs are shown in blue. Maintained, original TTWA shown in green. 
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3B Appendix: Table B.1: Fees Definition [1]: Main Equation1, 4, 5 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e 
ln(Fee)2, 3  -0.007 0.007 -0.006 0.007 -0.005 0.007 -0.006 0.007 -0.007 0.008 -0.006 0.008 
Female  
  
-0.022*** 0.001 -0.029*** 0.001 -0.029*** 0.001 -0.031*** 0.001 -0.031*** 0.001 
Disability  
  
0.024*** 0.002 0.030*** 0.002 0.030*** 0.002 0.031*** 0.002 0.031*** 0.002 
Ethnicity Black 
  
0.038*** 0.004 0.054*** 0.004 0.057*** 0.004 0.056*** 0.004 0.058*** 0.004 
 
Asian 
  
0.033*** 0.002 0.050*** 0.003 0.051*** 0.003 0.052*** 0.003 0.052*** 0.003 
 
Other 
  
0.033*** 0.003 0.035*** 0.003 0.037*** 0.003 0.037*** 0.003 0.037*** 0.003 
 
Unknown 
  
0.021*** 0.004 0.027*** 0.005 0.027*** 0.005 0.028*** 0.005 0.027*** 0.005 
School Type Private 
    
0.008*** 0.002 0.009*** 0.002 0.009*** 0.002 0.010*** 0.002 
 
Unknown 
    
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Parental Occ. Lower Manag., Prof. 
    
-0.004*** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 
 
Intermediate  
    
-0.012*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 
 
Small Employers  
    
-0.015*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.002 -0.016*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.002 
 
Super., & Tech. 
    
-0.014*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.002 -0.014*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.002 
 
Semi-routine  
    
-0.011*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 
 
Routine, Unemp. 
    
-0.017*** 0.002 -0.018*** 0.002 -0.018*** 0.002 -0.018*** 0.002 
 
Unknown 
    
-0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
UG Class  First 
    
0.177*** 0.006 0.177*** 0.006 0.134*** 0.004 0.134*** 0.004 
 
Upper Second 
    
0.084*** 0.003 0.084*** 0.003 0.041*** 0.002 0.041*** 0.002 
 
Lower Second 
    
0.043*** 0.002 0.043*** 0.002 
    
 
Unknown 
    
0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007 
    
Sch. Results  2nd Quartile 
    
-0.009*** 0.001 -0.009*** 0.001 -0.009*** 0.001 -0.009*** 0.001 
 
3rd Quartile 
    
-0.013*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 
 
4th Quartile 
    
0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 
Dom. Econ. Unemployment3 
      
0.015 0.013 0.018 0.013 -0.050** 0.024 
 
Hourly Earnings3 
      
-0.028*** 0.003 -0.030*** 0.004 -0.011 0.008 
Controls  Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age, Dom. TTWA 
Observations 658,618 658,618 528,430 524,941 495,996 495,996 
F-stat 126.52*** 73.33*** 72.51*** 68.64*** 69.88*** 14.16*** 
Note(s): (1) Dep. Var. is a binary indicator of whether the student progressed to postgraduate higher education. Std err. clustered at the Institution-by-subject level. All specifications include Institution-by-subject fixed effects. (2) 
Expected Fees are defined as the average postgraduate fee in the student’s undergraduate subject at their undergraduate institution. See Section 3.4. (3) These variables are continuous. (4) Specifications (5), (6), (11) and (12) include 
only students achieving at least a Lower Second Class UG degree. Specifications (1)-(6) are estimated by OLS. Specifications (7)-(12) are estimated by IV.  (5) *, ** and ** reflect significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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3B Appendix: Table B.1 (Cont): Fees Definition [1]: Main Equation1, 4, 5 
 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e 
ln(Fee)2, 3 -0.140*** 0.034 -0.130*** 0.034 -0.167** 0.070 -0.172** 0.072 -0.167** 0.071 -0.171** 0.073 
Female  
  
-0.022*** 0.001 -0.029*** 0.001 -0.029*** 0.001 -0.031*** 0.001 -0.031*** 0.001 
Disability  
  
0.024*** 0.002 0.031*** 0.002 0.030*** 0.002 0.032*** 0.002 0.032*** 0.002 
Ethnicity Black 
  
0.038*** 0.004 0.055*** 0.004 0.058*** 0.004 0.057*** 0.004 0.058*** 0.004 
 
Asian 
  
0.033*** 0.002 0.050*** 0.003 0.051*** 0.003 0.052*** 0.003 0.052*** 0.003 
 
Other 
  
0.034*** 0.003 0.036*** 0.003 0.038*** 0.003 0.038*** 0.003 0.038*** 0.003 
 
Unknown 
  
0.022*** 0.004 0.028*** 0.005 0.028*** 0.005 0.029*** 0.005 0.029*** 0.005 
School Type Private 
    
0.008*** 0.002 0.009*** 0.002 0.009*** 0.002 0.009*** 0.002 
 
Unknown 
    
0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Parental Occ. Lower Manag., Prof. 
    
-0.005*** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 
 
Intermediate  
    
-0.012*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 
 
Small Employers  
    
-0.015*** 0.002 -0.016*** 0.002 -0.016*** 0.002 -0.016*** 0.002 
 
Super., & Tech. 
    
-0.014*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.002 
 
Semi-routine  
    
-0.012*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 
 
Routine, Unemp. 
    
-0.017*** 0.002 -0.018*** 0.002 -0.018*** 0.002 -0.018*** 0.002 
 
Unknown 
    
-0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
UG Class  First 
    
0.177*** 0.008 0.177*** 0.008 0.134*** 0.005 0.134*** 0.005 
 
Upper Second 
    
0.084*** 0.007 0.084*** 0.007 0.041*** 0.002 0.041*** 0.002 
 
Lower Second 
    
0.043*** 0.007 0.043*** 0.007 
    
 
Unknown 
    
0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007 
    
Sch. Results  2nd Quartile 
    
-0.010*** 0.001 -0.010*** 0.001 -0.010*** 0.002 -0.010*** 0.002 
 
3rd Quartile 
    
-0.013*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.014*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 
 
4th Quartile 
    
-0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 
Dom. Econ. Unemployment3 
      
0.020 0.013 0.023* 0.013 -0.053** 0.025 
 
Hourly Earnings3 
      
-0.028*** 0.004 -0.030*** 0.004 -0.012 0.008 
Controls  Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age, Dom. TTWA 
Observations 612,531 612,531 493,664 490,358 463,197 463,197 
F-stat 103.19*** 70.58*** 68.53*** 64.75*** 66.09*** 13.96*** 
Note(s): (1) Dep. Var. is a binary indicator of whether the student progressed to postgraduate higher education. Std err. clustered at the Institution-by-subject level. All specifications include Institution-by-subject fixed effects. (2) 
Expected Fees are defined as the average postgraduate fee in the student’s undergraduate subject at their undergraduate institution. See Section 3.4. (3) These variables are continuous. (4) Specifications (5), (6), (11) and (12) include 
only students achieving at least a Lower Second Class UG degree. Specifications (1)-(6) are estimated by OLS. Specifications (7)-(12) are estimated by IV.  (5) *, ** and ** reflect significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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3B Appendix: Table B.2: Fees Definition [1]: First Stage Equation1,3 
 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e 
Teaching Cost2  0.049*** 0.012 0.049*** 0.012 0.040*** 0.01 0.040*** 0.009 0.040*** 0.009 0.040*** 0.009 
Trade Weighted GBP2 -0.042** 0.017 -0.042** 0.017 -0.033** 0.015 -0.033** 0.015 -0.033** 0.015 -0.033** 0.015 
Female  
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Disability  
  
-0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
Ethnicity Black 
  
0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 
Asian 
  
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 
Other 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 
Unknown 
  
-0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 
School Type Private 
    
-0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 
Unknown 
    
0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
Parental Occ. Lower Manag., Prof. 
    
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Intermediate  
    
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Small Employers  
    
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Super., & Tech. 
    
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 
Semi-routine  
    
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Routine, Unemp. 
    
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 
Unknown 
    
-0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 
UG Class  First 
    
0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 
Upper Second 
    
0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Lower Second 
    
0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 
    
 
Unknown 
    
0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 
    
Sch. Results  2nd Quartile 
    
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
3rd Quartile 
    
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 
4th Quartile 
    
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Dom. Econ. Unemployment2 
      
0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.013 
 
Hourly Earnings2 
      
-0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.006** 0.003 
Controls  Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age, Dom. TTWA 
Observations 612,531 612,531 493,664 490,358 463,197 463,197 
F-stat 162.39** 66.33** 43.67** 40.96** 40.98** 16.60** 
Note(s): (1) Dep. Var. is natural logarithm of the average cost of a course of higher study by subject and institution, see Section 3.4. Std. err clustered at the Institution-by-subject level. All specifications include Institution-by-subject 
fixed effects. (2) These variables are continuous. (3) *, ** and ** reflect significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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3C Appendix: Table C.1: Fees Definition [2]: Main Equation1, 4, 5 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e 
ln(Fee)2, 3  -0.009 0.010 -0.008 0.010 -0.006 0.012 -0.007 0.011 -0.008 0.012 -0.007 0.012 
Female  
  
-0.022*** 0.001 -0.029*** 0.001 -0.029*** 0.001 -0.031*** 0.001 -0.031*** 0.001 
Disability  
  
0.024*** 0.002 0.030*** 0.002 0.030*** 0.002 0.031*** 0.002 0.031*** 0.002 
Ethnicity Black 
  
0.038*** 0.004 0.054*** 0.004 0.057*** 0.004 0.056*** 0.004 0.058*** 0.004 
 
Asian 
  
0.033*** 0.002 0.050*** 0.003 0.051*** 0.003 0.052*** 0.003 0.052*** 0.003 
 
Other 
  
0.033*** 0.003 0.035*** 0.003 0.037*** 0.003 0.037*** 0.003 0.037*** 0.003 
 
Unknown 
  
0.021*** 0.004 0.027*** 0.005 0.027*** 0.005 0.028*** 0.005 0.027*** 0.005 
School Type Private 
    
0.008*** 0.002 0.009*** 0.002 0.009*** 0.002 0.010*** 0.002 
 
Unknown 
    
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Parental Occ. Lower Manag., Prof. 
    
-0.004*** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 
 
Intermediate  
    
-0.012*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 
 
Small Employers  
    
-0.015*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.002 -0.016*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.002 
 
Super., & Tech. 
    
-0.014*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.002 -0.014*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.002 
 
Semi-routine  
    
-0.011*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 
 
Routine, Unemp. 
    
-0.017*** 0.002 -0.018*** 0.002 -0.018*** 0.002 -0.018*** 0.002 
 
Unknown 
    
-0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
UG Class  First 
    
0.169*** 0.008 0.169*** 0.008 0.134*** 0.004 0.134*** 0.004 
 
Upper Second 
    
0.076*** 0.007 0.076*** 0.007 0.041*** 0.002 0.041*** 0.002 
 
Lower Second 
    
0.035*** 0.007 0.035*** 0.007 
    
 
Unknown 
    
-0.008 0.007 -0.008 0.007 
    
Sch. Results  2nd Quartile 
    
-0.009*** 0.001 -0.009*** 0.001 -0.009*** 0.001 -0.009*** 0.001 
 
3rd Quartile 
    
-0.013*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 
 
4th Quartile 
    
0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 
Dom. Econ. Unemployment3 
      
0.015 0.013 0.018 0.013 -0.050** 0.024 
 
Hourly Earnings3 
      
-0.028*** 0.003 -0.030*** 0.004 -0.011 0.008 
Controls Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age, Dom. TTWA 
Observations 658,618 658,618 528,430 524,941 495,996 495,996 
F-stat 128.61*** 73.18*** 72.42*** 68.53*** 69.84*** 14.13*** 
Note(s): (1) Dep. Var. is a binary indicator of whether the student progressed to postgraduate higher education. Std err. clustered at the Institution-by-subject level. All specifications include Institution-by-subject fixed effects. (2) 
Expected Fees are defined as the average postgraduate fee at the student’s undergraduate institution. See Section 3.4. (3) These variables are continuous. (4) Specifications (5), (6), (11) and (12) include only students achieving at least a 
Lower Second Class UG degree. Specifications (1)-(6) are estimated by OLS. Specifications (7)-(12) are estimated by IV. (5) *, ** and ** reflect significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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3C Appendix: Table C.1 (Cont): Fees Definition [2]: Main Equation1, 4, 5 
 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e 
ln(Fee)2, 3 -0.271*** 0.083 -0.251*** 0.076 -0.280** 0.112 -0.287** 0.114 -0.283** 0.113 -0.288** 0.115 
Female  
  
-0.022*** 0.001 -0.029*** 0.001 -0.029*** 0.001 -0.031*** 0.001 -0.031*** 0.001 
Disability  
  
0.024*** 0.002 0.031*** 0.002 0.030*** 0.002 0.032*** 0.002 0.032*** 0.002 
Ethnicity Black 
  
0.038*** 0.004 0.055*** 0.004 0.057*** 0.004 0.057*** 0.004 0.058*** 0.004 
 
Asian 
  
0.033*** 0.002 0.050*** 0.003 0.051*** 0.003 0.052*** 0.003 0.052*** 0.003 
 
Other 
  
0.034*** 0.003 0.036*** 0.003 0.038*** 0.003 0.038*** 0.003 0.038*** 0.003 
 
Unknown 
  
0.023*** 0.004 0.028*** 0.005 0.028*** 0.005 0.029*** 0.005 0.029*** 0.005 
School Type Private 
    
0.008*** 0.002 0.009*** 0.002 0.009*** 0.002 0.009*** 0.002 
 
Unknown 
    
0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
Parental Occ. Lower Manag., Prof. 
    
-0.005*** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 
 
Intermediate  
    
-0.012*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 
 
Small Employers  
    
-0.015*** 0.002 -0.016*** 0.002 -0.016*** 0.002 -0.016*** 0.002 
 
Super., & Tech. 
    
-0.014*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.002 -0.014*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.002 
 
Semi-routine  
    
-0.012*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 
 
Routine, Unemp. 
    
-0.017*** 0.002 -0.018*** 0.002 -0.018*** 0.002 -0.018*** 0.002 
 
Unknown 
    
0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 
UG Class  First 
    
0.168*** 0.008 0.168*** 0.008 0.134*** 0.005 0.134*** 0.005 
 
Upper Second 
    
0.075*** 0.007 0.075*** 0.007 0.041*** 0.002 0.041*** 0.002 
 
Lower Second 
    
0.034*** 0.007 0.034*** 0.007 
    
 
Unknown 
    
-0.009 0.007 -0.009 0.007 
    
Sch. Results  2nd Quartile 
    
-0.010*** 0.001 -0.010*** 0.001 -0.010*** 0.002 -0.010*** 0.002 
 
3rd Quartile 
    
-0.013*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 
 
4th Quartile 
    
-0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 
Dom. Econ. Unemployment3 
      
0.020 0.013 0.023* 0.013 -0.050** 0.025 
 
Hourly Earnings3 
      
-0.028*** 0.004 -0.029*** 0.004 -0.012 0.008 
Controls Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age, Dom. TTWA 
Observations 612,531 612,531 493,664 490,358 463,197 463,197 
F-stat 94.52*** 67.49*** 67.92*** 64.15*** 65.59*** 13.67*** 
Note(s): (1) Dep. Var. is a binary indicator of whether the student progressed to postgraduate higher education. Std err. clustered at the Institution-by-subject level. All specifications include Institution-by-subject fixed effects. (2) 
Expected Fees are defined as the average postgraduate fee at the student’s undergraduate institution. See Section 3.4. (3) These variables are continuous. (4) Specifications (5), (6), (11) and (12) include only students achieving at least a 
Lower Second Class UG degree. Specifications (1)-(6) are estimated by OLS. Specifications (7)-(12) are estimated by IV. (5) *, ** and ** reflect significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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3C Appendix: Table C.2: Fees Definition [2]: First Stage Equation1, 3 
 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e 
Teaching Cost2  0.044*** 0.006 0.044*** 0.006 0.040*** 0.003 0.040*** 0.003 0.039*** 0.003 0.039*** 0.003 
Trade Weighted GBP2 -0.019*** 0.007 -0.019*** 0.007 -0.018** 0.008 -0.018** 0.008 -0.018** 0.008 -0.018** 0.008 
Female  
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Disability  
  
-0.001* 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 
Ethnicity Black 
  
-0.001 0.001 -0.002** 0.001 -0.002** 0.001 -0.002** 0.001 -0.002** 0.001 
 
Asian 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Other 
  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Unknown 
  
0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 
School Type Private 
    
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Unknown 
    
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Parental Occ. Lower Manag., Prof. 
    
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Intermediate  
    
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Small Employers  
    
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Super., & Tech. 
    
0.001* 0.000 0.001* 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001* 0.000 
 
Semi-routine  
    
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Routine, Unemp. 
    
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Unknown 
    
0.002** 0.001 0.002** 0.001 0.001** 0.001 0.001** 0.001 
UG Class  First 
    
-0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Upper Second 
    
-0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Lower Second 
    
-0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 
    
 
Unknown 
    
-0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 
    
Sch. Results  2nd Quartile 
    
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
3rd Quartile 
    
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
4th Quartile 
    
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Dom. Econ. Unemployment2 
      
0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.013 0.011 
 
Hourly Earnings2 
      
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.004 0.003 
Controls Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age, Dom. TTWA 
Observations 612,531 612,531 493,664 490,358 463,197 463,197 
F-stat 415.66*** 175.33*** 113.87*** 108.67*** 115.07*** 28.86*** 
Note(s): (1) Dep. Var. is natural logarithm of the average cost of a course of higher study by institution, see Section 3.4. Std. err clustered at the Institution-by-subject level. All specifications include Institution-by-subject fixed effects. 
(2) These variables are continuous. (3) *, ** and ** reflect significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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3D Appendix: Table D.1: Fees Definition [3]: Main Equation1, 4, 5 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e 
ln(Fee)2, 3 0.304*** 0.042 0.265*** 0.039 -0.038*** 0.012 -0.020 0.012 -0.020 0.012 -0.008 0.014 
Female  
  
-0.025*** 0.001 -0.031*** 0.001 -0.031*** 0.001 -0.032*** 0.001 -0.032*** 0.001 
Disability  
  
0.029*** 0.002 0.032*** 0.002 0.032*** 0.002 0.034*** 0.003 0.034*** 0.003 
Ethnicity Black 
  
0.033*** 0.004 0.058*** 0.004 0.060*** 0.004 0.059*** 0.004 0.061*** 0.004 
 
Asian 
  
0.029*** 0.003 0.053*** 0.003 0.054*** 0.003 0.055*** 0.003 0.055*** 0.003 
 
Other 
  
0.026*** 0.003 0.037*** 0.003 0.038*** 0.003 0.038*** 0.003 0.038*** 0.003 
 
Unknown 
  
0.024*** 0.005 0.028*** 0.005 0.028*** 0.005 0.029*** 0.005 0.029*** 0.005 
School Type Private 
    
0.009*** 0.002 0.010*** 0.002 0.010*** 0.002 0.010*** 0.002 
 
Unknown 
    
0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002 
Parental Occ. Lower Manag., Prof. 
    
-0.005*** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 
 
Intermediate  
    
-0.013*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 
 
Small Employers  
    
-0.015*** 0.002 -0.016*** 0.002 -0.017*** 0.002 -0.016*** 0.002 
 
Super., & Tech. 
    
-0.014*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.002 
 
Semi-routine  
    
-0.013*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 
 
Routine, Unemp. 
    
-0.017*** 0.002 -0.018*** 0.002 -0.019*** 0.003 -0.018*** 0.002 
 
Unknown 
    
-0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 
UG Class  First 
    
0.142*** 0.005 0.142*** 0.005 0.142*** 0.005 0.142*** 0.005 
 
Upper Second 
    
0.045*** 0.002 0.044*** 0.002 0.045*** 0.002 0.045*** 0.002 
 
Lower Second 
    
-0.047*** 0.003 -0.046*** 0.003 
    
 
Unknown 
    
-0.041*** 0.007 -0.041*** 0.007 
    
Sch. Results  2nd Quartile 
    
-0.010*** 0.002 -0.010*** 0.002 -0.010*** 0.002 -0.010*** 0.002 
 
3rd Quartile 
    
-0.013*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.014*** 0.002 -0.014*** 0.002 
 
4th Quartile 
    
-0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 
Dom. Econ. Unemployment3 
      
0.015 0.013 0.018 0.014 -0.051** 0.026 
 
Hourly Earnings3 
      
-0.029*** 0.004 -0.031*** 0.004 -0.013 0.008 
Controls Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age, Dom. TTWA 
Observations 487,519 487,519 487,519 487,519 461,927 461,927 
F-stat 86.82*** 62.64*** 74.47*** 70.68*** 71.40*** 14.90*** 
Note(s): (1) Dep. Var. is a binary indicator of whether the student progressed to postgraduate higher education. Std err. clustered at the Institution-by-subject level. All specifications include Institution-by-subject fixed effects. (2) 
Expected Fees are estimated using the average postgraduate fee paid by students on the same undergraduate course (assuming they continue with their undergraduate subject). See Section 3.4. (3) These variables are continuous. (4) 
Specifications (5), (6), (11) and (12) include only students achieving at least a Lower Second Class UG degree.  Specifications (1)-(6) are estimated by OLS. Specifications (7)-(12) are estimated by IV. (5) *, ** and ** reflect significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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3D Appendix: Table D.1 (Cont): Fees Definition [3]: Main Equation1, 4, 5 
 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e 
ln(Fee)2, 3 -0.273*** 0.104 -0.268** 0.113 -0.257** 0.106 -0.255** 0.105 -0.250** 0.106 -0.258** 0.110 
Female  
  
-0.026*** 0.001 -0.031*** 0.001 -0.031*** 0.001 -0.033*** 0.001 -0.033*** 0.001 
Disability  
  
0.030*** 0.003 0.033*** 0.003 0.033*** 0.003 0.034*** 0.003 0.035*** 0.003 
Ethnicity Black 
  
0.046*** 0.005 0.065*** 0.005 0.067*** 0.005 0.065*** 0.005 0.066*** 0.005 
 
Asian 
  
0.045*** 0.005 0.061*** 0.005 0.062*** 0.005 0.062*** 0.005 0.063*** 0.005 
 
Other 
  
0.037*** 0.004 0.042*** 0.004 0.043*** 0.003 0.043*** 0.004 0.043*** 0.003 
 
Unknown 
  
0.027*** 0.005 0.030*** 0.005 0.030*** 0.005 0.031*** 0.006 0.031*** 0.006 
School Type Private 
    
0.014*** 0.003 0.015*** 0.003 0.014*** 0.003 0.015*** 0.003 
 
Unknown 
    
0.005* 0.002 0.004* 0.002 0.005* 0.003 0.004* 0.003 
Parental Occ. Lower Manag., Prof. 
    
-0.006*** 0.002 -0.006*** 0.002 -0.006*** 0.002 -0.006*** 0.002 
 
Intermediate  
    
-0.015*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.002 
 
Small Employers  
    
-0.018*** 0.002 -0.018*** 0.002 -0.018*** 0.002 -0.018*** 0.002 
 
Super., & Tech. 
    
-0.016*** 0.002 -0.016*** 0.002 -0.016*** 0.002 -0.017*** 0.002 
 
Semi-routine  
    
-0.016*** 0.002 -0.016*** 0.002 -0.016*** 0.002 -0.017*** 0.002 
 
Routine, Unemp. 
    
-0.021*** 0.003 -0.022*** 0.003 -0.022*** 0.003 -0.022*** 0.003 
 
Unknown 
    
-0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 
UG Class  First 
    
0.150*** 0.006 0.151*** 0.006 0.150*** 0.006 0.151*** 0.006 
 
Upper Second 
    
0.049*** 0.003 0.049*** 0.003 0.049*** 0.003 0.050*** 0.003 
 
Lower Second 
    
-0.050*** 0.003 -0.050*** 0.003 
    
 
Unknown 
    
-0.040*** 0.007 -0.040*** 0.007 
    
Sch. Results  2nd Quartile 
    
-0.012*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 
 
3rd Quartile 
    
-0.014*** 0.002 -0.014*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.002 -0.014*** 0.002 
 
4th Quartile 
    
-0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.003 
Dom. Econ. Unemployment3 
      
0.021 0.013 0.024* 0.014 -0.061** 0.027 
 
Hourly Earnings3 
      
-0.017*** 0.006 -0.019*** 0.006 -0.014* 0.008 
Controls Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age, Dom. TTWA 
Observations 454,853 454,853 454,853 454,853 430,091 430,091 
F-stat 79.71*** 63.71*** 70.35*** 66.59 67.41*** 14.85*** 
Note(s): (1) Dep. Var. is a binary indicator of whether the student progressed to postgraduate higher education. Std err. clustered at the Institution-by-subject level. All specifications include Institution-by-subject fixed effects. (2) 
Expected Fees are estimated using the average postgraduate fee paid by students on the same undergraduate course (assuming they continue with their undergraduate subject). See Section 3.4. (3) These variables are continuous. (4) 
Specifications (5), (6), (11) and (12) include only students achieving at least a Lower Second Class UG degree. Specifications (1)-(6) are estimated by OLS. Specifications (7)-(12) are estimated by IV.  (5) *, ** and ** reflect significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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3D Appendix: Table D.2: Fees Definition [3]: First Stage Equation1, 3 
 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e 
Teaching Cost2  0.023*** (0.005) 0.024*** (0.004) 0.024*** (0.004) 0.024*** (0.004) 0.024*** (0.004) 0.024*** (0.005) 
Trade Weighted GBP2 -0.022** (0.009) -0.022** (0.009) -0.021** (0.009) -0.021** (0.009) -0.021** (0.009) -0.021** (0.009) 
Female  
  
-0.003*** (0.000) -0.004*** (0.000) -0.004*** (0.000) -0.004*** (0.000) -0.004*** (0.000) 
Disability  
  
0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Ethnicity Black 
  
0.023*** (0.001) 0.030*** (0.001) 0.024*** (0.001) 0.024*** (0.001) 0.020*** (0.001) 
 
Asian 
  
0.031*** (0.001) 0.037*** (0.000) 0.034*** (0.000) 0.034*** (0.000) 0.034*** (0.000) 
 
Other 
  
0.017*** (0.000) 0.019*** (0.000) 0.016*** (0.000) 0.015*** (0.000) 0.014*** (0.000) 
 
Unknown 
  
0.002 (0.002) 0.003* (0.002) 0.003 (0.002) 0.003 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 
School Type Private 
    
0.021*** (0.000) 0.020*** (0.000) 0.020*** (0.000) 0.019*** (0.000) 
 
Unknown 
    
0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001) 
Parental Occ. Lower Manag., Prof. 
    
-0.004*** (0.000) -0.004*** (0.000) -0.004*** (0.000) -0.004*** (0.000) 
 
Intermediate  
    
-0.009*** (0.000) -0.009*** (0.000) -0.009*** (0.000) -0.009*** (0.000) 
 
Small Employers  
    
-0.006*** (0.000) -0.005*** (0.000) -0.005*** (0.000) -0.006*** (0.000) 
 
Super., & Tech. 
    
-0.005*** (0.000) -0.004*** (0.000) -0.004*** (0.000) -0.004*** (0.000) 
 
Semi-routine  
    
-0.013*** (0.000) -0.011*** (0.000) -0.011*** (0.000) -0.011*** (0.000) 
 
Routine, Unemp. 
    
-0.015*** (0.000) -0.013*** (0.000) -0.013*** (0.000) -0.013*** (0.000) 
 
Unknown 
    
-0.005*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) 
UG Class  First 
    
0.037*** (0.000) 0.037*** (0.000) 0.037*** (0.000) 0.036*** (0.000) 
 
Upper Second 
    
0.022*** (0.000) 0.021*** (0.000) 0.021*** (0.000) 0.021*** (0.000) 
 
Lower Second 
    
-0.017*** (0.000) -0.017*** (0.000) 
    
 
Unknown 
    
0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 
    
Sch. Results  2nd Quartile 
    
-0.004*** (0.000) -0.004*** (0.000) -0.004*** (0.000) -0.004*** (0.000) 
 
3rd Quartile 
    
-0.002*** (0.000) -0.002*** (0.000) -0.002*** (0.000) -0.001* (0.000) 
 
4th Quartile 
    
-0.002*** (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001) 
Dom. Econ. Unemployment2 
      
0.006* (0.003) 0.006* (0.003) -0.022*** (0.007) 
 
Hourly Earnings2 
      
0.048*** (0.001) 0.048*** (0.001) -0.004** (0.002) 
Controls Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age, Dom. TTWA 
Observations 454,853 454,853 484,853 454,853 430,091 430,091 
F-stat 343.62*** 571.40*** 1634.59*** 1917.53*** 1899.86*** 1786.27*** 
Note(s): (1) Dep. Var. is natural logarithm of the average price for a postgraduate course paid by students on a given undergraduate course (assuming they continue with their undergraduate subject), estimated as a function of their 
academic and individual characteristics. See Section 3.4. Std. err clustered at the Institution-by-subject level. All specifications include Institution-by-subject fixed effects. (2) These variables are continuous. (3) *, ** and ** reflect 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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3E Appendix: Table E.1: Fees Definition [4]: Main Equation1, 4, 5 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e 
ln(Fee)2, 3 0.506*** 0.042 0.460*** 0.041 -0.095*** 0.019 -0.054*** 0.019 -0.055*** 0.019 -0.016 0.023 
Female  
  
-0.024*** 0.001 -0.031*** 0.001 -0.031*** 0.001 -0.032*** 0.001 -0.032*** 0.001 
Disability  
  
0.029*** 0.002 0.032*** 0.002 0.032*** 0.002 0.034*** 0.003 0.034*** 0.003 
Ethnicity Black 
  
0.029*** 0.004 0.059*** 0.004 0.060*** 0.004 0.059*** 0.004 0.060*** 0.004 
 
Asian 
  
0.023*** 0.003 0.055*** 0.003 0.055*** 0.003 0.056*** 0.003 0.055*** 0.003 
 
Other 
  
0.022*** 0.003 0.038*** 0.003 0.039*** 0.003 0.038*** 0.003 0.038*** 0.003 
 
Unknown 
  
0.025*** 0.005 0.028*** 0.005 0.028*** 0.005 0.029*** 0.005 0.029*** 0.005 
School Type Private 
    
0.012*** 0.002 0.011*** 0.002 0.011*** 0.002 0.011*** 0.003 
 
Unknown 
    
0.004* 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004* 0.002 0.004 0.002 
Parental Occ. Lower Manag., Prof. 
    
-0.005*** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 
 
Intermediate  
    
-0.013*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 
 
Small Employers  
    
-0.016*** 0.002 -0.016*** 0.002 -0.017*** 0.002 -0.016*** 0.002 
 
Super., & Tech. 
    
-0.015*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.002 -0.015*** 0.002 
 
Semi-routine  
    
-0.013*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 
 
Routine, Unemp. 
    
-0.019*** 0.002 -0.019*** 0.002 -0.019*** 0.003 -0.019*** 0.002 
 
Unknown 
    
-0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
UG Class  First 
    
0.145*** 0.005 0.143*** 0.005 0.143*** 0.005 0.142*** 0.005 
 
Upper Second 
    
0.046*** 0.002 0.045*** 0.002 0.045*** 0.002 0.045*** 0.002 
 
Lower Second 
    
-0.046*** 0.003 -0.046*** 0.003 
    
 
Unknown 
    
-0.040*** 0.007 -0.040*** 0.007 
    
Sch. Results  2nd Quartile 
    
-0.010*** 0.002 -0.010*** 0.002 -0.010*** 0.002 -0.010*** 0.002 
 
3rd Quartile 
    
-0.013*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.014*** 0.002 -0.014*** 0.002 
 
4th Quartile 
    
-0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 
Dom. Econ. Unemployment3 
      
0.019 0.013 0.021 0.014 -0.049* 0.026 
 
Hourly Earnings3 
      
-0.026*** 0.004 -0.028*** 0.004 -0.013 0.008 
Controls Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age, Dom. TTWA 
Observations 488,863 488,863 488,863 488,863 463,146 463,146 
F-stat 116.33*** 69.08*** 74.44*** 70.66*** 71.47*** 14.83*** 
Note(s): (1) Dep. Var. is a binary indicator of whether the student progressed to postgraduate higher education. Std err. clustered at the Institution-by-subject level. All specifications include Institution-by-subject fixed effects. (2) 
Expected Fees are estimated using the average postgraduate fee paid by students on the same undergraduate course. See Section 3.4. (3) These variables are continuous. (4) Specifications (5), (6), (11) and (12) include only students 
achieving at least a Lower Second Class UG degree. Specifications (1)-(6) are estimated by OLS. Specifications (7)-(12) are estimated by IV. (5) *, ** and ** reflect significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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3E Appendix: Table E.1 (Cont): Fees Definition [4]: Main Equation1, 4, 5 
 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e 
ln(Fee)2, 3 -0.480** 0.201 -0.466** 0.189 -0.439** 0.179 -0.435** 0.177 -0.433** 0.177 -0.447** 0.182 
Female  
  
-0.028*** 0.002 -0.033*** 0.002 -0.033*** 0.002 -0.034*** 0.002 -0.034*** 0.002 
Disability  
  
0.031*** 0.003 0.033*** 0.002 0.033*** 0.002 0.034*** 0.003 0.035*** 0.003 
Ethnicity Black 
  
0.049*** 0.006 0.069*** 0.006 0.068*** 0.005 0.067*** 0.005 0.066*** 0.005 
 
Asian 
  
0.051*** 0.006 0.067*** 0.007 0.067*** 0.006 0.067*** 0.006 0.068*** 0.006 
 
Other 
  
0.041*** 0.005 0.046*** 0.005 0.046*** 0.004 0.045*** 0.004 0.045*** 0.004 
 
Unknown 
  
0.026*** 0.005 0.029*** 0.005 0.029*** 0.005 0.030*** 0.006 0.029*** 0.006 
School Type Private 
    
0.023*** 0.007 0.023*** 0.006 0.023*** 0.006 0.024*** 0.007 
 
Unknown 
    
0.005** 0.002 0.006** 0.002 0.006** 0.003 0.005** 0.003 
Parental Occ. Lower Manag., Prof. 
    
-0.007*** 0.002 -0.007*** 0.002 -0.007*** 0.002 -0.007*** 0.002 
 
Intermediate  
    
-0.017*** 0.002 -0.017*** 0.002 -0.017*** 0.002 -0.017*** 0.002 
 
Small Employers  
    
-0.019*** 0.002 -0.019*** 0.002 -0.020*** 0.002 -0.020*** 0.002 
 
Super., & Tech. 
    
-0.016*** 0.002 -0.016*** 0.002 -0.016*** 0.002 -0.017*** 0.002 
 
Semi-routine  
    
-0.016*** 0.002 -0.016*** 0.002 -0.016*** 0.002 -0.017*** 0.002 
 
Routine, Unemp. 
    
-0.024*** 0.004 -0.024*** 0.003 -0.024*** 0.003 -0.024*** 0.003 
 
Unknown 
    
-0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
UG Class  First 
    
0.160*** 0.009 0.160*** 0.009 0.160*** 0.009 0.160*** 0.009 
 
Upper Second 
    
0.052*** 0.004 0.052*** 0.004 0.052*** 0.004 0.053*** 0.004 
 
Lower Second 
    
-0.048*** 0.003 -0.048*** 0.003 
    
 
Unknown 
    
-0.038*** 0.007 -0.037*** 0.007 
    
Sch. Results  2nd Quartile 
    
-0.012*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 -0.012*** 0.002 -0.011*** 0.002 
 
3rd Quartile 
    
-0.013*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 -0.014*** 0.002 -0.013*** 0.002 
 
4th Quartile 
    
-0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.003 
Dom. Econ. Unemployment3 
      
0.044*** 0.016 0.047*** 0.017 -0.051* 0.027 
 
Hourly Earnings3 
      
-0.001 0.012 -0.003 0.012 -0.020** 0.009 
Controls Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age, Dom. TTWA 
Observations 456,071 456,071 456,071 456,071 432,003 432,003 
F-stat 75.26*** 61.08*** 70.07*** 66.49*** 67.48*** 14.60*** 
Note(s): (1) Dep. Var. is a binary indicator of whether the student progressed to postgraduate higher education. Std err. clustered at the Institution-by-subject level. All specifications include Institution-by-subject fixed effects. (2) 
Expected Fees are estimated using the average postgraduate fee paid by students on the same undergraduate course. See Section 3.4. (3) These variables are continuous. (4) Specifications (5), (6), (11) and (12) include only students 
achieving at least a Lower Second Class UG degree. Specifications (1)-(6) are estimated by OLS. Specifications (7)-(12) are estimated by IV.  (5) *, ** and ** reflect significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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3E Appendix: Table E.2: Fees Definition [4]: First Stage Equation1,3 
 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e β s.e 
Teaching Cost2  0.021*** (0.002) 0.022*** (0.002) 0.023*** (0.002) 0.023*** (0.002) 0.023*** (0.002) 0.023*** (0.002) 
Trade Weighted GBP2 -0.012*** (0.005) -0.012** (0.005) -0.012** (0.005) -0.012** (0.005) -0.012** (0.005) -0.012** (0.005) 
Female  
  
-0.005*** (0.000) -0.006*** (0.000) -0.005*** (0.000) -0.005*** (0.000) -0.005*** (0.000) 
Disability  
  
0.001*** (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
Ethnicity Black 
  
0.020*** (0.001) 0.027*** (0.001) 0.018*** (0.001) 0.018*** (0.001) 0.013*** (0.000) 
 
Asian 
  
0.030*** (0.000) 0.035*** (0.000) 0.031*** (0.000) 0.031*** (0.000) 0.031*** (0.000) 
 
Other 
  
0.019*** (0.000) 0.020*** (0.000) 0.016*** (0.000) 0.016*** (0.000) 0.014*** (0.000) 
 
Unknown 
  
-0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) 
School Type Private 
    
0.033*** (0.000) 0.031*** (0.000) 0.031*** (0.000) 0.031*** (0.000) 
 
Unknown 
    
0.003*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.000) 
Parental Occ. Lower Manag., Prof. 
    
-0.004*** (0.000) -0.003*** (0.000) -0.003*** (0.000) -0.003*** (0.000) 
 
Intermediate  
    
-0.009*** (0.000) -0.009*** (0.000) -0.009*** (0.000) -0.009*** (0.000) 
 
Small Employers  
    
-0.007*** (0.000) -0.006*** (0.000) -0.006*** (0.000) -0.006*** (0.000) 
 
Super., & Tech. 
    
-0.004*** (0.000) -0.003*** (0.000) -0.003*** (0.000) -0.003*** (0.000) 
 
Semi-routine  
    
-0.008*** (0.000) -0.007*** (0.000) -0.007*** (0.000) -0.006*** (0.000) 
 
Routine, Unemp. 
    
-0.015*** (0.000) -0.012*** (0.000) -0.012*** (0.000) -0.012*** (0.000) 
 
Unknown 
    
-0.002*** (0.000) -0.001** (0.000) -0.001** (0.000) -0.001** (0.000) 
UG Class  First 
    
0.044*** (0.000) 0.044*** (0.000) 0.044*** (0.000) 0.043*** (0.000) 
 
Upper Second 
    
0.020*** (0.000) 0.019*** (0.000) 0.019*** (0.000) 0.019*** (0.000) 
 
Lower Second 
    
-0.006*** (0.000) -0.006*** (0.000) 
    
 
Unknown 
    
0.005*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 
    
Sch. Results  2nd Quartile 
    
-0.002*** (0.000) -0.002*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.001) -0.001** (0.001) 
 
3rd Quartile 
    
0.000 (0.001) 0.001* (0.001) 0.001* (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001) 
 
4th Quartile 
    
-0.001* (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 
Dom. Econ. Unemployment2 
      
0.055*** (0.003) 0.055*** (0.003) 0.003 (0.006) 
 
Hourly Earnings2 
      
0.066*** (0.001) 0.066*** (0.001) -0.016*** (0.002) 
Controls Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age Cohorts, Age, Dom. TTWA 
Observations 456,071 456,071 456,071 456,071 432,003 432,003 
F-stat 1470.91*** 1259.70*** 3769.27*** 5185.19*** 5063.77*** 5074.29*** 
Note(s): (1) Dep. Var. is natural logarithm of the average price for a postgraduate course paid by students on a given undergraduate course, estimated as a function of their academic and individual characteristics. See Section 3.4. Std. 
err clustered at the Institution-by-subject level. All specifications include Institution-by-subject fixed effects. (2) These variables are continuous. (3) *, ** and ** reflect significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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4. Would you like a degree with that? Graduate labour market outcomes in the 
context of local economic disparities in the United Kingdom 
 
The expansion of higher education in the UK and recent reforms to the funding of 
undergraduate teaching have led to a resurgence of academic and policy-maker interest 
in the pecuniary returns to a degree. Between 2000/01 and 2010/11, the number of full-
time undergraduates at universities in Great Britain increased by 32.1%. The number of 
full-time postgraduate students increased by 80.9% over the same period, taking the 
total number of UK domiciled students in higher education to more than two million 
(HESA 2011). The increased supply of graduates, the economic downturn and reforms 
intended to shift the costs of undergraduate teaching from tax-payers to individual 
students (Barr 2010a, 2010b), have raised questions about whether a higher education 
qualification remains a ‘good investment’.  
 Labour economists have long been interested in the returns to education and to 
an undergraduate degree in particular (Card 1999). The pecuniary benefits of a 
qualification are a function of both (1) the wage obtained and (2) the likelihood of 
finding work after graduating. As is widely recognised, the empirical difficulty of 
calculating these benefits lies in identifying the appropriate counterfactual (Angrist and 
Krueger 1999): the pecuniary return to a degree is given by the difference in earned 
wages relative to what the same individual would have obtained without the 
qualification. Appropriately accounting for the impact of unobserved individual 
heterogeneity makes this work particularly challenging.  
 This paper examines two specific graduate labour market outcomes: (1) the 
likelihood of a student finding employment after graduation and (2) the likelihood that 
their qualification was a requirement for their job. In the first case, students who are 
more successful in finding employment after graduation are likely to have a higher 
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return, everything else being equal. The second case concerns the ‘quality’ of the match 
between the graduate’s skills and their employer’s technology. Ex ante, students who 
achieve better quality matches in the labour market also seem likely to have a higher 
return.  
 This paper makes several contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, it 
presents a critical discussion of the methods previously employed by researchers 
examining the incidence and effects of ‘over-education’. Secondly, it estimates a series 
of linear probability models using several waves of a survey of recent graduates from 
British universities. Using the repeated cross-sectional nature of this dataset, it includes 
a large number of fixed effects for university courses and areas of residence which 
partially control for several forms of endogeneity bias. Finally, it considers the 
empirical difficulties of the field and offers a set of thoughts for further study. 
 The results suggest that graduate labour market outcomes vary widely across 
observably different groups, even after controlling for common unobserved 
characteristics. Students from ethnic minorities, disabled students and students 
graduating from shorter courses are less likely to find employment after graduation. 
Males are less likely to find employment than females, while recent graduates from 
higher socio-economic groups are more likely to be outside the workforce than their less 
well-off peers.  
The results also suggest that the males who do enter employment are more likely 
to be mismatched in their role than an equivalent female. Students who achieve better 
academic results and students from wealthy backgrounds also appear to have greater 
access to Professional & Managerial vacancies. Taken together, the results raise 
questions about how graduates make the transition from university to the labour market.   
 The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 4.1 provides a review of 
the literature on graduate labour market outcomes. Section 4.2 discusses my conceptual 
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framework and highlights the empirical challenges of work in this field. Section 4.3 
presents the data, Section 4.4 describes the results and Section 4.5 considers the 
limitations of the analysis. Section 4.6 provides some discussion and conclusions.  
 
4.1 Literature review 
 
The literature on graduate outcomes in the United Kingdom is substantial. Significant 
research attention has focussed on students’ migration decisions (Faggian and McCann 
2006, 2009, Faggian, McCann and Sheppard 2007a, 2007b), starting salaries (Blundell 
et al. 2000, Dolton and Makepeace 1990), subsequent earnings (Dolton and Makepeace 
1990, Bratti, Naylor and Smith 2005, Bratti and Mancini 2003, Fengliang et al. 2009, 
Behrman, Rosenzweig and Taubman 1996, Dearden, McIntosh, Myck and Vignoles 
2002), their likelihood of employment (Smith, McKnight and Naylor 2000, Bratti, 
McKnight, Naylor and Smith 2004, Unwin and Di Pietro 2005) as well as their choice 
of occupation and industry (Davies and Guppy 1997). Less attention has been paid to 
their choice of academic field (Montmarquette et al. 2002, Bratti 2006, Wales 2010), 
their likelihood of progressing to postgraduate study (Machin and Murphy 2011) and 
the effect of tuition fees on their behaviour (Crawford and Dearden 2010). 
 A substantial volume of research has also examined the incidence and effects of 
‘over-education’ in the labour market: a phenomenon in which an individual’s acquired 
human capital, skills or qualifications exceed the requirements of the job in which 
he/she is employed. This review begins with the theoretical approaches which are 
frequently invoked to motivate studies of labour market mismatch. It briefly discusses 
different measures of ‘over-education’, before proceeding to review papers which have 
investigated either the incidence or impact of labour market mismatch. Particular 
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attention is given to the empirical methods used by different researchers and their 
results.
28
  
 
4.1.1 Theoretical framework 
 
Researchers have used several different theoretical devices to motivate their empirical 
work on over-education. However, the concept remains a difficult one for economists. 
At an aggregate level, economists expect an increase in the supply of skilled labour to 
lead to a fall in price and higher graduate employment. At the level of the firm, if a 
worker’s skills are not being fully exploited then the firm should change its technology 
to make use of its under-utilised resources. Confronted with a firm which refuses to 
alter its technology to make best use of his skills, a rational yet over-educated worker 
will move to another firm which can use his greater skills and, consequently, pay him a 
higher wage. As a result, over-education is primarily a short-run phenomenon: no 
worker should find himself permanently over-educated.   
 Several researchers have motivated their studies of over-education as a test of 
the standard Mincerian wage equation (Mincer 1974). Building on previous work, they 
distinguish between ‘required’ schooling – the number of years of education required to 
do the job; ‘over’ schooling – the number of years of education in excess of required 
schooling; and ‘under’ schooling’ – the number of years of education less than the 
required level. All three are entered into a wage regression with the aim of testing 
Mincer’s central hypothesis: that acquired schooling determines individual productivity 
and therefore the wage. In this case, the coefficients on over-, under- and required-
schooling are of equal absolute value. However, it should be clear that in this theoretical 
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 For comprehensive meta-analyses of the over-education literature see Hartog (2000), 
Groot and van den Brink (2000) and McGuinness (2006). 
174 
 
framework there is no explicit explanation for over-education: education simply affects 
wages and productivity. 
 Several researchers motivate their empirical analysis by comparing this 
Mincerian approach with an ‘Assignment’ model of the labour market, in which 
characteristics of both the individual and the job affect the wage offer. Building on the 
work of Thurow (1975) this approach conceives of the labour market as two ‘queues’ – 
one consisting of workers organised by ability, one consisting of jobs organised by 
difficulty. The most difficult job is assigned to the most able worker, while easier jobs 
are assigned to less able workers. In this context, if qualifications and ability are partial 
substitutes, several researchers have argued that individuals may ‘over-invest’ in 
education to move forward in this queue to get a better job. In these models, over-
education may be the dominant strategy for individuals of lesser ability.
29
  
 Search costs and labour market frictions have also formed the basis of an 
explanation for over-education. Ordine and Rose (2011) construct a model composed of 
heterogeneous workers and firms, in which worker productivity and firm technology are 
not observed by the other party until after the worker has joined the firm. Workers are 
attached to firms on the basis of their observable education ‘signals’ in a process which 
assigns students of differing innate ability the same probability of a successful match. 
This pooling equilibrium for observably similar workers who have different levels of 
ability creates the potential for over-education. Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and 
Dodaldo, Jansen and Jimeno (2009) also offer models of over-education arising from 
search costs and matching frictions. Albrecht and Vroman (2002) propose a model in 
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 McGuiness (2006) identifies three approaches – ‘Human Capital,’ ‘Job Competition’ 
and ‘Assignment’. He argues that these models differ in their predictions about the 
factors which affect wages. Human capital theory suggests that the worker’s 
productivity entirely determines the wage, while the job competition model argues that 
only characteristics of the job are relevant. Assignment models, he argues, offer a 
middle way in which both characteristics of the worker and of the job should be 
included in wage regressions.  
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which highly skilled workers may take either skilled or unskilled positions, depending 
on the extent of productivity differences between the high- and low-skilled workers and 
the relative size of the highly-skilled worker population. Doldaldo, Jansen and Jimeno 
(2009) develop Albrecht and Vroman’s (2002) model to include on the job search 
motivated by the desire to find a better match and highlight the consequences of 
transitory mismatch on less educated workers.  
While these papers offer explanations for temporary mismatch among a single 
cohort of workers, they do not explain the persistence of over-education for some 
individuals. Based on a relatively small sample, Grip et al. (2008) present evidence that 
over-educated workers suffer from more rapid cognitive decline than well-matched 
workers. Applying cognitive ability tests to the same subjects at six year intervals, they 
conclude that over-educated workers may remain in mismatched positions because these 
positions are detrimental to their development.  
  
4.1.2 Measurement issues 
 
The measurement of over-education is fraught and variable choice is often driven by 
available data rather than the merits of a particular measure. In each case the researcher 
elicits the level of education required for a given role and compares it to the educational 
attainment of those actually in employment. Troublingly, papers which have used more 
than one measure have found their results to be sensitive to the use of different 
indicators (Dolton and Silles 2008, McGoldrick and Robst 1996). 
 The literature distinguishes between three approaches to measuring the required 
schooling for a particular position – two ‘objective’ and one ‘subjective’. In the latter, 
individual workers are asked to assess the level of education required to perform their 
work to an acceptable standard. The precise form and wording used varies across 
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studies. In some cases, individuals are asked to report the level of education required for 
their position (‘What was the minimum formal qualification for (entering) this job?’ 
(Dolton and Vignoles 2000, pp.182)), in others they are asked what kind of education is 
the best preparation for taking on their position (‘Which education, according to you, is 
the best preparation for the work you are doing?’ (Hartog and Oosterbeek 1988, pp.188-
189)), while in yet others they are asked to relay the level of education required of 
someone starting a position like theirs now (‘What type of formal schooling is now 
normally required for people who do your type of work?’ (Vahey 2000, pp.220). 
Finally, in some cases researchers ask workers whether their skill-set qualifies them to 
work in a more senior position (‘Do you feel that you have skills or qualifications to do 
a more demanding job than the one you have now?’ (Budria and Moro-Egido 2008, 
pp.334). 
 Several problems with this approach are self-evident. Firstly, the wording of the 
question may substantively change the results, as the different emphases in each 
question may plausibly draw different responses from the same individual (Leuven and 
Oosterbeek 2011, Green et al. 1999). Secondly, individuals may have an interest in 
over-stating the difficulty of their role, or the importance of their skills and 
qualifications. Thirdly, the approach assumes that all agents measure work ‘difficulty’ 
on a common scale. Each is likely to lead to a subjective bias in responses.  
 The two ‘objective’ measures of over-education involve measuring individually 
reported education against a standard for the field set by either (1) formal occupational 
classifications or (2) the workers observed in the relevant position. In the first case, 
researchers use dictionaries of occupational titles (for example, see DOT 2011) to 
identify the required level of educational attainment for a given position. This is 
converted into years of schooling and used as a yardstick against which to judge 
whether individuals are over- or under-educated. However, occupational dictionaries are 
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published infrequently and the method used to convert required education into years of 
schooling is not universally accepted (Leuven and Oosterbeek 2011). Researchers are 
also forced to assume that all employers have similar educational requirements and, 
therefore, similar technology (Chevalier 2003). 
In the second case, researchers compare individual educational attainment to the 
modal qualification or mean years of education among workers in a particular 
occupation. Individuals who are ‘significantly’ above or below the chosen benchmark 
are deemed to be over- or under-educated respectively. Difficulty arises here in 
determining how much more or less than the benchmark constitutes ‘real’ over- or 
under-education. 
 In addition to the individual difficulties which affect all of these measures, 
several conceptual problems blight attempts to gather clear evidence on the quality of 
labour market matches. Firstly, employers may specify a formal qualifying level of 
education to be eligible for a position which does not reflect the education required to 
carry out the tasks (Dolton and Vignoles 2000). Consequently, a graduate might enter a 
position for which their qualification was a formal requirement, but in which their 
acquired skills and knowledge are not utilised. Secondly, the increased supply of skilled 
labour has led to concerns about ‘qualification inflation’. This arises if employers 
increase the level of education required for a given position while the job’s content 
remains the same. Both these effects may lead to significant under-reporting of poor 
quality matches.  
 This discussion points to a broader conceptual problem regarding the extent to 
which the terms ‘over-education’, ‘over-qualification’ and ‘over-skilled’ are 
interchangeable. Over-education and over-qualification both appear to imply that an 
individual has acquired more education than is strictly required for a given position. In 
the former, the worker has more years of schooling than necessary, while in the latter 
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they hold qualifications above the formal requirements. Over-skilling suggests 
something tangibly different: that a worker has more skills than are strictly needed for 
their work. If, as seems likely, skills and qualifications are only imperfectly correlated, 
in some cases the indicators of mismatch may diverge. 
As more attention has been devoted to unobserved individual heterogeneity, a 
growing number of researchers have sought to distinguish ‘over-skilling’ from ‘over-
education’. This approach leads to a more detailed classification of graduates, in which 
students can report under-utilization of skills separately from the requirements of the 
job. Green and Zhu (2010) use this approach to identify four groups of graduates: (1) 
those in graduate jobs using their skills, (2) those in graduate jobs under-utilizing their 
skills, (3) those in non-graduate jobs using their skills and (4) those in non-graduate jobs 
under-utilizing their skills. Allen and van der Velden (2001) adopt a similar approach 
using European data to classify graduates on the basis of (a) whether they meet the skill 
requirements for their position and (b) whether they could perform better with 
additional skills. Green and McInstosh (2007) use UK data to show that only around 
half of those who report themselves as over-qualified are actually over-skilled and find 
evidence of significant skill heterogeneity within qualifications. Chevalier (2003) also 
attempts to step beyond the boundaries of ‘formal’ over-education by asking graduates 
to report how satisfied they are with the match between their skills and their position. 
However, all of these are subjective individual responses and so these papers remain 
affected by many of the problems detailed above. 
 
4.1.3 Incidence of over-education 
 
Partly as a result of the different measures adopted, researchers have generated varying 
estimates of the incidence of over-education and its determinants. Problems of 
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measurement have been compounded by the use of inadequate or inappropriate methods 
(Leuven and Oosterbeek 2011) and as a consequence there is no consensus about how 
to assess the quality of labour market matches. The following section is framed around 
the various different methods which have been employed elsewhere. 
 The simplest approach used to model the incidence of labour market mismatch 
involves a binary choice framework, in which students either obtain a matched opening 
or are over-educated in their first job. The substantial empirical literature which has 
developed from Freeman’s (1976) original over-education contribution has sought to 
relate individual, academic and parental characteristics to the likelihood of being over-
educated. Dolton and Silles (2001) use data on recent graduates from Newcastle 
University to estimate a series of probit regressions in the probability of a student being 
over-educated. They find that graduates of different academic subjects have different 
mismatch propensities, with Education graduates significantly less likely to be over-
educated than graduates of other subjects. Students achieving First Class degrees also 
appear less likely to be mismatched, in both their initial and subsequent jobs.  
 Dolton and Silles (2008) extend their earlier analysis using an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) approach and several different definitions of over-education. They again 
conclude that there are significant differences in mismatch propensities between 
graduates of different academic disciplines and between students entering different 
sectors, occupations and firm sizes. Students entering Managerial and Professional roles 
at smaller firms outside the Education sector appear significantly more likely to report 
themselves over-educated in both their first and subsequent jobs. However, the 
magnitude and significance of many of their estimated effects vary depending on the 
definition adopted. Frenette (2004) supports these findings using a logit model and data 
on Canadian graduates. Examining mismatch probabilities two and five years after 
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graduation, he finds significant differences among students entering different industries 
with different types of qualification. 
 Several researchers have developed extended models which consider the 
incidence of over- and under-education together. Battu and Sloane (2004) estimate a 
multinomial logit model in the probabilities of being (1) over-educated, (2) matched and 
(3) under-educated. Their results suggest that non-white individuals are significantly 
more likely to be over-educated than equivalent white workers. Younger individuals, 
holding qualifications from foreign universities are also more likely to be over-
educated, although this effect is smaller for UK-born second generation migrants.  
Chevalier (2003) also estimates a multinomial logit, but among a classification 
based on both required qualifications and job-match satisfaction. His potential outcomes 
include (1) matched (students are employed in a graduate level occupation), (2) 
apparently over-educated (students are in a non-graduate job, but satisfied with their 
match), and (3) genuinely over-educated (students are in a non-graduate job and report 
themselves dissatisfied with their match). He concludes that graduates achieving First 
Class or Upper Second Class degrees, in Mathematics, Engineering or Education are 
significantly less likely to be ‘genuinely’ over-educated. Battu, Bellfield and Sloane 
(1999, 2000) and Chevalier and Lindley (2009) also report significant differences in 
over-education propensities across academic subjects. None of these papers find 
evidence that the incidence of over-education is affected by either the individual’s 
gender or socio-economic background.  
 Alongside individual and academic characteristics, several papers have 
investigated the spatial incidence of over-education. Frank (1978) argued that married 
women may be more vulnerable to over-education if household location decisions are 
based on their spouse’s career options. This effect may be amplified if families locate in 
relatively small urban centres, where the number and range of labour market openings is 
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more limited. McGoldrick and Robst (1996) test this theory using three measures of 
over-education and data from the United States. Estimating a multinomial logit model 
and comparing married white males and females, they find no convincing evidence 
either that (1) women are more likely to be over-educated or (2) that labour market 
mismatch is spatially mediated. Consistent with several other papers, their results vary 
depending on the measure of over-education they adopt.  
Büchel and Battu (2003) use German data to examine whether labour market 
characteristics influence the probability of being mismatched. Estimating a logit 
regression, they find that married women in rural areas of Germany are almost twice as 
likely to be over-educated as equivalent single males. However, controlling for the 
proximity of local employment centres eliminates the gender difference and suggests 
that both males and females in small labour markets may be more at risk of over-
education than equivalent individuals in urban areas.  
Büchel and van Ham (2003) also investigate whether local labour markets affect 
the quality of worker-job matches. Using German data, they estimate a two-stage model 
of the probability of over-education, controlling for selection into the labour market in 
the first stage. They conclude that the characteristics of local labour markets can 
influence both the probability of employment and the likelihood of being over-educated. 
Specifically, they find that the level of unemployment in the area around the worker’s 
residence affects the probability of them finding work, while (1) the distance to an 
agglomeration and (2) access to a car both affect the quality of the labour market match. 
These findings suggest that workers with relatively limited mobility, both in terms of 
their ability to commute and their ability to migrate for employment, may be more at 
risk of over-education.  
 The use of multi-stage models, in particular to control for selection into the 
labour market, has become more prevalent among recent contributions as authors have 
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recognised the sample selection bias present in their work.
30
 Where the choice to 
participate in the labour market is endogenous, parameter estimates in over-education 
regressions may be biased and inconsistent. However, the difficulty of finding 
appropriate exclusion restrictions – variables which affect the probability of 
employment but not the quality of the labour market match – has led to a dependence on 
often questionable instruments. In their first-stage model, Büchel and van Ham (2003) 
argue that age and its square affect selection into employment but not the quality of job 
obtained. However, older individuals may be more likely to find a good quality match if 
(a) experience is valued by employers or (b) if individuals get better at job search with 
greater practice.  
 Ordine and Rose (2011), who offer a similar two-stage empirical analysis using 
a Heckman model to control for selection into the labour market, use the square of the 
student’s university grade, attendance at a technical school and whether the individual 
has a child as instruments for participation. However, the former instruments – 
university grade squared and attendance at a technical school – could both affect wages 
directly. The final instrument seems more plausible, and follows the example of several 
others in the field, notably Dolton and Vignoles (2000). However, in these studies 
identification rests on the maintained assumption that the choice to start a family is 
exogenous to labour market conditions. If a couple’s choice to start a family is a 
function of their economic circumstances then this too may be a weak instrument. 
 An alternative approach to controlling for unobservable skills is adopted by 
Chevalier (2003). To account for idiosyncratic differences in productivity, Chevalier 
(2003) estimates expected starting wages for each student in his dataset. He calculates 
the difference between expected and actual starting wages and includes this in his 
multinomial logit specification, arguing that this variable captures individual 
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 This is discussed further in the next section. 
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productivity. This measure of unobserved skills has a significant, negative impact on the 
probability of an individual being ‘genuinely over-educated’ relative to the ‘well-
matched’ base case, providing further evidence that mismatched individuals are not a 
random draw from the population. 
 
4.1.4 Impact of over-education 
  
Recent work on the impact of over-education on wages has been heavily criticised for a 
range of empirical short-comings (Leuven and Oosterbeek 2011). Indeed, a large 
number of papers proceed directly from a descriptive examination of the incidence of 
over-education to estimating its effects on wages, without considering the likely 
endogeneity of either participating in the labour market or being poorly matched. This 
section examines recent papers which have adopted methods designed to partially 
control for these effects.  
 Dolton and Vignoles (2000) offer the first of several papers which attempt to 
control for selection effects as they examine the impact of over-education on wages 
using the 1980 National Survey of Graduates and Diplomates. Although they treat the 
individual’s quality of labour market match as exogenous, Dolton and Vignoles (2000) 
recognise that the women in employment in their 1986 sample are a non-random draw 
of the original 1980 survey. To control for this, they estimate the effect of over-
education on female wages in two stages: first running a participation regression to 
model the likelihood that a woman chooses to remain in the labour market, and then 
using the Inverse Mills Ratio (from the first stage) in the second-stage, wage equation 
(Heckman 1979).  
 As set out in the previous section, this approach depends on finding an 
appropriate exclusion restriction. Dolton and Vignoles (2000) use (1) the number of 
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children in the household, (2) the woman’s starting wage (in 1980) and (3) their 
industry of employment (in 1980) to estimate the likelihood of a given female 
participating in the labour market in 1986. They argue that the participation decision 
may be influenced by domestic factors or by the opportunity cost of not participating. In 
practice, controlling for selection into the labour market makes little difference to their 
parameter of interest and they consequently report the OLS estimates. They conclude 
that being over-educated reduces graduate starting salaries by between 3.0% and 13.3%, 
with jobs which require much lower levels of qualification carrying the larger penalty. 
Examining the subsequent (1986) employment of their sample, Dolton and Vignoles 
(2000) find that those who are over-educated still carry a slightly reduced pay penalty of 
between 1.7% and 11.0%. 
 While selection into the labour market is important, Leuven and Oosterbeek 
(2011) are especially critical of papers which do not account for omitted variable bias 
arising from unobserved individual heterogeneity. Their concern derives from the risk 
that students who are of lower (unobserved) ability may choose to work in positions for 
which they are ‘over-qualified’, but not ‘over-skilled’. A number of different strategies 
have been adopted to try to control for the likely endogeneity of over-education. Firstly, 
some papers have adopted an instrumental variables approach to try to reduce the effect 
of unobserved ability. The difficulty with this approach lies in finding an appropriate 
exclusion restriction for the first stage equation – a variable which affects the 
probability of being over-educated but not the level of the wage. 
 Dolton and Silles (2001) is one such study. Using data on recent graduates, they 
include three instruments in their first-stage regressions: (1) whether the student 
relocated for their first job, (2) family commitments – including whether the individual 
has children or a partner prior to getting their first job and (3) the level of debt the 
student has on graduation. Chevalier (2003) argues that migration behaviour may be a 
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weak instrument – especially given that wages are likely to affect migration choices 
themselves. Their family commitment instruments also appear relatively weak (only the 
presence of children is significant in the first stage, and then only at the 10% level), but 
student debt seems more plausible. Using their IV approach, Dolton and Silles (2001) 
estimate that over-education imposes an 18% wage penalty in their first job, and around 
a 30% penalty in their job five years later.  
 The difficulty of finding plausible instruments for over-education has 
encouraged some researchers to adopt panel data methods which exploit longitudinal 
datasets. These studies start with a set of wage equations for two time periods of the 
form:   
 
                             (1) 
                             (2) 
 
Equations (1) and (2) relate individual income,   , to an agent’s unobserved and time-
invariant ability,   , and over-education status,   . Differencing (1) and (2) allows 
researchers to cancel out unobserved individual ability, and to estimate equation (3): 
 
                                                    (3) 
  
 Frenette (2004) uses this approach with longitudinal data on three cohorts of 
Canadian graduates. Differencing out unobserved ability, identification in his model 
depends on individual transitions between over-educated and well-matched positions. 
His results suggest that the wage penalty estimated by OLS is biased upwards. For a 
college graduate, the estimated effect of being over-educated in his first position falls 
from -11.1% to -6.0% when using the differencing approach. For Bachelors degree 
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students the differenced coefficient remains relatively large, but only half as big as that 
from the OLS procedure: -10.9% compared to -19.4%. 
 Dolton and Silles (2008) combine a panel data and an instrumental variables 
approach to both (a) difference out individual ability and (b) control for measurement 
error in their over-education variables. Anticipating a central criticism of Leuven and 
Oosterbeek (2011), they argue that if their over-education variables are affected by 
measurement error, then the estimated coefficients will be biased towards zero. To 
partially control for this effect they use two indicators of the education required for a 
position: the qualification required to secure the job and the qualification required to do 
the job. Their strategy therefore involves two stages – first differencing across initial 
and current jobs and then instrumenting for the change in one over-education measure 
using the change in the other. Their results confirm Frenette’s (2004) findings, as their 
estimates of the wage penalty decline after controlling for individual heterogeneity. 
However, using multiple over-education variables to control for measurement error has 
the opposite effect on their mismatch coefficients. While controlling for just individual 
heterogeneity produces a wage penalty of between 18.7% and 21.7%, accounting for 
both unobserved individual characteristics and measurement error generates wage 
penalties of between 34.6% and 39.7%. 
 
4.2 Conceptual and empirical framework 
 
The central empirical focus of this paper is on the factors which determine the 
probabilities that a student (a) finds employment after completing their undergraduate 
degree and (b) that the student is mismatched, in the sense that their qualification was 
not a requirement for their position. Following previous work, which was hampered by 
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endogeneity arising from multiple forms of sample selection bias (Leuven and 
Oosterbeek 2011), I begin the discussion with a simple linear model: 
 
                                 (4) 
 
Equation (4) states that the probability that a student finds employment is a function of 
their individual characteristics,   , the characteristics of their institution,   , and 
conditions in the labour market,     . i, j and k index individuals, institutions and labour 
market areas respectively. The probability of a student entering a mismatched position 
can be defined similarly: 
 
                                 (5) 
 
 While the estimation of (4) and (5) is practically straightforward, there are 
several conceptual problems which threaten to bias estimates of the parameter sets A 
and B. Firstly, as is now widely recognised, individuals are likely to self-select into the 
labour market based on a combination of observable and unobservable characteristics 
(Dolton and Vignoles 2000). All else equal, students with stronger academic credentials 
and greater unobservable ability may systematically choose different outcomes from 
less well-qualified, lower ability students. As a result, the students which appear in 
either (4) or (5) are not a random sample of the population. In (4), only students who 
choose to enter the labour market are included. In (5), only students who enter 
employment are included in the analysis. In both cases, parameter estimates are based 
on an endogenously selected sub-sample of the student body and cannot be generalised 
to the population as a whole. Applying equations (4) and (5) without appropriately 
controlling for selection risks parameter bias and inconsistency. 
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 Secondly, the literature has yet to incorporate controls for potentially 
endogenous selection into universities. Researchers frequently estimate    and    
depending on selection on observables for identification (Perna 2003, 2005, Monks 
2000, Ciriaci and Muscio 2010). However, as has been argued persuasively elsewhere 
(Black and Smith 2004, Ehrenberg 2004, Hoxby 1997, Arcidiacono 2004, Chevalier and 
Conlon 2003, Long 2004), students exhibit substantial sorting when choosing where to 
study, much of which may also be based on unobserved characteristics. This sorting 
renders it very difficult if not impossible to separate the time-invariant characteristics of 
universities from the unobserved characteristics of individuals. To see this problem, 
envisage a sorting method into universities, in which students sort into the distribution 
of universities (good to bad) based on their ability (high to low). Without reliable 
measures of ability, the impact of attending a ‘good’ institution on either employment 
probabilities or earnings is inseparable from the impact of the student’s characteristics. 
Coefficient estimates of parameters    and    are therefore likely to be biased through 
endogeneity.
31
 
 Thirdly, an analogous problem affects estimates of    and   . Several papers in 
the field examine the impact of local economic characteristics on individual behaviour 
by including measures of earnings or unemployment rates in regressions such as (4) or 
(5). However, this over-looks the problem of residential sorting. As has been 
documented by Gobillon, Selod and Zenou (2007) and Dujardin, Selod and Thomas 
(2008), individuals may differ in terms of their preferences for residential areas. If these 
preferences over neighbourhoods also influence the probability of labour market 
outcomes, then the parameter estimates    and    will be similarly biased. 
                                                          
31
 This argument is the intuitive insight behind Black and Smith’s (2004) ‘Common 
Support’ problem. They argue that OLS estimates of the returns to university quality 
may be biased if selection is near perfectly based on ability. Unless some high (low) 
ability students are observed in the less good (the best) universities, then the regression 
suffers from a lack of common support, with detrimental consequences for parameter 
estimates. 
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 Finally, equation (5) may also suffer from the standard omitted variable 
problem. Unless all of an individual’s relevant skills and abilities are included amongst 
the explanatory variables, then there remains a risk that the estimated coefficients are 
biased by the covariance between the measured and unobserved variables. In particular, 
unless all the relevant skills and abilities of individuals are included in (5), the risk of 
omitted variable bias remains. 
  
4.2.1 Empirical framework  
 
To partially mitigate against these effects, equations (4) and (5) are modified and two 
identifying assumptions are introduced. Equation (4) is replaced with a linear 
probability model such that: 
 
        
                                   
(6) 
                 
             
   
             
   
  
 
Equation (6) specifies the probability of employment as a latent variable   , which is 
again a function of individual (  ), institutional (    ) and labour market characteristics 
(      ). Three arrays of fixed effects, for domicile region (  ), institution (  ) and cohort 
(  ), complement the variables in (6). The subscripts i, j, k, and t denote individuals, 
institutions, domicile labour market areas and time respectively. In common with other 
models of revealed preference,   takes a value zero if the latent term is negative and a 
value one otherwise. Equation (7) shows the equivalent specification for the probability 
of being in a mismatched position: 
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(7) 
                 
            
   
            
   
  
 
 Introducing these arrays of fixed effects goes some way towards reducing the 
identification problems outlined in the previous section. Exploiting the time variation in 
the dataset, I make three additional assumptions which when combined with the arrays 
of fixed effects, allow me to partially control for endogenous university and residential 
selection. Firstly, I assume that students sort into university courses based on both 
individual characteristics and characteristics of the institution, which may either be 
observed or unobserved by the researcher. These might include ability, interest in 
research or the extent of work experience gained during their undergraduate degree. 
Secondly, I assume that the individual’s unobserved characteristics, which I cannot 
directly control for, are common among all students making the same choice of 
university and subject. Introducing a fixed effect for each university course controls for 
these unobserved characteristics to the extent to that they are time-invariant, allowing 
all students on a given subject-institution combination to share a single, intercept 
shifting effect on the probability of (a) employment and (b) mismatch.  
Thirdly and analogously, I assume that students who share a common region of 
domicile share a set of unobserved characteristics which may affect both their 
residential location and the probability of a given labour market outcome. Introducing 
an array of fixed effects for each domicile region helps to condition out the impact of 
these unobservables. Identification therefore depends on variation in local economic 
conditions through time. This is a significant methodological innovation compared to 
prior work (Frank 1978, McGoldrick and Robst 1996, Büchel and Battu 2003, Büchel 
and Ham 2003) and permits a more causal interpretation of the coefficients. 
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As in the previous chapters of this thesis, the linear approach I adopt represents a 
compromise between the methodologically desirable and the practically possible. A 
series of fixed-effect conditional logit models were also estimated for a random subset 
of students to ensure that the results are not a consequence of the method employed. 
These produced similar estimates to the linear probability models presented here.  
  
4.3 Data 
 
The primary dataset used in this paper is the Destination of Leavers from Higher 
Education (DLHE) survey provided by the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA), 
which has been used and analysed extensively elsewhere (Faggian and McCann 2006, 
2009, Faggian, McCann and Sheppard, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, Naylor and Smith 2004, 
Smith and Naylor 2005, Wales 2010). The DLHE is a rich, micro-level dataset based on 
a combination of institutional information and the results of a large survey of graduates 
carried out six to nine months after they graduate. It includes a broad range of individual 
level information, such as age, gender and ethnicity, as well as information about the 
student’s institution, subject and degree classification. Alongside these variables, 
geographical information on the student’s domicile and employment postcode districts 
is included. 
 The survey component of the DLHE provides the dependent variables for my 
analysis of employment outcomes. Graduates are asked to report their activity based on 
a classification including various forms of employment (full-time, part-time, 
voluntary/unpaid, work & studying), further study, unemployed or other activity. Figure 
4.1 shows the proportion of students who enter Employment, go on to Further Study or 
who report Other Activity between 2002/03 and 2008/09. The proportion entering 
employment fell slightly in the last two years of available data, from a peak of 72.8% in  
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2006/07 to just over 67.0% in 2008/09. The proportion entering Further Study increased 
slightly in the final two years, from an average of 24.1% between 2002/03 to a little 
over 26.0% in 2008/09. 
Of those who are in employment, the DLHE requests further details about the 
nature of that employment. My analysis of graduate mismatch is based on the answer 
provided to the question ‘Would you have been able to get the job you will be doing on 
… without the qualification you have recently obtained (the actual qualification, not the 
subject of study)?’ (HESA 2006, pp.2). Five possible responses were provided: (1) ‘No: 
the qualification was a formal requirement’, (2) ‘No: successful applicants were 
expected to have the qualification’, (3) ‘Possibly: but the qualification did give me an 
advantage’, (4) ‘Yes’, and (5) ‘Don’t know’. Individuals who agreed with statements 
(1)-(3) are coded as ‘Matched’, while individuals who responded to (4) ‘Yes’, are coded 
as ‘Mismatched’. Figure 4.2 shows the proportion of students in employment who fall 
into each category between 2002/03 and 2008/09, and suggests that between 60% and 
70% of graduates take up positions for which they are well-qualified. The proportion  
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 
Figure 4.1: Graduate destinations 2002/03-2008/09 
Employment 
Further Study 
Other 
Note(s): (1) Proportion of all responding students.  Sample size: 1.2m students. (2) Employment includes 
all modes (FT, PT, Voluntary, etc). (3) Percentages do not sum because students reporting ‘Working & 
Studying’ are allocated to both ‘Employment ‘ and ‘Further Study’. 
% 
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reporting that their qualification was not required for their current position fell from 
34.9% in 2002/03 to a low of 27.1% in 2006/07 before rising again to 29.7% in 
2008/09. 
In the context of the earlier discussion of measures of over-education, this is a 
subjective indicator which depends on the student’s interpretation of the qualifications 
required for the job. I neither claim that this is a perfect measure, nor argue that this 
wording will induce students to use some common measure of difficulty. Instead I make 
two assumptions which frame the following analysis. Firstly, the responses to this 
question, however subjective, capture a noisy indicator of the quality of the labour 
market match by the student. Secondly, no group is inherently more likely to report that 
their qualifications were not required for their position. For the analysis to be valid, two 
individuals who made identical education choices and who enter the same jobs have an 
identical likelihood of reporting themselves mismatched. For clarity, I make the 
maintained assumption that no group howsoever defined (ethnic, socio-economic, age 
or gender) is more likely than any other to report themselves over-educated given the 
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Figure 4.2: Graduate mismatch 2002/03-2008/09 
Required 
Not Required 
Unknown 
Note(s): (1) Proportion of all responding students in FT employment.  
% 
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same educational choices, attainment and eventual employment. This is strong 
assumption and a key limitation of this paper which is discussed further in Section 4.5 
 The starting sample of students from the DLHE, including all first degree 
undergraduates domiciled in and graduating from a university in Great Britain between 
2004/05 and 2008/09, aged between 20 and 24 on graduation, yields observations on 
1,191,430 students. Eliminating part-time students, those studying Medicine or an 
indeterminate subject,
32
 or whose area of domicile is missing reduces the sample to 
864,930.
33
 Of these, 22.7% failed to respond to the survey.
34
 Further attrition occurs 
through missing data.  
As the explanatory variables are introduced gradually, the final sample size 
varies across specifications. The employment regressions include only students who 
opted not to pursue Further study, yielding a sample of between 540,700 and 510,190 
observations. The mismatch regressions, which include only those in employment, 
include between 454,560 and 402,080 observations. Comparing those who respond to 
the survey to those who are excluded or do not respond suggests that the analysis 
slightly over-samples younger students from wealthy backgrounds, although these 
differences are relatively slight. 
                                                          
32
 Students who reported that they divided their time equally between two academic 
subjects, as defined by the Joint Academic Classification of Subjects level two 
(JACS2), are considered to studied an indeterminate subject. Students are assigned the 
subject on which they spent most of their time. 86.3% of the initial sample report a 
single subject specialism.  
33
 Students may be missing domicile information for four reasons. (1) They failed to 
provide a domicile postcode sector (1.4% of the initial sample). (2) They report a Non-
UK address (12.9%). (3) They provide an inaccurate postcode sector (8 observations). 
(4) Their domicile postcode district is split among multiple Travel to Work Areas 
(TTWA). In these cases, Census data on the number of 17, 18 and 19 year olds in each 
Output Area is used to calculate the likelihood of students coming from each possible 
TTWA. 0.31% of the initial sample is dropped owing to uncertainty over domicile. 
96.7% of the initial sample can be assigned to a single TTWA with greater than 70% 
certainty. 90.0% can be assigned to a single TTWA with greater than 90% certainty. 
34
 The non-response rate to the DLHE survey varies between 21.0% and 24.3% across 
the five academic years considered. These fluctuations are assumed to be random as 
they do not appear to differ systematically across sub-groups. 
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4.3.1 Other data sources 
 
Alongside the DLHE, a range of information about local economic conditions was 
gathered from the Office for National Statistics. Specifically, average hourly wages for 
both men and women were extracted from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 
and the Claimant Count rate of unemployment was gathered from the Department of 
Work and Pensions local level datasets. Information about vacancies by occupation was 
taken from the Job Centre Plus vacancy data and broken into ‘high occupations’ – 
including Managerial and Professional vacancies – and ‘low occupations’ – which is 
composed of Elementary, Process, Plant & Machine Operative, Sales & Customer 
Service and Personal Service vacancies. Total employment was taken from the Annual 
Business Inquiry, while the working age population was taken from the Mid-Year 
Population Estimates.  
 To examine the impact of housing costs on the propensity for students to enter 
employment, data was gathered on rents in each of the 408 Local Authority Districts of 
Great Britain. As data on private rents are not publicly available, information was 
gathered on the level of rents charged by Registered Social Landlords (RSL) in each 
area of England, Wales and Scotland. RSLs are landlords who provide housing for 
vulnerable groups and those who cannot afford to rent privately. They provide a range 
of different sorts of accommodation, but generally charge a below-market rent. For this 
application, identification is achieved using spatial and temporal variation in RSL rents, 
on the assumption that changes through time reflect marginal changes in local housing 
markets. These data were used in preference to house price information which is highly 
correlated with local economic conditions.  
 While data on unemployment and vacancies was available at the travel to work 
area level, the rental, population and employment data was gathered at the Local 
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Authority District level and aggregated using usual resident population shares from the 
2001 census. The resulting dataset offers a range of indicators for the 297 travel to work 
areas (TTWA) between 2003 and 2009. In addition to these measures of local economic 
conditions, a further set of data on institutions was gathered from the Higher Education 
Information Database for Institutions (HEIDI). This source provided information on the 
level of teaching funds and the total number of undergraduate students, between 
2003/04 and 2008/09, from which I calculated teaching funds per student.   
 
4.4 Results 
 
The primary empirical focus of this paper is on examining the determinants of graduate 
labour market outcomes in the United Kingdom. A series of linear probability models 
were estimated to identify the effects of individual, academic and local economic 
characteristics on (a) the probability of a student finding employment after graduation 
and (b) the probability that he is mismatched. The variables were introduced gradually 
and the full results are shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.   
 
4.4.1 Employment 
 
Table 4.1 shows the impact of individual, academic and local economic characteristics 
on the probability that a student is in employment six to nine months after graduation. 
Each specification includes a set of cohort dummy variables (five effects), and 
specifications (1), (2), (3) and (5) all include fixed effects for each observed subject-
institution combination (between 1,764 and 1,702 effects). Specification (5) also 
includes fixed effects for each domicile TTWA (297 effects) and represents my 
preferred specification. As discussed above, these effects go some way towards 
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controlling for unobserved characteristics of the individual and of the institution, and 
help to mitigate against parameter bias arising from selection into universities and 
residential areas. (4) is estimated free of these controls to contrast the results before and 
after controlling for selection effects. Each reported regression includes only those 
students who choose to enter the labour market following the graduation, excluding 
students who progress to Further study. 
 The results shown in Table 4.1 suggest significant heterogeneity among 
observably different students, even after controlling for their common, time-invariant 
unobserved characteristics. Firstly, women are more likely to be in employment six to 
nine months after graduating than equivalent male students, who are significantly more 
likely to be unemployed or unavailable for employment. This effect is broadly 
consistent across the specifications, varying between 3.9% and 5.2%. Older students are 
also more likely to be in employment, with an additional year of age adding between 
7.4% and 15.3% to the probability that a graduate is in work. Students who report some 
form of disability are significantly less likely to be in employment. 
 The impact of ethnicity is one of the larger estimated effects and suggests that 
non-white students are significantly less likely to find work than equivalently qualified 
white graduates. In specification (5), Black and Asian students are 4.1% and 7.2% less 
likely to find employment respectively, while students from Other ethnic backgrounds 
are 3.8% less likely to be in work. While these effects are broadly similar across the 
specifications, amongst the greatest differences arise between (4) and (5). This suggests 
that there is significant sorting into different degree subjects and institutions based on 
ethnic background, which is controlled for more completely in specification (5). 
Compared to the coefficients on ethnic group, the impact of socio-economic 
background is relatively small. The coefficients suggest that students from relatively 
less well-off backgrounds are significantly more likely to enter employment than
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Table 4.1: Results: Employment probabilities1, 2, 5 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female 0.042a (0.001) 0.042a (0.001) 0.039a (0.001) 0.052a (0.003) 0.043a (0.006) 
Age3 0.140a (0.019) 0.153a (0.019) 0.108a (0.020) 0.074a (0.022) 0.112a (0.020) 
Age-Squared3 -0.003a (0.000) -0.003a (0.000) -0.003a (0.000) -0.002a (0.000) -0.003a (0.000) 
Disability -0.030a (0.002) -0.030a (0.002) -0.026a (0.002) -0.030a (0.002) -0.026a (0.002) 
Ethnicity 
     
  
  
Black -0.052a (0.004) -0.052a (0.004) -0.045a (0.004) -0.046a (0.004) -0.041a (0.004) 
Asian -0.078a (0.003) -0.078a (0.003) -0.072a (0.003) -0.062a (0.005) -0.072a (0.003) 
Other -0.044a (0.004) -0.043a (0.004) -0.039a (0.004) -0.042a (0.004) -0.038a (0.004) 
Unknown -0.033a (0.003) -0.030a (0.003) -0.026a (0.004) -0.023a (0.004) -0.020a (0.004) 
Socio-economic group 
     
  
  
Lower Manag. & Prof. 
  
0.004a (0.002) 0.004a (0.002) 0.006a (0.002) 0.005a (0.002) 
Intermediate  
  
0.012a (0.002) 0.012a (0.002) 0.014a (0.002) 0.012a (0.002) 
Small Employers  
  
-0.007a (0.002) -0.007a (0.003) -0.003 (0.003) -0.005c (0.003) 
Lower Super. & Tech. 
  
0.010a (0.003) 0.009a (0.003) 0.013a (0.003) 0.009a (0.003) 
Semi-routine  
  
0.010a (0.002) 0.010a (0.002) 0.013a (0.002) 0.010a (0.002) 
Routine & Unemp. 
  
0.009a (0.003) 0.009a (0.003) 0.013a (0.003) 0.009a (0.003) 
Unknown 
  
-0.003 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) 
Academic Characteristics 
     
  
  
Sch. Type Private 
    
-0.025a (0.002) -0.031a (0.002) -0.024a (0.002) 
Unknown 
    
-0.005b (0.002) -0.003 (0.002) -0.004b (0.002) 
Sch. Res. 1st Quartile  
    
-0.008a (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) -0.008a (0.002) 
 
2nd Quartile  
    
-0.001 (0.002) 0.006a (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) 
 
4th Quartile 
    
0.002 (0.002) -0.008a (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 
 
Unknown 
    
-0.005b (0.002) 0.001 (0.003) -0.005b (0.002) 
UG Class 1 
    
0.036a (0.002) 0.032a (0.002) 0.035a (0.002) 
 
2-1 
    
0.017a (0.001) 0.013a (0.001) 0.016a (0.001) 
 
3 
    
-0.027a (0.003) -0.030a (0.003) -0.027a (0.003) 
 
Other 
    
0.007 (0.005) 0.024a (0.007) 0.007 (0.005) 
Three Year UG 
    
-0.028a (0.004) -0.039a (0.005) -0.029a (0.004) 
Four Year UG 
    
-0.012a (0.004) -0.013a (0.004) -0.012a (0.004) 
Funds per student4 
    
0.003 (0.002) 0.007a (0.002) 0.005c (0.003) 
Dom. Econ. Characteristics 
     
  
  
Unemployment 18-244 
      
0.178a (0.042) -0.010 (0.065) 
Average FT Earnings4 
      
-0.006 (0.007) 0.017 (0.017) 
Low Occ. Vac4 
      
0.004c (0.002) 0.006b (0.003) 
Manag. & Prof. Vac4 
      
0.005a (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) 
Total Employment4 
      
-0.008a (0.003) 0.010 (0.023) 
RSL Rent4 
      
-0.028a (0.009) 0.027 (0.030) 
Working Age Pop4 
      
0.003c (0.002) -0.172b (0.068) 
Inst. Econ. Characteristics 
     
  
  
Unemployment 18-244 
      
-0.021a (0.007) 0.006 (0.014) 
Average FT Earnings4 
      
0.021 (0.019) 0.013 (0.027) 
Low Occ. Vac4 
      
0.006 (0.005) 0.003 (0.004) 
Manag. & Prof. Vac4 
      
-0.003 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 
Total Employment4 
      
-0.011 (0.007) -0.067c (0.038) 
RSL Rent4 
      
0.038b (0.019) -0.010 (0.042) 
Working Age Pop4 
      
-0.006c (0.004) -0.115 (0.082) 
Controls & Observations 
     
  
  Year FE YES – (5) YES – (5) YES – (5) YES – (5) YES – (5) 
Inst.*Sub. FE YES – (1,764) YES – (1,764) YES – (1,703)  YES – (1,702) 
Domicile TTWA FE 
   
 YES – (297) 
Observations 540,701 540,701 523,372 510,189 510,189 
Note(s): (1) Dep. Var is binary, taking a value 1 if the student reports being over-educated. Regressions include only students who 
report a specific activity other than full-time study. (2) Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the inst*sub level. (3) These variables 
are quasi-continuous. (4) These variables are continuous. (5) a, b and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% & 10% levels respectively. 
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equivalent students of Higher Managerial & Professional parents. While the broadest 
differences again arise between specifications (4) and (5) – suggesting significant 
sorting into residence and university courses – the absolute magnitude of these effects 
never exceeds 1.3%. This result suggests that students from relatively more affluent 
backgrounds may be able to take more time to decide on their next career steps after 
graduation than students from less wealthy households. 
 The results also highlight the importance of academic success to the likelihood 
of employment. Achieving a First Class (Upper Second Class) undergraduate degree 
increases the probability of a student finding employment by 3.2%-3.6% (1.3%-1.7%) 
relative to achieving a Lower Second Class undergraduate degree. Graduates of longer 
degrees are also significantly more likely to find employment: relative to a graduate of a 
five-year degree course, students graduating in three (four) years are 2.9% (1.2%) less 
likely to be in employment six to nine months after completion. According to 
specification (5), school results seem to have little bearing on labour market outcomes, 
while attendance at a Private school is associated with a higher probability of being 
outside the workforce.  
 Examining the effects of local economic conditions on student behaviour in 
specifications (4) and (5) suggests that controlling for selection into university courses 
and TTWAs of residence is important. Whereas (4) detects a series of effects arising 
from unemployment and rental rates, (5) isolates just two effects which are significant at 
the five percent level. Identifying using variation in economic characteristics over time, 
these results suggest that students in areas with growing numbers of Low Occupation 
Vacancies are marginally more likely to find employment, while students from areas 
with a growing supply of labour are significantly less likely to find employment. 
Economic conditions around the student’s institution make very little difference to 
labour market outcomes. 
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4.4.2 Over-education 
   
Table 4.2 shows the results of a second set of linear probability models examining the 
impact of individual, academic and local economic characteristics on the probability 
that a student who is in employment six to nine months after graduation reports that he 
is over-educated in that position. As before, the variables are entered gradually with the 
most detailed specification reflecting the preferred set of results. Each regression 
includes a set of cohort dummies (five effects), and all but specification (5) include a 
full set of fixed effects for each observed subject-institution combination (between 
1,761 and 1,696 effects). Further controls for the industry (16 effects), employer size 
(five effects) and the TTWA of the student’s domicile (297 effects) are also 
incorporated in the later specifications. Supporting empirical work suggested that a 
further set of fixed effects were required for the TTWA of the student’s employer, 
adding a further set of 297 variables to specification (6). Once again, the penultimate 
specification is estimated without controls for university and residential selection to 
allow the impact of the fixed effects to be assessed. 
 The results in Table 4.2 confirm the findings of some prior work, but also 
present several new effects. Firstly, in the most detailed specification women are found 
to be significantly less likely to report that they are mismatched in their first position 
than men. The magnitude of this effect varies across specifications, ranging from 1.4% 
in regression (3) to -5.8% in regression (6). These differences are largely attributable to 
the inclusion of a detailed set of variables on the nature of the student’s work in 
equation (4) and a complete set of controls for the student’s TTWAs of domicile and 
employment in (6). This result stands in contrast to the results of Battu, Bellfield and 
Sloane (1999, 2000), Chevalier (2003) and Chevalier and Lindley (2009), none of  
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Table 4.2: Results: Mismatch probabilities1, 2, 3, 13 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Female 0.007a (0.002) 0.007a (0.002) 0.014a (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) -0.022a (0.005) -0.058a (0.008) 
Age4 -0.177a (0.028) -0.168a (0.028) 0.019 (0.026) 0.033 (0.023) 0.061b (0.027) 0.050b (0.024) 
Age-Squared4 0.004a (0.001) 0.004a (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001b (0.001) -0.001c (0.001) 
Disability 0.000 (0.003) 0.000 (0.003) -0.002 (0.003) 0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.003) 0.000 (0.002) 
Ethnicity Black 0.028a (0.006) 0.027a (0.006) 0.011b (0.005) 0.018a (0.005) 0.026a (0.006) 0.025a (0.005) 
 
Asian 0.006c (0.004) 0.003 (0.004) -0.006c (0.003) -0.003 (0.003) -0.009c (0.005) 0.000 (0.003) 
 
Other 0.006 (0.004) 0.006 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004) 0.008b (0.004) 0.015a (0.004) 0.011a (0.004) 
 
Unknown -0.031a (0.004) -0.030a (0.004) -0.032a (0.004) -0.014a (0.004) 0.009 (0.005) 0.004 (0.005) 
Socio-economic group Lower Manag. & Prof. 
  
0.007a (0.002) 0.005a (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 
Intermediate  
  
0.018a (0.002) 0.016a (0.002) 0.007a (0.002) 0.006b (0.002) 0.006a (0.002) 
Small Employers  
  
0.020a (0.003) 0.017a (0.003) 0.008a (0.003) 0.007b (0.003) 0.008a (0.003) 
Lower Super. & Technical  
  
0.019a (0.004) 0.017a (0.004) 0.007b (0.003) 0.004 (0.003) 0.005 (0.003) 
Semi-routine  
  
0.024a (0.003) 0.020a (0.003) 0.008a (0.003) 0.006b (0.003) 0.005c (0.003) 
Routine, Never Worked & Unemp. 
  
0.031a (0.004) 0.026a (0.004) 0.009a (0.004) 0.006 (0.004) 0.008b (0.004) 
Unknown 
  
0.009a (0.002) 0.011a (0.003) 0.008a (0.002) 0.006b (0.003) 0.007a (0.002) 
School Type Private 
    
-0.023a (0.003) -0.009a (0.002) -0.003 (0.002) -0.004c (0.002) 
Unknown  
    
-0.008a (0.003) -0.003 (0.002) 0.004 (0.004) -0.002 (0.003) 
School Results 1st Quartile  
    
0.001 (0.003) -0.004 (0.002) -0.006c (0.003) -0.003 (0.002) 
2nd Quartile  
    
-0.004c (0.002) -0.004b (0.002) -0.006a (0.002) -0.004c (0.002) 
4th Quartile 
    
-0.005b (0.002) -0.003 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) -0.005b (0.002) 
Unknown 
    
-0.010a (0.003) -0.007a (0.003) -0.016a (0.004) -0.007a (0.003) 
UG Degree Class 1 
    
-0.109a (0.003) -0.049a (0.003) -0.047a (0.003) -0.046a (0.003) 
2-1 
    
-0.049a (0.002) -0.024a (0.002) -0.020a (0.002) -0.023a (0.002) 
3 
    
0.048a (0.004) 0.021a (0.003) 0.023a (0.004) 0.022a (0.004) 
Other 
    
-0.011 (0.010) -0.013c (0.007) -0.034a (0.009) -0.012 (0.008) 
UG Degree Duration Three Year 
    
0.057a (0.006) 0.023a (0.004) 0.038a (0.005) 0.025a (0.005) 
Four Year 
    
0.004 (0.005) -0.002 (0.004) -0.002 (0.005) 0.000 (0.004) 
Teaching funds per student5 
    
-0.002 (0.007) -0.005 (0.007) -0.009a (0.003) -0.004 (0.007) 
Occupation of Employment Professional 
      
-0.144a (0.005) -0.158a (0.006) -0.147a (0.005) 
Lower Professional 
      
-0.068a (0.005) -0.075a (0.005) -0.069a (0.005) 
Admin. & Secretarial 
      
0.169a (0.005) 0.179a (0.005) 0.168a (0.005) 
Skilled  
      
0.231a (0.014) 0.236a (0.015) 0.224a (0.014) 
Personal Service  
      
0.145a (0.007) 0.153a (0.007) 0.138a (0.007) 
Sales & Customer Service 
      
0.298a (0.006) 0.307a (0.007) 0.291a (0.006) 
Process & Plant Operatives 
      
0.294a (0.015) 0.296a (0.016) 0.284a (0.015) 
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Cont. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Elementary 
      
0.301a (0.007) 0.308a (0.008) 0.294a (0.007) 
Unknown 
      
0.027 (0.021) 0.059b (0.026) 0.048c (0.026) 
Dom. Econ. Characteristics5, 12 Unemployment 18-246 
        
-0.091 (0.080) -0.021 (0.083) 
 
Average FT Earnings7 
        
0.003 (0.009) -0.020 (0.020) 
 
Low Occupation Vacancies8 
        
-0.007a (0.003) -0.004 (0.004) 
 
Manag. & Prof. Vacancies8 
        
0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) 
 
Total Employment9 
        
0.009a (0.003) 0.025 (0.030) 
 
RSL Rent10 
        
0.045a (0.012) -0.032 (0.038) 
 
Working Age Population11 
        
0.003 (0.002) 0.001 (0.096) 
Inst. Econ. Characteristics5, 12 Unemployment 18-246 
        
0.009 (0.012) -0.050a (0.016) 
 
Average FT Earnings7 
        
-0.065c (0.037) 0.046 (0.038) 
 
Low Occupation Vacancies8 
        
-0.003 (0.008) 0.001 (0.007) 
 
Manag. & Prof. Vacancies8 
        
-0.006 (0.005) 0.000 (0.005) 
 
Total Employment9 
        
0.020c (0.012) -0.065 (0.070) 
 
RSL Rent10 
        
0.026 (0.033) 0.261a (0.070) 
 
Working Age Population11 
        
-0.008 (0.006) 0.566a (0.154) 
Emp. Econ. Characteristics5, 12 Unemployment 18-246 
        
-0.021a (0.003) -0.029a (0.007) 
 
Average FT Earnings7 
        
-0.081a (0.013) 0.001 (0.026) 
 
Low Occupation Vacancies8 
        
0.007b (0.003) -0.002 (0.004) 
 
Manag. & Prof. Vacancies8 
        
0.003 (0.002) 0.000 (0.003) 
 
Total Employment9 
        
0.002 (0.005) -0.017 (0.039) 
 
RSL Rent10 
        
-0.060a (0.015) -0.023 (0.046) 
 
Working Age Population11 
        
0.010a (0.003) -0.080 (0.100) 
Controls & Observations Year FE YES – (5) YES – (5) YES – (5) YES – (5) YES – (5) YES – (5) 
 
Institution*Subject YES – (1,761) YES – (1,761) YES – (1,700) YES – (1,700)  YES – (1,696) 
 
Industry of Employment FE 
   
YES – (16) YES – (16) YES – (16) 
 
Firm Size FE 
   
YES – (5) YES – (5) YES – (5) 
 
Domicile TTWA FE 
    
 YES – (297) 
 
Employer TTWA FE 
    
 YES – (297) 
 Observations 454,562 454,562 440,357 439,346 402,083 402,083 
Note(s): (1) Dep. Var. is binary, taking a value 1 if the student reports being over-educated. (2) Std. Errors in brackets, clustered at the inst*sub level. (3) Excluded categories include male, white, state-school educated, Higher Manag. & 
Prof. background, Managerial role in their first job, achieved third-quartile sch. results, Third Class degree, 2005/06. (4) These variables are quasi-continuous. (5) These variables are continuous. (6) Measure of unemp. is the natural 
logarithm of the number of people aged 18-24 who are claiming Job Seekers Allowance. (7) Av. FT Earnings are the natural logarithm of per hour earnings. (8) Low Occupation Vacancies and Manag. & Prof. Vacancies are defined 
from Job Centre Plus data, see Section 4.3. (9) Total Emp. is the natural logarithm of total employment from the Annual Business Inquiry. (10) RSL Rents are the av. rents in each Local Authority District in Great Britain aggregated to 
TTWA level and expressed in as the natural logarithm of av. weekly rents. (11) Working Age Pop. is the natural logarithm of the working age pop. in each TTWA taken from the Mid-Year Population Estimates. (12) These variables are 
defined at the TTWA level. (13) a, b and c indicate significance at the 1%, 5% & 10% levels respectively. 
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whom find evidence of a significant difference between males and females. This 
difference seems likely to stem from the relatively more detailed set of control variables 
included in this analysis. 
The results also suggest significant variation in mismatch propensities between 
different ethnic groups. Table 4.2 adds detail to previous findings, suggesting that those 
Black students who do find employment are 1.1% to 2.8% more likely to be 
mismatched than equivalent white students, as are students from Other non-white ethnic 
groups (0.8% to 1.5%).  
 The impact of socio-economic background varies across the estimated 
specifications. In (2) and (3), students from less wealthy backgrounds appear to be 
significantly more likely to be over-educated in their first positions relative to students 
from Higher Managerial & Professional backgrounds. In specification (3), students 
whose parents are in the Semi-routine occupational groups are 2.0% more likely to be 
over-educated in their first job, while students from the lowest two occupational groups 
are 2.6% more likely to be mismatched.  
 However, the effect of socio-economic background diminishes in both size and 
significance with the introduction of job-specific variables. Controlling for the 
occupation, industry and size of the student’s chosen firm reduces the magnitude of five 
of the seven socio-economic group coefficients by more than half, suggesting a 
correlation between student background and the job opportunities which they access. In 
specification (6), just four socio-economic group variables are significant, each 
contributing less than 1% to the probability of a student being over-educated.  
 A similar pattern of attenuation is apparent among the estimated effects of 
academic background. In (3), First Class (Upper Second Class) undergraduate degree 
students are 10.9% (4.9%) less likely to be mismatched than Lower Second Class 
students, while attendance at a Private school is associated with a 2.3% reduction in the 
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probability of being over-educated. After the inclusion of job characteristics all of these 
effects remain significant, but are substantially attenuated.  
These results are consistent with a process of endogenous selection into labour 
market openings, in which academically stronger students, students from relatively 
wealthy backgrounds and those from Private schools are best placed to access jobs 
which make use of their skills, even after controlling for the unobservable 
characteristics common to students on each university course. 
 
4.4.3 Spatial labour markets and over-education 
 
Specifications (5) and (6) in Table 4.2 report the impact of labour market conditions 
around the student’s domicile, their institution and their eventual labour market of 
employment, on the probability of mismatch. In (5), the impact of economic conditions 
is estimated in terms of level effects. Specification (6), unlike prior work in the field 
(Frank 1978, McGoldrick and Robst 1996, Büchel and Battu 2003, Büchel and van 
Ham 2003), introduces controls for the common, time-invariant unobserved 
characteristics of residence, moving the coefficients towards a more causal 
interpretation.  
 While several economic characteristics of domicile are significantly correlated 
with the likelihood of mismatch in (5), the results in column (6) suggest that after 
controlling for residential selection, economic conditions in the student’s domicile 
TTWA make no significant contribution to the probability of over-education. This 
finding is consistent with a substantial literature which reports that relatively highly-
qualified people are thought to be among the most mobile section of the population. 
Students from relatively unfavourable areas may simply not return after graduation 
(Faggian and McCann 2006, Faggian, McCann and Sheppard 2006, 2007a, 2007b).  
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 In contrast, economic conditions around the student’s institution appear to play a 
greater role in determining graduate outcomes. Higher youth unemployment has a 
negative impact on the probability of mismatch, while the positive, significant 
coefficient on the cost of renting suggests that students from areas with growing 
housing costs are significantly more likely to be over-educated in their first job. This 
second result in particular is consistent with individuals accepting inappropriate 
employment as a means of servicing a growing stock of housing-related debt. 
 Finally, the relatively large impact of economic conditions around the student’s 
eventual employer is substantially reduced following the inclusion of controls for 
residential selection. Where five coefficients are significant at conventional levels in 
specification (5), only one retains its size and significance in (6). Further research is 
needed to establish whether this result is a consequence of the relatively short time 
period used here.  
 
4.5 Limitations 
 
Given recent criticism of work in the over-education field, the empirical ambitions of 
this paper are constrained to the safest econometric ground. Using a comprehensive set 
of controls my approach has tried to limit the impact of unobserved individual 
heterogeneity arising through endogenous selection into universities and residential 
areas. This approach allows a more causal interpretation of the coefficients than earlier 
papers. 
 The limitations of the analysis concern several issues raised in Section 4.1.
35
 
Firstly, my results do not control for selection into the labour market as others have 
sought to do (Dolton and Vignoles 2000). If, as seems plausible, the individuals who 
                                                          
35 A survey of supporting empirical work intended to address some of these issues is 
included in Appendix 4A. 
206 
 
choose to enter into employment are a non-random sample of the student population, 
then parameter estimates may be biased and inconsistent.  
 Secondly, even if the students included in my analysis are representative of the 
population, there remains the potential for significant differences in unobserved 
characteristics within each fixed effects group. This effect may be particularly important 
given the subjective nature of the mismatch indicator. The maintained assumption that 
an individual’s propensity to report themselves mismatched is independent of all 
observed non-employment characteristics may not hold. In particular, perceived or 
actual labour market discrimination directed towards observably different groups may 
influence their propensity to report themselves mismatched.  
Thirdly, the data offers a single snap-shot of student activity six to nine months 
after graduation, which limits our analysis to students’ first destinations. As more data 
becomes available for single cohorts at multiple points through time (Abreu, Faggian 
and McCann 2010), panel data methods which substantially mitigate the effect of 
unobserved individual heterogeneity offer significant scope for further work.  
 Finally, a concern for this work and other papers in the field is that the analysis 
here simply detects the different jobs that individuals are doing within a given firm. 
This risk is greatest if, as seems likely, students with better academic qualifications and 
stronger innate ability are appointed to the most challenging positions in an 
organisation, while weaker students tend to be appointed to ‘easier’ positions. Future 
work should (1) include as many characteristics of the job as possible and (2) ensure 
that there are sufficient observations in each cell for inference. This second condition is 
especially challenging, as for effective analysis the data must contain within-cell 
variation in over-education status which is unlikely in a regression which includes 
solely individuals who hold just one level of qualification.  
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To see this problem, suppose we run a regression of over-education status 
against individual characteristics and a set of dummy variables for each observed 
combination of industry, occupation, employer size and employer location. Unless there 
is variation in over-education status within each fixed effect group, then individual 
characteristics can have no role to play. 
 
4.6 Discussion and conclusions   
 
This paper set out to examine the factors which determine the probability of a student 
(a) finding employment after graduation and (b) entering a position for which their 
higher-level qualification was not a requirement. In the first case, students who are more 
successful in finding employment after graduation are likely to have a higher return, 
everything else equal. The second case concerns the ‘quality’ of the match between the 
graduate’s skills and their employer’s technology. Ex ante, students who achieve better 
quality matches in the labour market also seem likely to have a higher return.  
 Over-education is a difficult concept for economists. At an aggregate level, an 
increase in the supply of skills is expected to lead to a fall in the skilled wage and a 
consequent increase in demand. At the firm level, if a company has technology which 
does not exploit all of its worker’s skills and abilities then it is operating inside its 
production possibility frontier and – in the long run – will go out of business as other 
firms enter. At the individual level, workers who are confronted by employers who 
systematically under-use their skills cannot be earning their marginal product. The 
optimal strategy for these workers is to leave and join an employer who will use their 
skills and pay them their marginal product in return. Therefore, individuals should not 
find themselves permanently ‘over-educated.’  
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 To examine the incidence of over-education among recent graduates from 
British universities, this paper estimated a series of ordinary least squares regressions in 
the probability that (a) a student finds employment after graduation and (b) that he is 
mismatched in that employment. In so doing, this paper makes several contributions. 
Firstly, it offers a detailed micro-level analysis of graduate labour market outcomes in 
the UK. Secondly, it offers a critical discussion of research in this field and some 
guidance for further work. Thirdly, it controls for a broad array of possible sources of 
endogeneity. In particular, it attempts to control for both selection into courses based on 
common, time-invariant unobservables of students, and selection into labour market 
areas of domicile and employment.  
 Taken together, the results suggest that labour market outcomes for observably 
different students are markedly varied. While academic attainment is amongst the most 
important determinant of labour market success, the results also suggest that male 
students, students with disabilities and students from ethnic minorities are all 
significantly less likely to find employment after completing their undergraduate 
degrees. Students from lower socio-economic groups appear marginally more likely to 
enter employment than students from relatively wealthy backgrounds. 
 Alongside differences in employment propensities, the results also suggest that 
the quality of matches students achieve in the labour market varies significantly. After 
controlling for selection into university courses and academic attainment, students from 
relatively wealthy backgrounds are significantly less likely to be mismatched and 
appear more likely to enter high-level occupations. Students from ethnic minorities are 
significantly more likely to be mismatched, as are younger, male students. Local 
economic characteristics also appear to have a role in determining individual outcomes, 
although these effects are smaller in magnitude than personal characteristics. From a 
policy perspective, these findings raise questions about how graduates make the 
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transition from full-time study into employment. In particular they raise concerns about 
equality of access to graduate level positions for students from different ethnic groups 
and socio-economic backgrounds. 
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4A Appendix A: Unreported empirical work and results 
 
In addition to the results presented in this paper, several attempts were made to (a) unify 
the student’s choice of first destination within a single framework and (b) to find an 
appropriate exclusion restriction to allow me to estimate the impact of over-education 
on the initial wage. This section details these efforts and explains the reasons why they 
were abandoned. 
Upon graduation, students choose between three broad options: (a) to enter 
employment, (b) to continue to further study or (c) to remain outside the labour market. 
Students who enter employment are associated with a wage and provide an assessment 
of whether they are well-matched with their employer’s technology.  
 As set out above, Dolton and Vignoles (2000) argue that selection into the 
labour market is likely to be non-random, with detrimental consequences for parameter 
estimates based on an analysis of the sample of employed students. To control for 
labour market selection, attempts were made to develop a two stage model. In the first 
stage, students would choose whether to enter employment. In the second, the incidence 
of mismatch would be modelled, following Heckman (1979). This approach requires an 
exclusion restriction in the first stage: a variable which affects whether the student 
enters the labour market but not the quality of the job match. 
To that end, several candidate variables were tested. These included (1) the 
number of low-occupation job openings around the student’s undergraduate institution, 
(2) the level of rents around the student’s undergraduate institution and (3) the type of 
accommodation in which the student was housed during their undergraduate degree. In 
the first case, the number of low occupation job openings was proposed as a measure of 
the access each student had to low-skill employment opportunities. In the second and 
third cases, the intent was to capture how urgently a student needed a source of income. 
Students attending university in areas with rising rents, or in particular forms of housing 
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might have differing levels of housing-related debt. Students with larger debts might, 
logically, need employment more urgently to service that debt.  
Other candidate variables which were tested measured the attractiveness of 
further study. These variables – (4) average postgraduate fee levels, (5) the number of 
research students at each institution and (6) the league table rank of the institution – 
were intended to help identify the first stage through changes to the probability of 
further study. However, none of these variables approached the significance required to 
identify a second stage equation. 
To avoid identification problems, an alternative approach was attempted which 
collapsed the two stages into a single multinomial choice framework. In this 
specification, the student would choose between four options: (a) Further Study, (b) 
Well-matched Employment, (c) Mismatched Employment and (d) Unemployment. 
However, the only feasible estimation option for this framework was the multinomial 
logit, which requires the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption. This 
condition is unlikely to hold, as the probabilities of outcomes (c) and (d) in particular 
are likely to be correlated.  
Finally, in response to Leuven and Oosterbeek’s (2011) criticisms of the over-
education literature, a search was conducted to find an instrument for mismatch so that 
the wage penalty associated with over-education could be consistently estimated. This 
involved identifying a variable which influences the likelihood of over-education, but 
not the wage. Attention was again focussed on factors which might encourage students 
to enter employment – such as rental costs and types of housing. However, none of the 
tested variables had sufficient explanatory power to identify the second stage wage 
equation.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
This thesis considers three aspects of graduate behaviour in the light of differences in 
individual, academic and local economic characteristics. Using a substantial micro-level 
dataset, the three papers of this thesis examine graduate decisions about (1) the type of 
training to acquire at university level, (2) the level of university training to acquire and 
(3) the labour market outcomes which they achieve at the end of their studies. In each 
paper the methodology is designed to control as comprehensively as possible for several 
different forms of sample selection bias. This concluding section (1) briefly reviews the 
findings of each paper and synthesises them to draw some broader conclusions, (2) 
provides a discussion of some limitations of the work and (3) offers some thoughts for 
future study. 
 
5.1 The findings 
  
The three papers of this thesis examine the type and level of qualification to which 
students in higher education in the UK aspire and the labour market outcomes which 
they achieve following graduation. In the first paper (Section 2), each student’s choice 
of degree specialism is modelled as a function of their individual and academic 
characteristics, as well as conditions in their local labour market of domicile. The 
primary contributions of this paper include (1) an examination of degree choice using a 
highly disaggregated classification of academic fields, (2) providing a more rigorous 
empirical approach to pre-university sorting and (3) a carefully specified examination of 
the effects of local economic conditions, controlling for selection into areas of 
residence.  
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The results suggest that gender, ethnicity and prior academic attainment all have 
a significant impact on degree choice. Female students are more likely to take degrees 
in Biological Sciences, Languages, Linguistics & Classics and Law, while male 
students are more likely to study Mathematics, Engineering and Physical Science. 
Students from non-white ethnic backgrounds are concentrated in Business Studies, Law 
and Degrees Related to Medicine, although there is significant variation between ethnic 
groups and between male and female students within ethnic groups. Students who 
achieve higher school leaving grades are significantly more likely to take Mathematics, 
Medicine & Dentistry and Law degrees, while weaker students are concentrated in 
Business Studies, Art & Music and Biological Science. 
 The second paper (Section 3) extends the analysis of the first by modelling 
whether or not students choose to progress directly from their undergraduate studies to a 
higher, postgraduate degree as a function of similar individual, academic and local 
economic variables. Special attention is given to the role of postgraduate fees in 
determining the demand for course places above undergraduate level. The primary 
contributions of this paper include (1) the introduction of a large, new dataset of 
postgraduate tuition fees by subject and institution, (2) a detailed micro-level 
examination of participation in higher education above undergraduate level and (3) a 
more rigorous approach to controlling for selection effects arising from student sorting 
into universities and residential locations.  
 Building on limited prior work, the results of this paper again suggest that 
individual and academic characteristics play an important role in determining 
progression behaviour. Male students, students from ethnic minorities and students with 
disabilities are all significantly more likely to progress to postgraduate study, as are 
students who achieve more highly at undergraduate level. Adopting several different 
methods to estimate expected postgraduate tuition fees, the results of the analysis 
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suggest that fees have a significant, negative impact on the probability of a student 
choosing to progress to higher study. This result in particular carries implications for 
policy. 
The final paper (Section 4) moves away from examining the determinants of 
investment in human capital and instead considers the labour market outcomes achieved 
by graduates once their studies are complete. Building on prior work, this paper models 
the likelihood (a) that a student finds employment after graduation and (b) that their 
qualification was a formal requirement for their first, post-university labour market 
position. The primary contributions of this paper include (1) an extended critical 
discussion of the ‘over-education’ literature, (2) a contextual framework which 
highlights the empirical challenges of this field and (3) a limited micro-level assessment 
of the determinants of graduate labour market outcomes.  
The results of this paper suggest that even after controlling for several sets of 
common, time-invariant unobservable characteristics, graduate labour market outcomes 
vary markedly across observably different groups. Male students, younger students and 
students from ethnic minorities are less likely to find employment than female, older 
and white students respectively. Eliminating those students who pursue further study, I 
find that attendance at a Private school increases the likelihood that a student chooses 
not to be employed, while students who achieve greater academic success are more 
likely to be in work six to nine months after graduation. Female students and students 
entering higher level occupations in their first jobs are also significantly less likely to 
report that they are over-educated in their first labour market positions. 
Across all three papers, significant attention has been devoted to the impact of 
socio-economic background in determining individual level outcomes. Table 5.1 
summarises and collates these findings. In Panel A, the coefficients on socio-economic 
group dummy variables from several selected regressions of subject choice are shown. 
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Table 5.1: Socio-economic group effects1 
 
Lower 
Manag. & 
Prof. 
Intermed. 
Small 
Employers 
Lower 
Super. & 
Tech. 
Semi-
routine 
Routine, 
Unemp. 
Unknown 
Panel A: Subject Choice2 
Medicine & Dentistry (M) -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Medicine & Dentistry (F) -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.017*** -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.014*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Business Studies (M) 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.019*** 0.007 0.005 0.013*** 0.009*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) 
Business Studies (F) 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.021*** 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
History  (M) 0.002 0.000 -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.006*** 0.000 -0.004** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
History  (F) -0.001 -0.003 -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.003* -0.006** -0.007*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education (M) 0.001 0.003*** 0.002** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.001 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education (F) 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.003** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
 
Panel B: Progression Probabilities3 
Expected Fee Def [1] -0.005*** -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.018*** -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Expected Fee Def [2] -0.005*** -0.012*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.018*** 0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Expected Fee Def [3] -0.006*** -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.022*** -0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Expected Fee Def [4] -0.007*** -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.024*** -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
 
Panel C: Labour Market Outcomes 
Employment4 
0.005*** 0.012*** -0.005* 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009*** -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Mismatch (before controls 
for entry occupation)5 
0.005*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.026*** 0.011*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Mismatch (after controls 
for entry occupation)5 
0.001 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.005 0.005* 0.008** 0.007*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
Note(s): (1) Coefficients reported with standard errors in brackets underneath. (2) Dependent variable in these regressions is a binary 
variable taking a value one if the student chooses this subject, zero otherwise. Results from OLS regressions with fixed effects for 
schools and travel to work areas of residence. For other control variables see Appendix 2B. Standard errors clustered at the travel to 
work area level. (3) Dependent variable in these regressions is a binary variables taking a value one if the student is in full time study 
for a higher degree six to nine months after graduating with a first undergraduate degree. Results from IV regressions, Specification 
(12) for each definition of expected fees. Fixed effects for subject-institution combinations and travel to work areas of residence. For 
other control variables see Table 3.7, Appendix 3B, Appendix 3C, Appendix 3D and Appendix 3E. Standard errors clustered at the 
subject-institution level. (4) Dependent variable in this regression is a binary variable taking a value one if the student is in 
employment six to nine months after graduating. Results from OLS regression, Specification (5), see Section 4.4.1.  (5) Dependent 
variable in these regressions is a binary variable taking a value one if the student reported themselves mismatched in their labour 
market position at time of survey. Results from OLS regression including fixed effects for subject-institution combinations, and travel 
to work areas. See Section 4.4.2 for control variables. Standard errors clustered at the subject-by-institution level. 
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In Panel B, the estimated effects of socio-economic group on progression probabilities 
are shown for each definition of expected postgraduate tuition fees, while in Panel C 
their estimated impact on graduate labour market outcomes is summarised. 
 The results reported in Table 5.1 suggest that socio-economic background has a 
significant impact on all three aspects of graduate behaviour studied here. Students from 
higher occupational backgrounds are relatively more likely to take degrees in Medicine 
& Dentistry and History, and less likely to take Business Studies or Education degrees. 
Students from higher occupational groups are also significantly more likely to pursue 
higher study, even after controlling for academic achievement and expected 
postgraduate tuition fees. Finally, while students from less wealthy backgrounds are 
more likely to enter employment than students from the highest occupational groups, 
they are (1) significantly more likely to be mismatched in their positions and (2) appear 
less able to access Higher Managerial and Professional posts. Taken together, these 
results suggest that the well-established benefits of parental wealth persist beyond the 
completion of formal schooling into the early labour market experiences of young 
graduates in the UK.  
 Finally, as set out in the introduction, significant research attention has been 
devoted to a rigorous examination of the impact of local labour market conditions on 
graduate behaviour. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 offers a synthesis of the core results of this 
work. Panels A and B of Table 5.2 set out the impact of unemployment and earnings 
around the individual’s domicile on students’ degree choice and progression probability 
respectively. Table 5.3 sets out the impact of local economic characteristics around the 
individual’s domicile, institution and eventual employment location on graduate labour 
market outcomes. Each set of results is taken from the most complete, preferred 
specifications, which include a full set of fixed effects for each travel to work area of 
domicile (Table 5.2), institution and eventual employment (Table 5.3).  
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Table 5.2: Local labour market effects1 
TTWA region of: Domicile 
 
Unemployment Earnings 
Panel A: Subject Choice2 
Social Studies (M) 0.028*** 0.465*** 
 
(0.009) (0.045) 
Social Studies (F) 0.018** 0.392*** 
 
(0.007) (0.037) 
Mathematics (M) -0.031*** -0.262*** 
 
(0.009) (0.040) 
Mathematics (F) -0.002 -0.036** 
 
(0.003) (0.014) 
History (M) 0.038*** 0.372*** 
 
(0.006) (0.036) 
History (F) 0.021*** 0.233*** 
 
(0.005) (0.026) 
Art & Music (M) 0.026*** 0.286*** 
 
(0.006) (0.027) 
Art & Music (F) 0.018*** 0.323*** 
 
(0.006) (0.029) 
   
Panel B: Progression Probabilities3 
Expected Fee Def [1] -0.053** -0.012 
 
(0.025) (0.008) 
Expected Fee Def [2] -0.050** -0.012 
 
(0.025) (0.008) 
Expected Fee Def [3] -0.061** -0.014* 
 
(0.027) (0.008) 
Expected Fee Def [4] -0.051* -0.020** 
 
(0.027) (0.009) 
Note(s): (1) Coefficients reported with standard errors in brackets underneath. (2) Dependent variable in 
these regressions is a binary variable taking a value one if the student chooses this subject, zero otherwise. 
Results from OLS regressions with fixed effects for schools and travel to work areas of residence. For 
other control variables see Appendix 2B. Standard errors clustered at the travel to work area level. 
Unemployment here captures Youth Unemployment. (3) Dependent variable in these regressions is a 
binary variables taking a value one if the student is in full time study for a higher degree six to nine months 
after graduating with a first undergraduate degree. Results from IV regressions, Specification (12) for each 
definition of expected fees. Fixed effects for subject-institution combinations and travel to work areas of 
residence. For other control variables see Table 3.7 Appendix 3B, Appendix 3C, Appendix 3D and 
Appendix 3E. Standard errors clustered at the subject-institution level.  
Table 5.2 suggests that after controlling for selection into areas of residence, 
local labour market conditions play a significant role in determining individual student 
behaviour, although the magnitude of their impact is relatively small. Youth 
unemployment in the student’s travel to work area of domicile enters significantly in 13 
(10) of the nineteen detailed subject choice regressions for male (female) students, but 
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the estimated coefficients for both genders are very small. Average full-time hourly 
earnings appear to play a more substantial role in determining subject selection. 
Students from areas with growing incomes are more likely to take Social Studies, 
History and Art & Music degrees, while students from areas with relatively poor 
earnings growth are more likely to take degrees in Mathematics (males), Engineering 
(males) and Medicine & Dentistry (males and females). This result is particularly 
striking, as it suggests that students from areas of growing wealth are more likely to 
take arguably less vocational, arts subjects, while students from relatively less affluent 
areas are seeking the specific skill-sets associated with Medicine & Dentistry, 
Mathematics and Engineering. Combined with the significance of several estimated 
coefficients on the industrial composition of employment around student’s domicile, the 
results presented here suggest that labour market conditions play a significant if 
secondary role in determining degree choice. 
 Table 5.2 also presents some evidence that labour market conditions around the 
student’s domicile affect their probability of progression to a higher degree. Youth 
unemployment is significant at the five percent level in three of the four reported 
specifications and significant at the ten percent level in the fourth, suggesting that 
growing rates of youth unemployment reduce the probability that students progress to 
higher study. Average earnings appear to play a smaller role in determining progression 
rates, but are significant at the ten percent level or above in two of the four estimated 
specifications. Where previous research had found a positive relationship between 
unemployment and progression probabilities (Rice 1999, 2000), after controlling for 
selection effects the results presented here find the opposite: that students respond to 
uncertainty about the return to a higher qualification by choosing to enter the labour 
market rather than take on a costly course of higher study. Economic conditions around  
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Table 5.3: Local economic effects on labour market outcomes1 
TTWA of: Domicile Institution Employer 
 
Unemp Earnings Unemp Earnings Unemp Earnings 
Employment2 -0.010 0.017 0.006 0.013 
  
 
(0.065) (0.017) (0.014) (0.027) 
  
Mismatch3 -0.021 -0.020 -0.050*** 0.046 -0.029*** 0.001 
 
(0.083) (0.020) (0.016) (0.038) (0.007) (0.026) 
Note(s): (1) Coefficients reported with standard errors in brackets underneath. (2) Dependent variable in 
this regression is a binary variable taking a value one if the student is in employment six to nine months 
after graduating. Results from OLS regression, Specification (5), see Section 4.4.1. (3) Dependent variable 
in these regressions is a binary variable taking a value one if the student reported themselves mismatched 
in their labour market position six to nine months after graduating. Results from OLS regression including 
fixed effects for subject-institution combinations, and travel to work areas. See Section 4.4.2 for control 
variables. Standard errors clustered at the subject-by-institution level. 
the student’s institution were found to play no significant role in determining 
progression probabilities. 
 Finally, Table 5.3 shows the role which local economic conditions play in 
determining graduate labour market outcomes. Growing rates of unemployment around 
the student’s institution and eventual area of employment both significantly reduce the 
likelihood of mismatch, but the magnitude of this effect is of a similar order to that 
reported in Table 5.2. Average wages enter insignificantly in both the employment and 
mismatch regressions. 
 Taken together, these findings suggest that while there are significant effects of 
place, they are of second order importance to individual and academic characteristics 
such as gender, ethnicity and prior schooling success. After controlling for patterns of 
spatial sorting, local economic conditions make a marginal contribution to student 
choices, which instead tend to reflect the impact of the student’s own characteristics.  
 
5.2 Limitations 
 
As a discussion of specific limitations is included in each paper, this section is focused 
on three areas which present difficulties in each of the three chapters above. The first of 
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these arises from the problem of unobserved individual heterogeneity, which has the 
capacity to bias any or all of the coefficients estimated in each paper. In common with 
much research in labour economics, if there are relevant individual level characteristics 
which are both (a) unobserved and (b) correlated with other variables of interest, then 
the estimated coefficients on those variables of interest reflect both their causal impact 
and their covariance with the unobserved characteristic. To partially control for these 
effects, the papers presented here depend on three identifying assumptions. Firstly, I 
assume that all individuals on the same university course, from the same school or 
labour market area have a common set of unobservables. Secondly, I assume that these 
are time-invariant and thirdly, I assume that any remaining unobservable characteristics 
are orthogonal to the other explanatory variables. As has been set out at length, 
incorporating fixed effects for schools, subject-institution combinations and labour 
market areas enacts these assumptions empirically and helps to move the interpretation 
of the coefficients estimates closer to a causal effect.  
 However, this approach has several undesirable properties, among which a 
neglect of within group heterogeneity is possibly the most serious (Card 1999). To see 
this problem in the context of the first paper, consider two alternative systems for 
allocating students to secondary schools before students choose what subject to study at 
university. In the first case, students are imperfectly sorted into schools based on their 
ability, resulting in large differences in average ability across institutions. In the second, 
students are randomly assigned to secondary schools, causing average ability at each 
school to be equal. In the first case, the fixed effects condition out the average level of 
ability at each school and largely purge the subsequent analysis of omitted variable bias. 
In the latter case, introducing fixed effects also conditions out average ability, but as 
students within each school exhibit significant heterogeneity, the impact of above or 
below average ability remains. Consequently, this approach is most effective when 
231 
 
within school variation is less than between school variation. If, as is often the case, 
student assignment is more random than systematic, the effect of unobserved ability 
may remain.  
 The logic of this problem applies equally to the other variables used to define 
sets of fixed effects in the papers presented here. While students partially sort into 
university courses based on (imperfectly revealed) ability, the balance of within and 
between group variation by travel to work area presents some cause for concern. If, as is 
plausible, students vary more within travel to work areas than they do between travel to 
work areas, my subsequent analysis may still be affected by endogenous residential 
selection. In this light, the additional results reported in Section 2, which use postcode 
district level fixed effects, provide some reassurance. Using a much smaller spatial scale 
seems likely to shift the balance decisively in favour of greater between group variation, 
improving the effectiveness of the identification strategy. In practice, there are relatively 
few differences between the results from the two specifications.  
 The second identifying assumption I make – that the unobserved characteristics 
associated with selection into schools, university courses and labour market areas are 
constant over time – presents a second cause for concern. In the event of a school 
improving significantly or the return on a given university qualification changing 
significantly during the time period, the approach will fail to detect these differences 
which leads to further risk of parameter bias. To control for this problem, descriptive 
statistics were compiled on the observable characteristics of students at particular 
universities, from particular school types and from different labour market areas. While 
across-time variation in these characteristics appeared relatively slight, there remains a 
risk of temporal variation in unobservables.  
 The third limitation of the work presented here arises from uncertainty about the 
underlying causes of some of my estimated effects. While the results suggest that 
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students of different genders, ethnicities and from different socio-economic groups vary 
systematically in their behaviour, it remains unclear to what extent these differences 
reflect variation in preferences or constrained individual decision-making. These effects 
are particularly important as they have strong implications for policy.  
 
5.3 Future research 
 
In the context of the preceding discussion, several areas of research offer the potential to 
build on the findings presented in this thesis. Firstly, to address concerns about 
unobserved individual heterogeneity, many of the methods of labour economics 
reviewed in the first chapter have significant potential for future research (Card 1999, 
Angrist and Krueger 1999). Studies which can incorporate proxies for a student’s 
numerical ability, verbal reasoning or the results of cognitive tests into datasets such as 
those used here would help to assess the extent to which my results are affected by 
omitted variable bias. Equally, studies which build plausible identification strategies 
based on the different educational decisions of pairs of identical twins offer significant 
potential. Identification strategies based on within-pair variation in subject choice, 
postgraduate participation and labour market outcomes can expect to move even closer 
to estimating causal effects than can be achieved here. 
 The nature of the dataset used in this thesis limited the scope of my research to 
students who (a) chose to attend university and (b) completed their courses. 
Incorporating school level data offers a second area for future research. This would 
permit an examination of subject choice, postgraduate participation and labour market 
outcomes for marginal higher education entrants. Incorporating the likelihood of 
entrance to university after the completion of secondary school would allow researchers 
to understand whether marginal entrants make the same choices as other students. Do 
marginal entrants study the same subjects at the same institutions? Are they more or less 
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likely to remain in higher education beyond undergraduate level and how are they 
affected by tuition fees? Do they enjoy the same degree of success in the labour market? 
In the context of the recent rapid growth in the higher education sector, these issues are 
particularly important. 
 A third area for future research concerns more careful modelling work to address 
selection into university courses and into labour market areas of residence, institution 
and employment. The approach in this thesis has been to accept the choices individual 
students have made and to control for them using large arrays of fixed effects. Future 
work may develop a more detailed approach to these effects, specifically modelling the 
choice of university course or area of residence in a preliminary stage of analysis. Dahl 
(2002) offers one such study of the returns to education, conditional on a first stage 
model of residential choice among the states of the USA. This approach offers a more 
detailed insight into student behaviour than was possible here. 
 Finally, the results of this research suggest that graduate behaviour differs 
significantly across observably different groups. Students of different genders, ethnic 
groups and socio-economic backgrounds who achieve varying degrees of academic 
success choose to take different subjects, to a range of levels of study, with varying 
labour market outcomes. Future research should examine the extent to which these 
differences reflect variation in the underlying preferences of these groups, or 
constrained individual behaviour. 
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